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The Political Power of Nuisance Law:
Labor Picketing and the Courts
in Modern England, 1871-Present
RACHEL VORSPANt
INTRODUCTION

After decades of decline, the labor movements in
America and England are enjoying a resurgence. Unions in
the United States are experiencing greater vitality and
political visibility,' and in 1997 a Labour government took
power in England for the first time in eighteen years.! This
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B., 1967, University of
California, Berkeley; M.A., 1968, Ph.D., 1975, Columbia University (English
History); J.D., 1979, Harvard Law School. I would like to acknowledge the
assistance of Leslie Camacho, Dennis DaCosta, Matthew Diller, Martin
Flaherty, Bruce A. Green, Vivienne Hodges, Edward A. Purcell, Jr. and William
Treanor. Fordham Law School supported this project with a summer research
grant.
1. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, With Vigor, Labor Surges in Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at A16 (observing that "the emergence of unions in the
political calculations of both parties is largely a recognition of the growing
vitality of the labor movement after decades of decline"); Steven Greenhouse,
Unions, Growing Bolder, No Longer Shun Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1998, at
A12 (pointing to recent strikes as representing "a new aggressiveness on the
part of the nation's labor unions"); see also Juan Gonzalez, He's Got Labor Clout
Working Again, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 5, 1998, at 10 (commenting that John
Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO, is presiding over a "spectacular resurgence
of union militancy").
2. See Philip Webster, Landslide Victory for Labour, TIMES (London), May 2,
1997, at 1 (reporting on the Labour Party's "sensational landslide victory");
Philip Bassett, Wary Leader in Search of Unity and Influence, TIMES (London),
Sept. 6, 1997, at 30 (stating that Tony Blair's victory was central to the effort of
the Trades Union Congress to play "a new part in the life of Britain"); Philip
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phenomenon has prompted renewed interest in both
countries in the subject of labor law and the legal rights of
unionists. Many Americans are not aware, however, that
radically divergent historical developments in the two
countries have produced markedly different legal frameworks governing industrial relations.
In contrast to organized labor in America,3 trade unions
in England have traditionally eschewed legally enforceable
rights to strike, picket and bargain collectively in favor of
statutory immunities from legal liability. Between 1871 and
1906 Parliament created a self-regulating industrial
relations system that provided the basic framework for
English labor law until the 1980s. This regime of
"abstentionism" or "collective laissez-faire"4 afforded unions
legislative protection from various forms of criminal and
civil liability crafted by the nineteenth and twentiethcentury judiciary to hamper union activity.'
Bassett, Blair Will Head "Holy Trinity" of TUC Speakers, TIMES (London), June
16, 1997, at 13 (observing that "the trade unions are back in from the cold").
3. American unions, unlike their British counterparts, demanded and
obtained legal enforceability for collective bargaining agreements, rights to
organize and strike, and protection against employer unfair labor practices. See,
e.g., National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)); Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(1994)); see also Janice R. Bellace, Regulating Secondary Action: The British
and American Approaches, 4 COMP. LAB. L. 115, 116-19 (1981); Michael J.
Kiarman, The Judges Versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor
Law, 1867-1913, 75 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1594 (1989); Jeffrey A. Spector, Comment,
Replacement and Reinstatement of Strikers in the United States, Great Britain,
and Canada,13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 184, 184-85 (1992).
4. The phrase was coined in the 1950s by Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, Professor
of Comparative Law at the University of Oxford, to describe a regime where the
law "abstained" by parliamentary command from playing a regulatory role in
industrial relations. See Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour Law, in LAW AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

215, 224-44 (M. Ginsberg ed.,

1959) [hereinafter Kahn-Freund, Labour Law]; Otto Kahn-Freund, Legal
Framework, in THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 42, 10205 (A. Flanders & H. Clegg eds., 1954) [hereinafter Kahn-Freund, Legal
Framework]; see also PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LEGISLATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 8-59 (1993); Klarman, supra note 3, at 1593-94; K.W.
Wedderburn, Nuisance-Intimidation-Picketingin a Trade Dispute, 1960
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 163, 163-64.
5. For example, in the mid-nineteenth century the courts treated unions as
criminal conspiracies in restraint of trade. See, e.g., Hornby v. Close [1867] 2
Q.B. 153; R. v. Bunn, 12 Cox C.C. 316 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1872). However,
Parliament prohibited such actions in the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act. 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, § 3. In the 1890s and early twentieth
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Although this standard portrait of English industrial
relations is not inaccurate as far as it goes, it is incomplete
and misleading. By focusing on the system of specialized
common law liabilities and corresponding legislative
immunities, scholarly writing on English labor relations
has underestimated the extent to which the general law of
nuisance-both civil and criminal-served to regulate
industrial action in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The abstentionist perspective, in other words,
has obscured the consistent interventionism of judge-made
century, courts turned their attention to the civil law, developing doctrines of
civil conspiracy and union liability for the torts of members. See, e.g.,
Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (C.A.) (holding the officers of a union
liable for a "conspiracy to injure"); Trollope v. London Building Trades
Federation, 72 T.L.R. 342 (C.A. 1895) (holding unionists civilly liable for
publishing blacklists); Quinn v. Leatham [1901] App. Cas. 495 (H.L.) (approving
the principle in Temperton that a "conspiracy to injure" was actionable); Taff
Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants [1901] App. Cas. 426 (H.L.)
(holding unions liable in damages for the torts of their members). Parliament
again intervened in 1906, reversing these decisions in the Trade Disputes Act.
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, §§ 1, 3. After a lengthy period of
judicial passivity, in the 1960s the judges developed new causes of action
involving breach of contract. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard [1964] App. Cas. 1129
(H.L.) (finding tortious intimidation in a union's threat to call out members in
breach of contract); J.T. Stratford & Son v. Lindley [1965] App. Cas. 269 (H.L.)
(creating the tort of inducing breach of a commercial contract); Torquay Hotel
Co. v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106 (C.A.) (developing the tort of interfering with
the performance of a commercial contract). Common law civil actions for
conspiracy, inducing breach of contract and intimidation became known as
"economic torts." Parliament yet again responded with legislation that protected
union members against these new civil liabilities. See Trade Disputes Act, 1965,
ch. 48, § 4; Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (TULRA), 1974, ch. 52, § 14.
Thus the immunities generally represented legislative attempts to reverse
judicially-created union liabilities rather than an effort to confer "exceptional"
privileges on unionists. See, e.g., KEITH EWING, WAIVING THE RULES 146-47
(1988) (observing that the notion of privileges was an illusion because in
practice the torts applied only to unions and workers and Parliament
intervened only to remove laws of special application); Richard Tur, The
Legitimacy of IndustrialAction: Trade Unionism at the Crossroads, in TRADE
UNIONS 485, 485-86 (W.E.J. McCarthy ed., 2d ed. 1985) (remarking that
parliamentary action merely restored the status quo ante in the face of judicial
erosion of the immunities). See generally SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT,
TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, Cmnd. 8128, IT 34-101 (1981) [hereinafter TRADE
UNION IMMUNITIES]; Keith Ewing, Rights and Immunities in British Labour
Law, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 1, 1-10 (1988); Bob Simpson, Trade Union Immunities,
in LABOUR LAW IN BRITAIN 161 (Roy Lewis ed., 1986); K.W. Wedderburn, Labour
Law: Autonomy from the Common Law?, 9 COM. LAB. L.J. 219, 239-42 (1988).
This Article deals only with the application of general nuisance law to picketers,
not with the fluctuating fortunes of the specialized economic labor torts.
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nuisance law in determining the permissible bounds of
trade union activity. This article attempts to correct the
imbalance by exploring the significance of nuisance in the
history of modern English labor law. It argues that
scholars, by overlooking the general law, have exaggerated
the protection that the immunities conferred on unionists in
this period.
The impact of nuisance was especially decisive in
relation to picketing, a pivotal labor tactic that workers
embraced as their most powerful and galvanizing weapon.
Originating as a social phenomenon rather than a legal
concept,6 picketing was first used in a legal sense in 1867 to
refer to men stationed by a trade union outside an
employer's premises to publicize a strike and persuade
employees not to work.' Throughout the modern history of
union action picketing has been a significant factor in
determining the success or failure of strikes. Yet it was also
nuisance law, as well as the doctrines of the abstentionist
regime, that established the boundaries of lawful picketing.
During two explosive periods of industrial conflict-the
1890s through the 1920s, and the 1960s through the
1980s-courts greatly undermined picketing by adapting
and applying the general law of nuisance. By infringing
significantly on the ability of unionists to picket effectively,
6. See PEGGY KAHN ET AL., PICKETING: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES, TACTICS AND
THE LAw 42 (1983); REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE DISPUTES AND
TRADE COMBINATIONS, 1906, Cd. 2825, T 40 [hereinafter 1906 ROYAL
COMMISSION REPORT]. The word "picketing" was based on the military term for a
body of outlying troops on guard for the approach of the enemy. See ROBERT
TAYLOR, THE FIFTH ESTATE: BRITAIN'S UNIONS IN THE SEVENTIES 189 (1978). The

legal term for unlawful picketing was "watching or besetting." See infra note 22
and accompanying text.
7. R. v. Druitt, 10 Cox C.C. 592 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1867) (using the term
"picket" for the first time in a reported case); see JANE MORGAN, CONFLICT AND
ORDER 149 n.3 (1987). In 1869 the Royal Commission on Trade Unions defined

picketing as "posting members of the union at all approaches to the works
struck against, for the purpose of observing and reporting the workmen going to
or coming from the works, and of using such influence as may be in their power
to prevent the workmen from accepting work there." REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE ORGANIZATION AND RULES OF
TRADE UNIONS AND OTHER ASSOCIATIONS, ELEVENTH AND FINAL REPORT at xxi

(1869); see Jacob Finkelman, The Law of Picketing in Canada:1, 2 U. TORONTO
L.J. 67, 69 (1938) (noting that the main purposes of picketing were to publicize
the fact that a strike was in progress, to persuade workers to join the strike and
by moral persuasion or even physical obstruction to prevent them from going to
work).
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nuisance law played a critical and profoundly political role.
Nuisance doctrine presented several advantages as a
mechanism for regulating labor picketing. Most important,
it enabled courts to restrain unionists under the guise of
enforcing generic rules that purportedly governed all
segments of the population equally. Free from the taint of
anti-unionism attaching to specialized labor doctrines, it
proved uniquely serviceable to the government, police and
employers. In addition to its ostensible neutrality, nuisance
law proved extraordinarily malleable. As a legal category it
embraced a number of disparate concepts connected only by
indeterminate notions of "inconvenience" or "annoyance."
Private nuisance, a tort, protected a landowner's enjoyment
of property; public nuisance, a crime, safeguarded the
public's right to passage along the street. The breadth and
elasticity of these doctrines allowed courts to apply them to
picketing in unprecedented and ingenious forms. For example, during the first period of militant picketing in the
1890s, courts created a novel form of nuisance predicated
on the economic pressure that picketers exerted on employers. A century later, in the second major phase of industrial
volatility, courts fashioned another type of nuisance to provide relief to strikebreakers who suffered harassment from
unionists. Theoretically a generic rather than a labor doctrine, nuisance law nonetheless developed specialized forms
uniquely tailored to the phenomenon of labor picketing.
As nuisance law evolved into an effective instrument to
curtail picketing, the courts protected its expansion by
ensuring that labor nuisances were not subject to the
legislative picketing immunity. In other words, courts
elaborated and extended nuisance law while concomitantly
narrowing the statutory immunity precisely to place the
new picketing nuisances beyond the scope of parliamentary
protection. The focus of this Article is not the adverse
judicial treatment of unions, which is itself not a matter of
historical dispute.8 It is, rather, the complex process
8. Historians are in general agreement that most legal decisions were
antagonistic to unions in the nineteenth century and again after the 1960s. See,
e.g., BRIAN ABEL-SMITH AND ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 299300, 307 (1967); NoRMAN CITRiNE, TRADE UNION LAw 7-20 (2d ed. 1960)
(discussing nineteenth-century legal decisions); 1 H.A. CLEGG ET AL., A HISTORY
OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONS SINCE 1889, at 305-25 (1964); ALAN HARDING, A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 355-56, 408-11 (1966); OTTO KAHN-FREUND,
LABOUR AND THE LAW 246 (2d ed. 1977); NORMAN MANCHESTER, MODERN
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involving both common law adaptation and statutory
interpretation that courts utilized to inhibit picketing and,
further, the insufficiently appreciated role of nuisance in
this development.
This inquiry, a comprehensive historical study of the
impact of nuisance law on labor picketing in England,
comprises six sections. Part I introduces general principles
of labor law and nuisance law in the nineteenth century,
particularly the legislative scheme of "collective laissezfaire" that emerged after 1871 and remained relatively
intact until 1980. Part II examines the use of nuisance
doctrines against picketers in the first phase of confrontational picketing from 1889 to 1906, when the appearance
of militant unions representing unskilled workers stimuENGLAND 336-47 (1981); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF

LORDS AS A JUDIcIAL BODY, 1800-1976, at 93-98, 603-05 (1978); John Saville,
Trade Unions and Free Labour: The Background to the Taff Vale Decision, in
ESSAYS IN LABOUR HISTORY 317, 344-50 (Asa Briggs & John Saville eds., 1967);
Finkelman, supra note 7, at 68-69; Wedderburn, supra note 5, at 238; see also
infra notes 13, 93, 169. Much of the relevant material is usefully summarized
by Michael Klarman, who substantiates the courts' anti-union animus and
explores various causal hypotheses on the level of both "ideology" (the
adherence of the courts to nineteenth-century individualist ideas) and
"materialism" (the class bias of the judges). Kiarman, supra note 3, at 1487-90.
He concludes convincingly that the judiciary was indeed wedded to a philosophy
of unfettered individualism and that the adverse legal decisions also reflected at
least the judges' unconscious class prejudices and possibly also a conscious
desire to curb perceived threats to the established order. Id. at 1574-75. The
motivation of the judges is beyond the scope of this Article, which, moreover,
does not claim that the courts necessarily and in every instance exhibited
hostility to unions. In addition to a prolonged period of judicial passivity from
the 1920s to the 1960s, there were also pro-union decisions at other times,
including Connor v. Kent [1891] 2 Q.B. 545 (C.A.) and Allen v. Flood [1898] App.
Cas. 1 (H.L.) in the nineteenth century, and decisions by the House of Lords
reversing adverse rulings of the Court of Appeal in 1979-1980. See, e.g., Duport
Steels, Ltd. v. Sirs [1980] I.C.R. 176 (H.L.); Express Newspapers v. McShane
[1980] I.C.R 42 (H.L.); N.W.L. v. Woods, [1979] I.C.R. 867 (H.L.). Nor were the
judges necessarily out of step with public opinion; in both the 1890s and 1980s,
for example, a majority of the population shared their perception that the
unions were engaging in inappropriate and excessive behavior. See, e.g., Saville,
supra note 8, at 344-45 (suggesting that the anti-union decisions of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected and indeed followed public
opinion); DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 4, at 457 (observing that in the
1980s there was widespread public concern at the use of picketing as an
industrial tactic). The argument here is that the courts were consistently antiunion with respect to picketing particularly and that in volatile periods
nuisance proved an effective and underestimated mechanism to circumscribe
picketing activity.
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lated inventive judicial responses in both private and public
nuisance. Part III investigates the much heralded judicial
and legislative "triumphs" that unions enjoyed in 1906, and
it argues that both successes rested on flawed foundations
that unnecessarily exposed picketers to the vagaries of
nuisance law. Part IV explores the judicial treatment of
picketers between 1906 and 1980, a period when courts
widened public nuisance law and correspondingly restricted
the picketing immunity to defeat a series of new picketing
tactics. Part V considers the Thatcher government's efforts
in
the 1980s to dismantle the system of parliamentary
immunities
and the extent to which the political
environment encouraged the judiciary to refine nuisance
law as a tool against labor picketing. Finally, the
Conclusion analyzes the broader implications of the
relationship between nuisance law and larger social and
political developments, suggesting that nuisance wielded
considerable political power in regulating various forms of
organized popular protest in nineteenth and twentiethcentury England.
I.

LABOR LAW AND NUISANCE LAW IN VICToRIAN ENGLAND

A. The Legal Framework of IndustrialRelationsAfter 1871
In the United States and most western European
countries, workers have secured positive rights to strike
and engage in certain forms of industrial action.9 Conversely, labor law in England has traditionally been
premised on a series of legal immunities shielding participants in trade disputes from various forms of civil and
criminal liability." Although industrial action outside the
scope of an immunity was not necessarily unlawful-it was
permissible if not prohibited by the general law-most
forms of industrial action were in fact illegal without the
immunities." The ability to organize, bargain, strike or
picket has never enjoyed affirmative protection in England
on either statutory or constitutional grounds.'
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 240.
11. See TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supranote 5, $ 34.
12. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 233; Bellace, supra note 3, at 136;
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This unusual structure of English labor law reflected
the harsh judicial treatment of unions in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries and repeated efforts by
Parliament to redress their unfavorable status at common
law. During most of the Victorian period, the judiciary
viewed organized combinations of workers as criminal
conspiracies in restraint of trade and held individual

picketers liable for violence, threats, obstruction, molestation and intimidation." Capturing the anti-union animus

Lord Wedderburn, IndustrialRelations and the Courts, 9 INDus. L.J. 65, 70-71
(1980). The fact that positive labor rights did not exist in England was not
unusual in itself, because there also were (and are) no affirmative rights for
freedom of speech, assembly or other civil liberties that enjoy constitutional
status in the United States. Rather, "liberty" lay in the interstices of the law, in
the sphere of behavior that was not prohibited. See Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Gay v. Powell, 52 L.T.R. (n.s.) 92, 94 (Q.B. 1884); K.D.
EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN
BRITAIN 9 (1990); KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 254; A.V. Dicey, On the Right
of Public Meeting, 1889 CoNTEMP. REV. 508, 508. What was unique in the labor
context was that unions themselves consistently rejected the creation of positive
rights. Even in the 1970s, with the election of the third Labour government
since World War II, the Labour Party never seriously considered replacing the
immunities with a positive law approach. See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note
4, at 369; Wedderburn, supranote 5, at 240-42.
13. Between 1800 and 1825 unions were both criminal conspiracies in
restraint of trade at common law and prohibited by the Combination Acts of
1799 and 1800. Combination Act, 1799, 39 Geo. 3, ch. 81; Combination Act,
1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 106. The Combination Act of 1825, however, protected
unions against criminal conspiracy if they avoided five types of wrongful
conduct-violence, threats, intimidation, molestation and obstruction-when
committed with the intention of coercing the will of another. Combination Act,
1825, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129; see CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 43-44; W. MANSFIELD
COOPER, OUTLINE OF INDUSTRIAL LAW 302-04 (1947). Nonetheless, as the courts
developed the principles of common law conspiracy, the existence of a
combination to peacefully persuade workers to leave their employment
converted an otherwise non-criminal act into a criminal threat, obstruction or
molestation. See, e.g., R. v. Duffield, 5 Cox C.C. 404 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1851); R. v.
Rowlands, 5 Cox C.C. 436 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1851). Thus, although combinations
to raise wages and even to strike were technically lawful, it was unlawful to
threaten an employer that such a strike would take place or even to persuade
others by peaceful picketing to participate in it. See I.M. CHRISTIE, THE
LIABILITY OF STRIKERS IN THE LAW OF TORT 24-25 (1967); CITRINE, supra note 8,

at 8; W. HAMISH FRASER, TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIETY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
ACCEPTANCE, 1850-1880, at 186-87; K.W. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE
LAW 211-12 (1965). The Molestation of Workmen Act of 1859 mitigated the rigor
of the law by providing that no person merely by virtue of peaceably persuading
another to refrain from working to obtain a higher rate of wages or lower hours
of work was guilty of "molestation" or "obstruction." Molestation of Workmen
Act, 1859, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 43. However, judicial interpretation again
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of the courts, Baron Bramwell declared in 1867 that
picketing was lawful if it did not "coerce" or "annoy," but it
was illegitimate if it had "a deterring effect on the minds of
ordinary persons"-for instance, by exposing non-striking
employees "to have their motions watched, and to encounter
black looks." 4 In the same year, however, the new electoral
power of urban workingmen conferred by the Second
Reform Act prompted the government to appoint a Royal
Commission to investigate the status and activities of trade
unions. 5 Labor supporters ably presented their case, and
when the Commission recommended a favorable legal
status for unions, 6 Prime Minister William Gladstone
agreed to introduce pro-union legislation. The result was
organized labor's first significant parliamentary successthe Trade Union Act of 1871.17
Rather than declaring unions to be lawful entities, the
Act confirmed that they were unlawful bodies in restraint of
trade but granted them a special protective immunity. 8
Beatrice and Sidney Webb explained that rendering unions
legal in the usual sense would merely have brought them
"under the general law, and subjected them to constant and
harassing interference by the Courts of Justice." 9 Trade
undermined statutory intent. See, e.g., Walsby v. Anley, 121 Eng. Rep. 536
(Q.B. 1861); Shelburne v. Oliver, 13 L.T.R. (n.s.) 630 (Q.B. 1866); Springhead
Spinning Co. v. Riley, 6 L.R.-Eq. 551 (1868); Finkelman, supra note 7, at 75.
The legal position of the unions was thus precarious when the Royal
Commission took up the matter in 1867.
14. R. v. Druitt, 10 Cox C.C. 592, 601-02 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1867).
15. The immediate precipitants of the appointment of the Commission were
the growth in trade union membership, the occurrence of "outrages" by
unionists at Sheffield and Manchester, and the adverse judicial decision of
Hornby v. Close [1867] 2 Q.B. 153, which denied legal protection to union funds
because unions were entities in unlawful restraint of trade. See, e.g., ASA
BRIGGS, VICTORIAN PEOPLE 181-83 (rev. ed. 1970); CITRINE, supra note 8, at 10;
CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 44; MANCHESTER, supra note 8, at 337-38; HENRY
PELLING,

A HISTORY OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM 58-59 (3d ed. 1976).

16. The legislation was based on a Minority Report signed by Frederic
Harrison, Thomas Hughes and the Earl of Lichfield. See BRIGGS, supra note 15,
at 188-90; CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 45; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB,
THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 270 (rev. ed. 1935); Finkelman, supra note 7,
at 78-79.
17. Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 31.
18. The 1871 Act prohibited prosecutions for criminal conspiracy in
restraint of trade, id. § 2, and provided that internal agreements to which union
members were a party, including collective bargaining agreements, were valid
but legally unenforceable, id. § 3.
19. WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 271.
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unions had grown despite the law and lawyers, and "the
spirit of the one and the prejudices of the other were, and
still are, alien and hostile to the purposes and collective
action of the Trades Societies.""0 Only an express statutory
immunity, trade unionists believed, would remove the
threat of legal action and provide sufficient independence
from the courts.
The immunized status of unions as entities, however,
came at a heavy price. To balance the new protection,
Parliament increased the criminal penalties for individual
picketers engaging in certain forms of industrial action. The
Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLAA), also passed in 1871,
prohibited the use of violence, threats, intimidation,
molestation or obstruction with a view to coerce an
employer or workman.2' The statute deemed molestation or
obstruction to include unlawful gicketing, technically
known as "watching or besetting." Judges and magistrates, applying nuisance concepts of inconvenience and
annoyance to interpret the statutory language, readily
found picketers guilty of molestation or obstruction. For
example, Mr. Justice Brett in Regina v. Bunn23 defined
"molestation" as annoyance or interference that "would be
likely, in the minds of men of ordinary nerve, to deter them
from carrying on their business according to their own
will."24 Similarly, Regina v. Hibbert25 held that a molestation

would arise where picketing caused "feelings of annoyance"
or "some apprehension of loss or ruin."26 These and other

cases subjected picketing to so many legal constraints that

27
they effectively prohibited it.

20. Id. Mere legalization, they concluded, "would place the most formidable
weapons in the hands of unscrupulous employers." Id.
21. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 32.

22. Id. § 1. "Molestation" and "obstruction" were also deemed to include
persistently following someone from place to place, hiding tools or other
property and following a person with others in a disorderly manner through any
street or road. The 1871 Act repealed the Acts of 1825 and 1859. Id. § 7.
23. 12 Cox C.C. 316 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1872).
24. Id. at 340. It found a threat to strike by London gas stokers to be, if not
a criminal conspiracy in restraint of trade, nonetheless a conspiracy to coerce.
Id. at 350. The court sentenced the union members to twelve months at hard
labor. Id. at 351.
25. 13 Cox C.C. 82 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1875).
26. Id. at 87. The unionists were sentenced to a month in prison. Id.
27. See CHRISTIE, supra note 13, at 26-28; FRASER, supra note 13, at 192;
WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 283-85. According to the Webbs, in 1871 seven
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As the influence of classical economic theory declined
and unions gained in political strength, however, such
restrictive judicial attitudes grew increasingly discordant
with public opinion. Agitation from the new Trades Union
Congress (TUC), particularly its Parliamentary Committee,
helped induce the Conservative Government in 1875 to
sponsor further remedial legislation.28 The resulting
statute, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of
1875 (CPPA),29 confirmed the ability of workers to organize

and to strike. It introduced a "golden formula" providing
that no combination to do or procure any act "in
contemplation or furtherance of "a trade dispute" was
punishable as a criminal conspiracy unless the act itself
was independently punishable as a crime."
In the critical area of picketing, unions achieved
another signal success. 3 ' Although section 7 of the CPPA
reenacted the CLAA's prohibition against "watching or
besetting,"32 it also created for the first time a wholly new
and explicit exemption for peaceful picketing. A proviso to
section 7 declared that "attending at or near" a house or
place of work "in order merely to obtain or communicate
information" should not be deemed an unlawful watching or
besetting." Moreover, by its terms section 7 was of general
women were imprisoned in South Wales under the statute merely for saying
'Bah" to a blackleg, and innumerable convictions took place for the use of bad
language. "Almost any action taken by Trade Unionists to induce a man not to
accept employment at a struck shop," they complained, "resulted, under the
new Act, in imprisonment with hard labour." Id. at 284.
28. See CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 45; PELLING, supra note 15, at 68-69;
HENRY PELLING, POPULAR POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN 72
(2d ed. 1979); Kiarman, supra note 3, at 1497; H.W. McCready, BritishLabour's
Lobby, 1867-75, 22 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 141, 148 (1956). The Trades
Union Congress was formed in 1868, the Parliamentary Committee three years
later. PELLING, supranote 15, at 65-66.
29. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86.
30. Id. § 3; see WEDDERBURN, supranote 13, at 214.
31. The significance of picketing was underscored in an 1878 statement by
George Howell, the first secretary of the TUC: "[lilt is very frequently resorted to
in the event of a strike, or lockout, it is disliked and condemned by the masters,
justified and practised by the men, and is constantly discussed in the press, and
often the subject matter of a prosecution in our courts of law." GEORGE HOwELL,
THE CONFLICTS OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR 323 (London, Chatto & Windus 1878).
32. 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, § 7(4).
33. In view of its significance, section 7 is worth quoting in full:
Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain
from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to
do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority,-(1)
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application and not confined to employees participating in a
trade dispute, a feature that unions considered symbolically
important. As the trade union leader George Howell
declared, the statute had "liberated the working men of

England from the last vestige of the Criminal Laws

specially appertaining to labour."4 The CPPA engendered
remarkable unanimity of approval in press and Parliament,
and the TUC enthusiastically declared that the emancipation of the unions was "full and complete."35
Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or
children, or injures his property; or (2) Persistently follows such other
person about from place to place; or (3) Hides any tools, clothes, or
other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of
or hinders him in the use thereof; or (4) Watches or besets the house or
other place where such other person resides, or works, or carries on
business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place; or,
(5) Follows such other person with two or more other persons in a
disorderly manner in or through any street or road; shall, on conviction
thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction, or on indictment as
hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding
twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three
months, with or without hard labour. Attending at or near the house or
place where a person resides, or works, or carries on business, or
happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, in order merely
to obtain or communicate information, shall not be deemed a watching
or besetting within the meaning of this section.
Id. § 7 (repealed and replaced by Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, §§ 241, 300(1)). The proviso to section 7 of the CPPA was
later replaced with the more expansive section 2(1) of the Trades Disputes Act
of 1906. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 2(1); see infra note 145 and accompanying text.
34. GEORGE HOWELL, LABoUR LEGISLATION, LABOUR MOVEMENTS AND LABOUR
LEADERS 385 (1902); see R.J. Coleman, Sit-Ins and the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act 1875, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 610-11. On the symbolic
importance of the general nature of the CPPA, see 225 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.)
1582-83, 1588 (Aug. 20, 1875); Klarman, supra note 3, at 1496; McCready,
supra note 28, at 159. The Eighth Annual Trades Union Congress in 1875
carried a vote of thanks to the Home Secretary for steering the labor act
through Parliament. HOWELL, supranote 34, at 385. As it turned out, however,
the CPPA was virtually never applied outside the industrial context. Since 1875
prosecutions have been brought in only two reported cases involving nonindustrial disputes. D.P.P. v. Fidler [1992] Crim. L.R. 91 (Q.B.) (anti-abortion
protesters); D.P.P. v. Todd [1996] Crim. L.R. 344 (Q.B.) (demonstration against
construction of motorway).
35. Quoted in McCready, supra note 28, at 160; see FRASER, supra note 13,
at 195; PELLING, supra note 15, at 70. As the degree of legal emancipation
exceeded what most employers or lawyers thought appropriate, Home Secretary
Cross had to dissipate opposition from other cabinet members. The government
supported the bill because Disraeli believed that it would gain for Conservatives
the lasting affection of the working classes. See ROBERT BLAKE, DIsRAELI 533
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The TUC's view was hardly prescient. A strong
individualist tradition inhering in the common law
vigorously resisted the collectivist values communicated to
Parliament through electoral pressures. 6 Section 7's
proviso, while immunizing peaceful picketing from the
criminal penalties for watching or besetting set forth in the
section itself, did not shield it from the operation of the
general law. As a result, the general law of nuisance
emerged as an effective vehicle by which courts could
undermine the protection of the picketing exemption.
B. The Law of Nuisance
Two types of nuisance, public and private, delimited the
scope of permissible picketing. Public nuisance consisted of
"an act not warranted by law, or an omission to discharge a
legal duty, which obstructed or inconvenienced the public in
the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's
subjects." 7 The common right implicated by picketing,
which typically took place on a "highway, 3 8 was the right to
travel without interference along the street. 9 This right to
passage-probably the only positive English common law
right4 -reached almost mythic proportions in the nine(1968); ALAN Fox, HISTORY AND HERITAGE: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 156 (1985).

36. See Fox, supranote 35, at 161.
37. C.H.S. Fifoot, Criminal Law, in 4 STEPHEN'S COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 150-51 (G.C. Cheshire ed., 19th ed. 1928). The Commentaries
identified four types of public nuisance: (1) interference with public health or
comfort; (2) acts dangerous to public safety; (3) acts against public morality; and
(4) interference with public rights of passage. Id.; see, e.g., CLERK & LINDSELL ON
TORTS 24-01 (16th ed. 1989); WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 353-54 (W.V.H.
Rogers ed., 11th ed. 1979).
38. A "highway" was a strip of private land that contained an easement for
public passage. See HAROLD PARRISH & GERALD PONSONBY, PRATT AND
MACKENZIE'S LAW OF HIGHWAYS 3-14 (20th ed. 1962). The term applied to
streets, roads, footpaths, alleys, lanes, carriageways, bridlepaths, rivers, bridges
and tunnels. Id.
39. See, e.g., PAUL DAvIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LAW: TExT AND
MATERIALS 842-43 (2d ed. 1984); Hazel Carty, The Legality of Peaceful Picketing
on the Highway, 1984 PUB. L. 600, 614; Fraser P. Davidson, An OriginalIrish
Joke, 33 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 341, 347-48 (1982); Peter Wallington, Injunctions and
the "Rightto Demonstrate," 1976 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 82, 97-98.
40. See, e.g., MICHAEL SUPPERSTONE, BROWNLIE'S LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER AND
NATIONAL SECURITY 38 (2d ed. 1981); PETER THORNTON, PUBLIC ORDER LAW 89
(1987).
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teenth century.4
The right to passage was enforced both through the
common law crime of public nuisance and various national
statutes and local regulations. A common law charge of
public nuisance for obstructing passage could be brought in
three ways: by the Crown in a criminal proceeding; by the
Attorney General in a civil suit for an injunction; or by a
private individual (whether possessing an interest in land
or not) in a tort action for "particular damage" based on
infringement of the public right.42 The statutory equivalent
of common law nuisance was the offense of willful
obstruction under the Highways Act.43 All public nuisance
actions required proof of an unreasonable obstruction, but
this condition was easily satisfied. Any stationary activity
in the street, even of a merely partial or potential nature,
to
sufficed for obstruction,44 and conduct unrelated
4 5
"legitimate passage" was necessarily unreasonable.
Private nuisance, in contrast, was a common law tort
involving interference with an owner or occupier's use and
enjoyment of land.4" In picketing cases this generally meant
a suit by an employer-the owner or occupier of the
picketed premises-against strikers for physically blocking

41. See Rachel Vorspan, "FreedomofAssembly" and the Right to Passage in
Modern English Legal History, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921 (1997).
42. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Storr, 9 L.R.-C.P. 400 (1874); R.F.V. HEUSTON &
R.S. CHAMBERS, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 26 (18th ed.

1981); Gilbert Kodilinye, PublicNuisance and ParticularDamage in the Modern
Law, 6 LEGAL STUD. 182 (1986); J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Critical
Examination, 1989 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 66.

43. The statutory offense, contained in section 72 of the Highways Act 1835,
5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 50, and substantially reenacted in section 121 of the Highways
Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 25, and section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, ch. 66,
prohibited anyone from willfully obstructing the highway without "lawful
authority or excuse." Except for its remedies, the statutory violation was
identical to the common law offense; the element of willfulness was a
superfluity. See Arrowsmith v. Jenkins [1963] 2 Q.B. 561. References in this
Article to common law nuisance should therefore be read broadly to include
cases where judges interpreted the requirements of the Highways Act.
44. See, e.g., Gill v. Carson and Nield [1917] 2 KB. 674, 677-78; Homer v.
Cadman, 16 Cox. C.C. 51 (Q.B. 1886); R. v. United Kingdom Elec. Telegraph
Co., 176 Eng. Rep. 33 (Q.B. 1862); R. v. Train, 121 Eng. Rep. 1209 (Q.B. 1862).
45. See Harrison v. Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 Q.B. 142 (C.A.); see also
Hickman v. Maisey [1900] 1 Q.B. 752 (C.A.).
46. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. P.Y.A. Quarries, Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 169; WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 37, at 353, 355; F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of
Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 480, 482 (1949); Spencer, supra note 42, at 57.
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the facility's entrance.47 In the late nineteenth century,
however, courts created a form of nuisance applicable only
to picketing, one that wholly abandoned the requirement of
even potential physical obstruction. This new conception of
private nuisance was central in determining the legality of
strike action, and it represented the judiciary's most
inventive response to the "new unionism" that emerged in
the century's final decade.
II. THE NEW UNIONISM AND THE POWER OF NUISANCE:
1889-1906
A. The "New Unionism"
For fifteen years, while craft unions dominated the
labor landscape and an inhospitable economy buffeted the
working classes, the CPPA provoked little controversy. As
George Howell observed, between 1875 and 1890 there were
"few complaints as to the operation of such laws. "4 "The
Labour laws were accepted by the public as the rightful
thing," he commented; "and they rejoiced that one irritating
subject had been got out of the way."49 Strikes and picketing
were infrequent, prosecutions were comparatively few, and
neither employers nor unions felt any impetus toward law
reform."
The period of quiescence dissolved, however, in the late
47. For example, in the well-known case of Regina v. Hibbert, the Recorder
charged the grand jury to consider not merely whether there was force or
intimidation of those "passing to and fro" but also whether the evidence showed

that "defendants were guilty of obstructing and rendering difficult of access the
prosecutor's place of business." BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, COPY OF THE
CHARGE OF THE RECORDER TO THE GRAND JURY, 1875, H.C. 273, at 3 [hereinafter

GRAND JURY CHARGE]; see, e.g., Judge v. Bennett, 52 J.P. 247, 248 (Q.B.D. 1888);
EDWARD BENSON, THE LAW OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 209-10 (1988); DAVIES &

FREEDLAND, supra note 39, at 843; SARAH MCCABE & PETER WALLINGTON, THE
POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 31 (1988); Wallington, supra note
39, at 98.
48. HOWELL, supranote 34, at 387.
49. Id. at 389.
50. See, e.g., CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 305; Klarman, supra note 3, at
1498. Unions nonetheless carefully monitored the operation of the CPPA
picketing exemption. In 1886 the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC
reported to the Congress that the value of the proviso was "a point to which any

future committee will not fail to give vigilant attention, should it arise in a
court of law." TRADES UNION CONGRESS, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1886).
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1880s. Encouraged by the revival of trade and the spread of
socialist ideology, militant labor leaders mounted a
successful campaign to organize semi-skilled and unskilled
workers. 5' In 1889 alone, 200,000 workers previously
considered impervious to recruitment efforts-dockers, gas
workers, tramwaymen and unapprenticed laborers-joined
new unions. Between 1888 and 1890, the TUC membership
increased by 650,000.52 The London dock strike of 1889
became the public symbol of the new unionism, and the
following
nine years saw eleven more substantial stop53
pages.

The new unionism spurred audacious and provocative
strike tactics. As the President of the TUC told the
Congress in 1891, "in many cases, the workman cannot get
attention until he stops the wheels."54 Stoppages were
difficult to achieve in unskilled industries because replacement labor was readily available. Nonunion workers did not
ordinarily pose a serious threat to skilled workers such as
51. See CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 89-91; G.D.H. COLE & RAYMOND
POSTGATE, THE COMMON PEOPLE, 1746-1946, at 425-40 (1961); Fox, supra note
35, at 175; HENRY PELLING, THE ORIGINS OF THE LABOUR PARTY, 1880-1990, at
78-98 (2d ed. 1965). George Howell described the aggressive recruiting policy as
"not let them all come, but you must all come, into the union." HOWELL, supra
note 34, at 449.
52. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, The "New Unionism" Reconsidered, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 1880-1914,
at 13, 17 (Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Hans-Gerhard Husung eds., 1985);
Klarman, supra note 3, at 1499. The overall size of the trade union movement,
including both new and old unions, increased from 750,000 at the beginning of
1889 to 1.5 million in 1892 and to 2 million in 1900. CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8,
at 97; see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR, FIFTH AND FINAL REPORT, pt. I,
1894, C. 7421, T 68 [hereinafter 1894 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT].
53. CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 55. According to Eric Hobsbawm, between
1889 and World War I British industrial relations underwent a qualitative
transformation. In addition to the formation of "new" unions and eventually the
Labour Party, these two decades saw the first effective employers'
organizations, the first national industrial disputes, the first central
government intervention in strikes and the first public expressions of concern
about the possible adverse effects of unions on the competitive position of the
economy. Hobsbawm, supra note 52, at 15-16.
54. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1891).
Similarly, Earl Wemyss told the House of Lords that whereas for the old unions
a strike was a last resort, the new unions were of a totally different character:
"So far from discouraging strife, the new Unionism fosters strife." 351 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 351-52 (Mar. 6, 1891). Picketing inevitably involved abuses
because it "represents the power of the Union that is at its back-the coercive
will of those men by whom it is directed." Id.
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cotton spinners or boilermakers, but in casual or semiskilled trades an effective strike required an elaborate
system of militant picketers to obstruct the inevitable
supply of alternative labor.5 In 1894 the Royal Commission
on Labour reported that the unskilled laborers' lack of a
natural monopoly promoted a tendency toward "violent
methods of action" to prevent substitute workers, known as
"free laborers," from replacing striking unionists.
Initially, public opinion was sympathetic toward more
combative union tactics because of widespread recognition
that unskilled laborers suffered from depressed working
conditions.57 Tolerance soon waned, however, when unions
became more disruptive and strikers began to inflict serious
damage on the economy. Many contemporaries believed
that work stoppages severely undermined Britain's economic
struggle
against
German
and
American
competition.58 As the conflict between "free labor" and the
new unions accelerated in the 1890s, picketing law assumed
a new importance. Employers sought relief in the courts,
and the conservative judiciary,
reflecting the altered mood,
59
willingly came to their aid.
B. JudicialResponse: Lyons v. Wilkins
Beginning in the 1890s judges decided a growing
number of cases adversely to unions, developed new civil
torts to replace the doctrine of criminal conspiracy, and

55. See CLEGG ET AL., supra note 8, at 94; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB,
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 719 n.1 (1965); Kenneth D. Brown, Trade Unions and
the Law, in A HISTORY OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1875-1914, at 116,
120-21 (Chris Wrigley ed., 1982); Saville, supra note 8, at 318-19.
56. 1894 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52,
79, 95.
57. See, e.g., PELLING, supranote 15, at 106; Saville, supra note 8, at 322.
58. See Fox, supra note 35, at 180; PELLING, supra note 15, at 109-10;
Hobsbawm, supranote 52, at 16; Saville, supranote 8, at 318-19.
59. John Saville has pointed out that in adopting an anti-union stance in the
1890s, the courts merely echoed public and parliamentary hostility toward the
unions:
In the decade after 1889, the Courts followed, at only a short distance
of time, the changes in public opinion towards the trade unions; and it
is instructive to match, argument for argument, the attacks upon trade
unions in the press and in Parliament, and the obiter dicta of the
judges in decisions the result of which was the steady whittling away of
the legal rights of the unions.
Saville, supranote 8, at 344-45.
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increasingly used injunctions to restrain strikes." Even
more significant, the House of Lords, in its landmark Taff
Vale decision,6 allowed employers to sue a union in a
corporate capacity for damages allegedly caused by union
officers. Judges also demonstrated continuing hostility
toward picketing by harshly interpreting the criminal
provisions of section 7 of the CPPA.62 Although in 1891
Baron Bramwell informed the House of Lords that there
was "nothing unlawful in picketing provided that it is
lawfully practised," in his view it was never so practiced.
Rather, it invariably inflicted an "intolerable wrong" on
both non-striking workers and the community at large. 3
Responding to the judicial assault, the TUC passed
annual resolutions demanding amendment of the CPPA to
safeguard the right to picket. 64 A speaker at the 1893
Congress insisted that the law must be modified because
trade unionists "did not want to be at the mercy or will of
any judge or any magistrate who might be prejudiced
against them."65 Similarly, the following year a delegate
voiced a widely shared conviction of workers when he

bitterly charged that the Act was "constructed almost in

every case according to the wish, whim, or desire of the

60. For example, the Court of Appeal reformulated criminal conspiracy as a
new civil tort of "conspiracy to injure." The doctrine first appeared in Temperton
v. Russell [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (C.A.), where the court held officers of a union who
boycotted a struck employer's supplier liable for maliciously coercing others to
break a contract and for forming a "conspiracy to injure." See, e.g., Trollope v.
London Building Trades Federation, 72 T.L.R. 342 (C.A. 1895) (holding
unionists civilly liable for publishing lists of blacklegs); Quinn v. Leatham
[1901] App. Cas. 495, 506 (H.L.) (approving the principle in Temperton that a
"conspiracy to injure" was actionable); CHRISTIE, supranote 13, at 32; CLEGG ET
AL., supranote 8, at 308-09; Saville, supra note 8, at 345.
61. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants [1901] App. Cas.
426 (H.L.).
62. See, e.g., M'Kinlay v. Hart [1897] 2 Adam 366 (H.C.J.); Clarkson v.
Stuart, 32 Scot. L. Rep. 4 (H.C.J. 1894); Agnew v. Munro, 18 R.(J.) 22 (1891).
63. 351 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 371-72 (Mar. 6, 1891). He commented that
it would not be worth the trouble to picket unless it "inspire[d] terror." Id. at
372. Baron Bramwell's view of picketing was received favorably by the Law
Times, which observed that the "object of 'picketing' in every recorded case has
been, not the collection of information, but the coercion of other men."
Comment The Law and the Lawyers, 85 LAW TIAIES 333, 333 (1888).
64. See TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 43-44
(1893); TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1894);
TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 23, 37-38 (1896);
TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 21-22, 43 (1897).
65. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1893).
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judge, who might be interested or prejudiced."66
Soon thereafter trade union anxiety turned to horror
when the Court of Appeal handed down its 1896 and 1899
decisions in Lyons v. Wilkins." Addressing the interplay
between nuisance, picketing and the CPPA, the court
significantly altered the law in two respects. First, it
expanded common law private nuisance to apply to peaceful
picketing. Second, it simultaneously limited the section 7
picketing immunity for "attending to communicate information" to exclude precisely the peaceful conduct that it
had designated a private nuisance. The court thus
consigned all effective trade union behavior to the territory
of nuisance at the same time that it interpreted nuisance in
an unprecedented way to encompass the activity of peaceful
picketing.
Lyons involved a strike by the Amalgamated Trade
Society of Fancy Leather Workers against J. Lyons & Sons,
a London leather goods manufacturer. Four picketers in
relays of two approached persons entering and leaving the
premises, persuading employees not to work for the
company and distributing cards asking people not to apply
for work pending resolution of the dispute. Despite the fact
that the unionists did not issue threats or commit acts of
violence, Mr. Justice North granted the company an
interlocutory injunction restraining the picketing."
In March 1896 the Court of Appeal upheld the
injunction on the theory that the picketers were present
"not merely to obtain or communicate information," which
the section 7 proviso expressly permitted, but also to "put
pressure" upon the employers by persuading people not to
work for them.7" Sir Nathaniel Lindley conceded that the
1870s legislation did legalize strikes to a certain point, but
in his view the union had gone beyond communication and
66. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1894);
see Brown, supranote 55, at 120-21.
67. [1896] 1 Ch. 811; [1899] 1 Ch. 255.
68. [1896] 1 Ch. at 812, 825.
69. Id. at 818. Although the CPPA was a criminal statute, employers could
bring a civil action for an injunction to restrain threatened or continuing
breaches of the section. See, e.g., Ward, Lock & Co. v. Operative Printers'
Assistants' Soc'y, 22 T.L.R. 327, 329 (C.A. 1906) (stating that if unionists were
guilty of a section 7 offense, "the plaintiffs would have a good cause of action by
civil process"); R.Y. HEDGES & ALLAN WINTERBOTTOM, THE LEGAL HISTORY OF
TRADE UNIONISM 120 (1930).
70. [1896] 1 Ch. at 825-26.
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prevented the company "from carrying on their business
upon such terms as they may choose."7 Parliament had not
conferred upon unions the power to exert such pressure, he
insisted, even though a strike would likely fail without it. 2
As he bluntly and pragmatically told the union's counsel at
the argument, "[y]ou cannot make a strike effective without
doing more than is lawful."" The first Lyons decision thus
interpreted the immunity literally to include "communication" but not "persuasion"-the latter being the essence
of effective picketing-and found that acts of persuasion per
se violated the CPPA's watching or besetting clause.
Three years later the second Lyons decision, which
reviewed the grant of a perpetual injunction against the
union, 4went beyond interpreting the CPPA and introduced
a radical new theory of private nuisance. Lord Lindley, now
Master of the Rolls, ruled that the picketers' peaceful
conduct, by "seriously interfer[ing] with the ordinary
comfort of human existence," supported a common law
nuisance action.75 Such a nuisance was not immunized
because section 7's proviso did not shield picketers from
nuisance and in any event protected only communication
and not persuasion. Further, even if the picketers had not
committed a nuisance, they remained liable for the crime of
watching or besetting under the CPPA. The unionists had
argued that the prefatory language in section 7, which
required that an alleged act be done "wrongfully and
without lawful authority," contemplated that no person
could be found guilty of a CPPA offense unless the same act
also constituted an "independent illegality" such as
nuisance. Rejecting that contention, the court held that the
watching or besetting offense demanded only evidence that

71. Id. at 822. Lord Kay agreed that it was illegal to picket the company to
persuade workers not to work "in order to compel Messrs. Lyons to come to
their terms." Id. at 831.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 820. In a subsequent letter to The Times, Lord Lindley said that to
speak of peaceful persuasion was little less than "cant and hypocrisy." 167 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 280 (Dec. 12, 1906).
74. Mr. Justice Byrne's judgment of February 1898 echoed the 1896 opinion.
Picketing was lawful only if confined to obtaining or communicating
information, and picketing to persuade was an actionable watching and
besetting. [1899] 1 Ch. at 257.
75. Id. at 267.
76. Id. at 268-69.
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"proves the acts themselves.""
The second Lyons opinion thus encompassed two major
issues, one involving construction of the CPPA and the
other the scope of common law nuisance. On the CPPA
issue, the majority concluded that the phrase "wrongfully"
did not require an "independent illegality" such as nuisance
to ground a section 7 offense. Further, it found that the
immunity's protection extended only to communication but
not persuasion.78 On the common law issue, the court found
the picketers guilty of nuisance because peaceful picketing
inevitably interfered with the "ordinary comfort of human
existence." The majority thus agreed that picketing to
persuade was per se an unlawful watching or besetting
offense under section 7 and, in addition, per se a common
law nuisance independent of section 7.
Lyons was a ground-breaking decision in all respects. It
interpreted the CPPA in a wholly unexpected and highly
dubious manner, and it announced a novel departure in
nuisance law. With respect to the CPPA, Lyons distorted
the statute's purposes because Parliament's express
objective in 1875 had been to immunize "peaceful
persuasion." Lord James of Hereford, who had sat in
Parliament during consideration of the bill, later clearly
recalled the course of debate. When he and others moved an
amendment to include an explicit exemption for peaceful
picketing, the government assured members on the
authority of the Lord Chancellor that the protection they
sought "was to be found within the Bill."79 Indeed, the
77. Id. at 267. Lord Justice Chitty concurred. To watch and beset a man's
house in the manner at issue, he announced, undoubtedly constituted "a
nuisance of an aggravated character" as well as a section 7 violation. Id. at 27172. Attending to persuade was not within the proviso, id. at 271, and watching
or besetting was in itself unlawful, id. at 272. Sir Vaughan Williams concurred
in the result because he felt bound by the earlier Lyons decision, but he
dissented from the view espoused by the majority. In his opinion, persuasion in
the form of communication was covered by the proviso if it was not a nuisance.
In addition, the statute required an independent illegality to ground an offense
under section 7; that is, "wrongfully" essentially meant committing a nuisance.
Id. at 273. Finally, a common law watching or besetting might or might not
amount to a nuisance, and there were no facts in the present case to indicate
that persuasion was a nuisance. Id. at 273-74.
78. Id. at 272-73.
79. 166 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 718 (Dec. 4, 1906). Similarly, Lord
Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor, recollected that Home Secretary Cross stated in
the House of Commons that an amendment was "quite unnecessary" because,
as the bill stood, "picketing would be lawful for the purposes of peaceful
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administration in 1875 agreed to illustrate the Act's
purpose by circulating to magistrates throughout the
country a recent jury charge by the Recorder of London, Mr.
Russell Gurney, explicitly declaring persuasive picketing to
be a lawful act."0 In 1906, when Parliament rectified the
statutory ruling of Lyons by expressly adding the phrase
"peaceful persuasion" to the picketing immunity, it viewed
itself at a minimum as restoring the law enacted in 1875.81
The Solicitor General announced to the House of Commons
that the new statute was necessary because the law on
peaceful picketing had been "abrogated by the Law
Courts." 2 Lyons thus disproved the general belief that
peaceful picketing to persuade was already protected by the
picketing exemption.
persuasion." Id. at 693; see 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 306 (May 14, 1902);
226 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 715 (Aug. 7, 1875) (containing statement by
Secretary of War Gathorne Hardy-made after an M.P. moved for the addition
of "or peaceably to persuade"--that "it was clear peacefully persuading was not
illegal, and there could therefore be no object in inserting the words in the
Bill"); see also V. Henry Rothschild, Government Regulation of Trade Unions in
GreatBritain:II, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1938).
80. GRAND JURY CHARGE, supra note 47. The charge was rendered in the
case of Regina v. Hibbert, where the Recorder of London stated that
"persuading others not to work" was something parading picketers had "a right
to do." Id. at 2. Picketers did not, however, have a right to obstruct passage to a
business or conspire by terror or intimidation to deprive men of their free will.
Id. at 3. The Home Secretary stated in Parliament that the Recorder's charge
was the law of the land and that no future misunderstanding could arise after
its circulation to the magistrates. See 225 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 676 (May 4,
1875); 626 PARL. DEB. H.C. (3d ser.) 716 (Aug. 7, 1875) (containing Home
Secretary's declaration that the law he wanted was that laid down in the charge
of the Recorder of London); 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 279 (May 14, 1912)
(containing M.P.'s comment that the charge of Russell Gurney had been quoted
as authoritative by the Lord Chancellor in introducing the CPPA).
81. See 164 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 155 (Nov. 5, 1906). In 1902 Sir Robert
Reid, later Lord Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor, stated that allowing picketers
peacefully to persuade was the object and effect of the 1875 Act, and that until
1898 it had always been considered lawful to station picketers to exercise
peaceful persuasion. 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 306 (May 14, 1902). Lyons
was "one of the first deadly blows given to the effectiveness of strikes by recent
decisions." Id.
82. 155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1492 (Apr. 25, 1906).
83. As the labor mediator G.R. Askwith later noted, there had been "almost
a parliamentary contract that peaceful persuading should be allowed," but
nonetheless it had not been allowed since Lyons. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE
DISPUTES AND TRADE COMBINATIONS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1906, Cd. 2826, T
413 [hereinafter 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES OF EVIDENCE]. He also noted
that in testimony before the 1894 Royal Commission not a single witness had
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In addition to its revolutionary interpretation of the
CPPA, Lyons introduced a radical view of nuisance. Prior to
the decision private nuisance did not encompass economic
pressure on employers. As an M.P. remarked, when the
Court of Appeal declared in Lyons that peaceful picketing
interfered with the ordinary comfort of human existence, it
altered "what the whole legal profession had always
believed to be the law."' Indeed, the few authorities on
which the court relied were wholly inapposite, involving
noise from animals or the discharge of particles into the
air.85 Lyons' definition of nuisance to include a peaceful
attempt at economic pressure, even regardless of whether
such pressure was successful, incorporated into the common
law a new variety of nuisance peculiar to industrial
relations. It extended a theory about the physical
enjoyment of property into the entirely dissimilar territory
of competitive activities interfering with commercial
interests. 5
An obvious response to the new unionism, Lyons
significantly enhanced the range of options available to
employers by treating picketing as a section 7 violation and,
more critically, by expanding the scope of nuisance. In
limiting the immunity to "communication," it made acts of

104, 110; Klarman, supra
suggested that peaceful persuasion was illegal. Id.
note 3, at 1515 (commenting that Lyons exploded the common understanding
that peaceful persuasion was lawful); Case Comment, 12 L.Q. REV. 201, 201
(1896) (observing that Lyons' equation of persuasion with watching or besetting
was "not the law Parliament intended to make").
84. 108 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 306 (May 14, 1902); see id. at 318-19, 326.
85. See, e.g., Walter v. Selfe, 64 Eng. Rep. 849 (Ch. 1851) (smoke, vapors and
floating substances from burning bricks); Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 25
(Ex. Ch. 1862) ("corrupted air" from burning bricks); Crump v. Lambert [1867] 3
L.R.-Eq. 409 (Ch.) (noise, smoke and effluvia from neighboring iron factory);
Broder v. Saillard [1876] 2 Ch. D. 692 (dampness and noise from adjoining
stables); see also Carty, supra note 39, at 611; Davidson, supra note 39, at 349;
Finkelman, supranote 7, at 97-99.
86. The almost metaphysical nature of this form of nuisance is underscored
by the fact that in the area of industrial pollution, the damages required for a
plaintiff to prevail in nuisance against a manufacturing enterprise in the
nineteenth century reached virtually a trespass standard. It required direct and
visible physical interference with property as well as a diminution in property
value. Mental discomfort was not cognizable under the theory of "trifling
inconveniences." See, e.g., Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the
IndustrialRevolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 413-14 (1974). The picketing cases
accommodated industrial entrepreneurs in a converse fashion, by lowering the
threshold of injury required for employers to sue strikers.
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persuasion vulnerable to nuisance, and at the same time it
redefined nuisance so that acts of peaceful picketing
constituted nuisance per se. While scholars have devoted
considerable attention to the holding that an "independent
illegalityI was not necessary to ground a section 7 CPPA
offense," the court's rulings on nuisance law and the scope
of the immunity were far more significant. The judicial
approach of widening nuisance law and concomitantly restricting the picketing exemption became standard practice
in the twentieth century, and it affected the right to picket
far more broadly than did judicial construction of the rarely
used CPPA offense of watching or besetting."
C. Nuisance Law in Action: From Lyons to the Trade
DisputesAct of 1906
Trade unionists immediately recognized the serious
threat that Lyons posed to picketing. In 1896 the TUC's
Parliamentary Committee warned that judges "had
seriously checkmated" accepted methods of picketing and
recommended that trade unionists "lose no time and leave
no stone unturned" to place the laws "on a sounder and
more satisfactory basis." 9 The following year a Congress
resolution declared that recent legal decisions revealed
"considerable bias on the part of some of our judges and
juries" and that under the present state of the law it was
87. See, e.g., Francis Bennion, Mass Picketing and the 1875 Act, 1985 CRI.
L. REV. 64, 67-69; Brian Bercusson, One Hundred Years of Conspiracy and
Protection of Property: Time for a Change, 40 MOD. L. REV. 268, 275 (1977);
Coleman, supra note 34, at 614-15; Charles D. Drake, The Right To Picket
Peacefully:Section 134, 1972 INDus. L. J. 212, 213-14 ; Finkelman, supra note 7,
at 97-99; see also sources cited infra note 134.
88. In fact, the CPPA was almost never used until the miners' strike of
1984-1985. See, e.g., EWING & GEARTY, supra note 12, at 109 (1990); Richard
Kidner, Lessons in Trade Union Law Reform: The Origins and Passage of the
Trade Disputes Act 1906, 1982 LEGAL STuD. 34, 35 n.3; P.A. Thomas & P.N.
Todd, Mass Picketing:R.I.P., 1985 NEW L.J. 379, 379.
89. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1896).

Counsel to the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC similarly stated that the
decision made it "exceedingly difficult to conduct a strike with any degree of
success without doing illegal acts." 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 298 (May 14,
1902). In the same vein, J. Macdonald, secretary of the London Trades Council,
declared in 1901 that "the right to picket has been attacked, and, thanks to
judge-made law, nearly abolished.'" HOWELL, supra note 34, at 478 (quoting
Macdonald); see Brown, supranote 55, at 120-21; Rothschild, supra note 79, at
1341.
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virtually impossible for union members to obtain "evenhanded justice."" Recognizing that "the most important
point in the whole question was where did they stand in
regard to picketing,"9 the Parliamentary Committee
determined to collect funds to appeal the case to the House
of Lords. 2 Lyons, union members agreed, was but the latest
example of a pervasive anti-union bias on the part of
judges. 3
90. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1897); see W.J.
SHAXBY, THE CASE AGAINST PICKETING 9 (London, Liberty Review 1897). The
1897 Congress also passed a resolution that "the law as administered by the
various judicial courts is totally opposed to the spirit of the Act." TRADES UNION
CONGRESS,

supra, at 43.

91. 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 298, 319 (May 14, 1902).
92. See id. The Chairman of the TUC, in his opening address in 1901,
declared that a definite pronouncement was needed by the House of Lords on
that most "vital question" of picketing. Id. at 298. Probably a solicitor's errorfiling the petition a month too late-allowed the appeal to lapse. See CLEGG ET
AL., supra note 8, at 317 n.1; PELLING, supranote 51, at 200; B.C. ROBERTS, THE
TRADES UNION CONGRESS 165 (1958); Kidner, supra note 88, at 43 n.51. Many at
the time believed, however, that the case was not pursued on advice of counsel.
See 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 318 (May 14, 1902) (suggesting that the
appeal was abandoned because the union could not prevail on the nuisance
issue).
93. After Lyons the labor leader Keir Hardie stated in Parliament that
"there is some confusion in the minds of the judges" concerning peaceful
persuasion and that all labor asked was that the Act be amended so "that the
judges shall not be able to misunderstand or misconstrue its meaning." 108
PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 325 (May 14, 1902). He did not accuse judges of
being consciously biased, but "we say emphatically that the judges, being
human, are influenced by their environments, and that they unconsciously lean
towards the employers in giving judgment...." Id.; see also LORD ASKWITH,
INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS AND DISPUTES 95 (1981, orig. 1905) (observing that judges
found it difficult to overcome prejudices against unions and that unions were
therefore reluctant to trust the courts); A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION
BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
199 (1920) (commenting that nineteenth-century judges "believed that the
attempt of trade unions to raise the rate of wages was something like an
attempt to oppose a law of nature"); Fox, supra note 35, at 160-61, 179
(remarking on the individualism of the judges); HENRY PELLING, POPULAR
POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN 75-76 (2d ed. 1979) (noting the
judicial bias against unions); KIarman, supra note 3, at 1576-77 (stating that
trade unionists viewed Taff Vale, Quinn and Lyons as part of a judicial
conspiracy to cripple union power). By 1900 most of the judges had been
appointed by Lord Halsbury, who was well-known for his anti-union
sentiments. He was so partisan in his appointment of judges that he was
chastised by his own Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury. R.F.V.
HEUSTON, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS, 1885-1940, at 56-57, 75-76 (1964);
STEVENS, supra note 8, at 90-98. "The keen Labour man," Clement Attlee, a
Labour Prime Minister, later observed, "might well hang on his walls a portrait
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Labor fears were soon realized as employers took
advantage of the opportunities that Lyons created. After the
first Lyons decision, a group of influential employers formed
the Labour Protection Association and distributed to
magistrates, employers and constables a handbook entitled
The Case Against Picketing.94 The publication was aimed at
bringing prominently to employers' attention the new
strength of their legal position." In 1899 the employer
campaign produced a flurry of civil suits over union
resistance to the importation of free labor to break strikes.
The resulting decisions uniformly confirmed that picketing
was invariably unlawful as both a nuisance and a watching
or besetting.9 Charnock v. Court,97 for example, involved a
firm of Halifax master joiners that sought to break a strike
by transporting replacement workers from Ireland. The
union sent two men to the port of Fleetwood fifty miles
away to await the Irish steamer and offer to pay the fares of
the substitute workers if they went elsewhere to work.98
Relying on Lyons, the court held that the strikers picketed
at the port not to communicate but to "hold out
inducements" to the Irish to compel the masters "to conduct
their business in accordance with the requirements of the
[union] men."99 Similarly, Walters v. Green,'00 a case decided
a few months later also dealing with strikebreakers from
Ireland, enjoined two union members from picketing a
railway station in Hull because they attempted to compel
the employers "to conduct their business in accordance with
the views of the trade unions."'0 ' The courts thus identified
of Lord Halsbm7 alongside that of Keir Hardie." C.R. ATTLEE, THE LABOUR
PARTY IN PERSPECTIVE-AND TWELVE YEARS LATER 45 (1949).
94. SHAXBY, supra note 90, at 9; 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES OF
EVIDENCE, supra note 83, 3208; see Fox, supranote 35, at 192.
95. SHAXBY, supra note 90, at 38,42; see PELLING, supra note 15, at 111.
96. See, e.g., TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 38
(1896) (expressing concern about civil actions for injunctions after the first
Lyons decision); TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THMRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1897)
(same); see also FRANK BEALEY & HENRY PELLING, LABOUR AND POLITICS, 19001906, at 78-79 (1958); WEDDERBURN, supranote 13, at 233.
97. [1899] 2 Ch. 35. The court further found that "attendance" did not imply
any lengthy period of time nor have to occur at a place habitually frequented by
workmen. Id. at 39.
98. Id. at 36. Nine of thirteen men accepted the offer. See 1906 ROYAL
COMMISSION MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supranote 83, 116.
99. [1899] 2 Ch. at 38.
100. [1899] 2 Ch. at 696.
101. Id. at 702. The attorney for the plaintiffs stated that the action was
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unlawful pressure upon employers in even the most
peaceful
interactions
between
strikers
and their
replacements.
While employers profited from the Lyons decisions on
private nuisance, government officials exercised their power
to prosecute on grounds of public nuisance. A TUC delegate
remarked that recent civil decisions on picketing had given
"a direct encouragement to all magistrates, policemen, and
sheriffs throughout the country."' 2 For example, authorities
frequently arrested picketers for highway obstruction
during a major strike at the North Wales Penryhn quarries
between 1900 and 1903.03 The police employed public
nuisance and statutory obstruction more frequently than
the CPPA because the evidentiary requirements were less
rigorous, the offenses appeared more neutral, and the
Highways Act-the statutory equivalent of common law
public nuisance-contained a power of arrest.' Magistrates
invariably upheld police action against strikers brought on
the basis of nuisance. 5 Since 1898, an employer observed
with satisfaction in 1904, the magistrates had adopted "a
more wholesome and satisfactory method" of interpreting
picketing law.0 6 Another employer agreed that after Lyons
everything had "gone on quite smoothly." 7 Indeed, the
legal situation of the unions appeared grim in 1906.

founded on Lyons v. Wilkins, and the real injury "here, as there, is the common
design to put pressure on the plaintiffs." Id. at 700.
102. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, TWENTY-NINTH ANNuAL REPORT 38 (1896).
Even before Lyons, the police relied on obstruction of the highway to restrain
picketing by members of new unions. Evidence before the Royal Commission on
Labour indicated that the police often charged unionists in unskilled industries
who engaged in picketing activity with obstruction and annoyance. 1894 ROYAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, IT 164, 229.
103. See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 150.
104. Highways Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 50, § 79(2); see MORGAN, supra
note 7, at 151 (noting that the police failed to enforce the CPPA because they
had no powers of arrest under section 7 and because necessary evidence was
often unavailable after the fact).
105. WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 597 n.1 (observing that magistrates
sustained charges of obstruction of the highway against picketers).
106. 1906 ROYAL COMMiSSION MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 83, 3208.
He was pleased, in particular, that imprisonment with hard labor had become
the rule in sentencing. Id.
107. Id. 3844.

620

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

III. THE "DRAMATIC VICTORY" OF 1906: UNION TRIUMPHS ON
FLAWED FOUNDATIONS

Facing a harsh legal environment, trade unions began
to attract more sympathy in the early twentieth century as
Liberals realized that significant political benefits would
flow from the support of organized labor. Liberal politicians
began to pay heed to labor complaints that judicial
decisions, especially Lyons and Taff Vale, 10 8 unfairly
hamstrung union activity. As the future Liberal Prime
Minister H.H. Asquith acknowledged, picketers must necessarily "persuade or solicit those whom they are trying to
influence."' Similarly, R.B. Haldane, a Liberal lawyer and
future Lord Chancellor, complained that Lyons made it
almost impossible to conduct a strike lawfully. A striker
never imparted information for "any motive except that of
persuasion, " 110 he declared, and Lyons thus made the
108. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants [1901] App.
Cas. 426 (H.L.) compounded the unfavorable legal position of picketers under
Lyons by making the unions themselves corporately liable for the unlawful acts
of picketers. Indeed, Taff Vale itself was an action by a company against a trade
union and two of its officials for an injunction to restrain picketing; that is,
Lyons provided the substantive rule of liability applied in Taff Vale. Id. at 433.
In fact, it was only the issuance of the Lyons decision that encouraged Ammon
Beasley, the General Manager of the railway company, to seek an injunction
against the picketers in August 1900. See PHILIP S. BAGWELL, THE RAILWAYMEN:
THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF RAILWAYMEN 220 (1963). George

Howell observed in 1902 that Taff Vale "is the result of the New Unionism. It is,
in fact, retaliation by the employers-a significant protest against the intensely
militant spirit of modern trade unionism." HOWELL, supra note 34, at 479.
Testimony before the Royal Commission indicated that employers attributed
the passivity of the unions in the early twentieth century to Taff Vale. See 1906
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, 39; Klarman, supra note 3, at 1578.
However, the case also generated substantial support for a political labor party
and poisoned relations between the unions and the courts. See infra note 116.
109. 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 327 (May 14, 1902).

110. R.B. Haldane, The Labourer and the Law, 82 CONTEMP. REV. 362, 36970 (1903). Haldane added that, "[sipeaking for myself, I should be very sorry to
be called on to tell a Trade Union secretary how he could conduct a strike
lawfully. The only safe answer I could give would be that having regard to the
diverging opinions of the Judges I did not know." Id. at 368-69. In addition to
deploring the political and social biases of the judges, he lamented the lack of
clarity in the law. Id. at 371; see 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 321 (May 14,
1902) (observing that after the split decision in Lyons, "nobody to this hour
knows what is legal with regard to picketing, for there is obscurity as to
whether the law allows even peaceful persuasion"); see also id. at 326 (recording
Asquith's comment that the law was in "a confused and unsatisfactory state");
id. at 331 (containing Campbell-Bannerman's reference to the "state of

1998]

POWER OFNUISANCE LAW

621

CPPA's protection a "mere trap.""' Even the official Liberal
labor negotiator, R.G. Askwith, conceded that virtually
every action trade unions could pursue in the course of a
strike had been judicially tested "and not one of them has
been held to be such as could be employed in the interests of
labour.""'
With Liberal support, organized labor embarked on a
campaign to counter the adverse judicial rulings with
remedial legislation."' In 1903 A.J. Balfour, the Conservative Prime Minister, bowed to a demand that he appoint

a Royal Commission on the status of unions, but he failed to

name any labor representatives among its members."4 His
posture hardened unionists in favor of radical reform,
including outright reversal of Taff Vale and the restoration
of complete immunity for trade unions from damage suits."5

confusion in which the law now stands").
111. Haldane, supra note 110, at 369-70.
112. 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supranote 83, 161.
113. See SHAXBY, supra note 90, at 7. The Parliamentary Committee of the
TUC recommended that the Congress focus on picketing in its campaign for
new legislation, and a deputation lobbied the Home Secretary in February 1902
to amend the law. Sir Charles Dilke was influential in persuading the Liberals
to agree to legislate in Labour's interest; he secured Asquith's support for the
calling of a conference that led to a Liberal commitment to reform the CPPA.
See RoY JENKINS, VICTORIAN SCANDAL: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
GENTLEMAN SIR CHARLES DILKE 394 (1965); 2 STEPHEN GWYNN, THE LIFE OF THE
RT. HON. SIR CHARLES W. DiLKE 344 (Gertrude M. Tuckwell ed., 1917). The TUC
introduced private members' bills every year between 1902 and 1906. TRADES
UNION CONGRESS, THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 56 (1906); see infra note 140.
114. As a result, workers refused to give evidence before the Commission
and the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC declined to recognize its report.
See TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 53 (1906); 1906
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, J 6-7; see also CLEGG ET AL., supra
note 8, at 324-25; PELLING, supra note 15, at 124. The Commission's Report
recommended that Parliament declare trade unions to be legal associations,
extend the 1875 Act to secondary and sympathetic strikes, protect an individual
from liability in tort for doing an act only on the ground that it interfered with a
person's trade or employment, enable a union to shield itself against the
unauthorized action of its agents, allow trade unions to become incorporated or
enter into enforceable agreements and establish that an agreement or
combination to do any act in contemplation of a trade dispute should not be the
ground of a civil action. 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, 1 66.
With regard to picketing, the Report proposed replacing the watching or
besetting provision with the phrase "acts in such a manner as to cause a
reasonable apprehension in the mind of any person that violence will be used to
him or his wife or family, or damage be done to his property." Id. 48.
115. See Fox, supranote 35, at 181; ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 202; Kidner,
supra note 88, at 41. Some unions had originally been willing to consider some
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In the 1906 Liberal victory, voters elected twenty-nine
members of the newly formed Labour Party"6 as well as
twenty-five trade unionists, mostly miners, whom they
returned as members of the Liberal Party. " 7 The change in
government, the strong Labour Party presence, and a more
favorable climate for labor's claims almost immediately
produced two significant benefits for unions: the Court of
Appeal took a fresh and more sympathetic look at picketing
in Ward Lock & Co. v. Operative Printers' Assistants'
Society, "1 and Parliament enacted the Trade Disputes Act
of 1906.19
A. "Victory" in Court: Ward, Locke & Co.
Ward resembled Lyons on its facts but, heard by a
differently constituted panel in an altered political climate,
reached radically different conclusions on both the
interpretation of the CPPA and the law of nuisance. In
Ward the Court of Appeal ruled that section 7 did, after all,
require a finding of an "independent illegality" (essentially
the commission of a nuisance) to support a charge of
watching or besetting. More important, it held that

picketing might not satisfy the independent illegality

requirement because peaceful persuasion was not
necessarily a common law nuisance. Far-reaching in its
consequences, the decision was subsequently called "the
form of legal responsibility. They rejected this approach not only because of the
absence of any labor representatives on the Commission but also because of the
settlement of the damages case in Taff Vale in January 1903 at an immense
cost to the union of £42,000. See BAGWELL, supra note 108, at 22; CLEGG ET AL.,
supranote 8, at 322-23; Fox, supra note 35, at 181.
116. Anti-union legal decisions dramatically increased working-class
support for an independent Labour Party. Lyons encouraged formation of the
Labour Representation Committee in 1900, and the year following Taff Vale the
number of affiliated unions increased from 65 to 127. Between 1902 and 1904
Labour Representation Committee membership rose from 469,311 to 969,800.
R. PAGE ARNOT, THE MINERS: A HISTORY OF THE MINERS' FEDERATION OF GREAT
BRITAIN, 1889-1910, at 347 (1949); STEVENS, supra note 8, at 95 n.105 ("It can

thus be argued that Taff Vale 'made' the British Labour Party."). Stanley
Baldwin, the Conservative Prime Minister, often referred to the folly of the
decision, once remarking that "[tihe Conservatives can't talk of class-war: they
started it." Quoted in HEUSTON, supra note 93, at 76.
117. See ATTLEE, supranote 93, at 45; BEALEY & PELLING, supra note 96, at

124-25.
118. 22 T.L.R. 327 (C.A. 1906).
119. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47.
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foundation of the modern right to picket." 2 °
An established firm of printers in the neighborhood of
Lincoln's Inn in London had for years refused to employ
union workers. In July 1904 a printers' union stationed
picketers outside the company's Botolph Printing Works to
induce employees to join the union and, if the company did
not raise wages to the union rate, 12 to terminate their
employment by proper notice. The picketing was more
extensive than in Lyons, involving rotating shifts of three
picketers each as well as the presence of discharged
workers loitering in the neighborhood. 22 In the company's
action for an injunction, a jury found that the picketers had
caused a nuisance and violated the CPPA by watching or23
besetting the premises. After seven days of oral argument1
the Court of Appeal-apparently sensitive to charges of
judicial prejudice against unions, the increasing electoral
clout of labor and the contemporaneous legislative effort to
reform the CPPA-held unanimously that the picketing at
issue was entirely lawful under both the Act .of 1875 and
common law.
On the statutory issue, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams,
who had reluctantly concurred in Lyons,' 24 declared that the
CPPA did not (contrary to the Lyons ruling) introduce a
new criminal offense of watching or besetting. Rather,
120. See G.R. Rubin, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Picketing Law, 4
J. 57, 59 (1973). The unions were naturally delighted with the
decision, as the Trades Union Congress had supported the Operative Printers'
Assistants in their defense. See TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTY-NINTH
INDUS. REL.

ANNUAL REPORT

119 (1906).

121. The union rate of wages at the time was 22 shillings and sixpence, and
the company was paying 18 or 19 shillings. See Law Report, TIMES (London),
Feb. 12, 1906, at 15.
122. According to the company, the picketers remained outside the premises
in groups of 12 to 18, at times amounting to about 20, throughout the workday
and sometimes through the night. See Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Romer
& Lord Justice Coles-Hardy, TIMES (London), Feb. 15, 1906, at 3. The attorney
for the union claimed, however, that the picketing occurred only between July 8
and July 14, never attracted the attention of the police and was "carried on in
such a way as to be valueless." Id. In contrast, in Lyons Lord Lindley
acknowledged that there were few picketers, [1896] 1 Ch. at 825, and the
plaintiffs conceded that the picketers used no violence, intimidation or threats.
[1899] 1 Ch. at 256. The picketing in Lyons, however, did extend for months
during working hours. Id. at-270.
123. See Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal, TIMES (London),
Feb. 24, 1906, at 3.
124. See supranote 77.
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Parliament had included the words "wrongfully and
without legal authority" in section 7 to limit the criminal
provisions of the statute to cases already tortious. 25 Lord
Justice Fletcher-Moulton agreed that the Act "legalizes
nothing, and it renders nothing wrongful that was not so
before"; it merely visited certain acts with summary penal
consequences. 2 ' He regarded the legislature as having
inserted the word "wrongfully" to allow unions to "compel"
in the sense of "persuade" so long as they did not commit a
common law nuisance: "The right of the plaintiffs to try to
persuade a man to accept [work] and the right of the
defendants to try to persuade a man to refuse appear to me
to be rights of freedom of individual action equally
,,127
lawful.
On the common law nuisance issue, all the judges set
aside the jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor, concluding
that there was no evidence of nuisance or serious
interference with the comfort or ordinary enjoyment of the
Botolph Printing Works. 2 ' According to Lord Fletcher-

Moulton, no wrong would have been done "if the defendants
had succeeded in persuading every printer's assistant in the
country to join the union and they had rendered it
impossible for the plaintiffs to get men to work for them on
the terms they desired."

29

Ward thus held, first, that an

independent illegality such as common law nuisance was
required for a CPPA violation; and, second, that the
exertion of economic pressure, even if successful, did not
necessarily constitute such a nuisance."'
Though Ward did not explicitly overrule Lyons,' the
125. Ward, Lock & Co. v. Operative Printers' Assistants' Society, 22 T.L.R.
327, 329 (C.A. 1906).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 329-30.
128. Id. at 330.
129. Id.
130. The decision did not deal explicitly with the question whether the
immunity extended to peaceful persuasion. It found that the effect of the
proviso was to exempt certain acts that might otherwise be watching or
besetting from additional penal consequences, leaving them exactly as they
were before, whether torts or crimes. Inasmuch as peaceful picketing was in the
court's view neither a watching or besetting, a tort, or a crime, id. at 329,
presumably it was not necessary to call the proviso into play.
131. Indeed, Lord Fletcher Moulton went so far as to say that he was
following Lord Lindley in "restricting the application of the section to acts in
themselves wrongful." Id. at 329. Of course, he had a wholly different concept
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decisions were patently inconsistent. Scarcely distinguishable on their facts, they were radically divergent on
the law.' Apart from disagreement as to the need for an
independent illegality to ground a CPPA offense, the cases
were irreconcilable on the common law status of peaceful
picketing. The salient factual element in both cases was
peaceful persuasion that imposed economic pressure on an
employer. Lyons held such picketing to be per se a common
law nuisance, whereas Ward held that it might be, and on
the facts presented was, entirely lawful. Ward reflected not
different facts but a different perspective responsive to the
growing political strength of labor and broader changes in
public opinion. In its overall approach to picketing, it
anticipated the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act then
under consideration in Parliament.
While scholars
have
appreciated
and indeed
underscored the different perspectives between Lyons and
Ward on the status of peaceful picketing,'33 they have
overlooked another far more critical point. The decisions
were congruent in making nuisance the ultimate determinant of lawful industrial action. In their holdings on both
issues-the construction of the CPPA and the status of
picketing at common law-Lyons and Ward equally treated
common law nuisance as the operative concept in
determining the legitimacy of labor picketing. That common
premise, obscured by the striking contrasts between the
decisions, ultimately proved decisive. Indeed, it provided
the key that future courts used to subvert Ward's ostensibly
pro-labor pronouncements and maintain the de facto
supremacy of judicially-constructed common law nuisance
doctrines.
On the statutory disagreement-whether the CPPA
than Lord Lindley of what constituted "wrongful" acts.

132. Some cases later tried to reconcile Lyons and Ward on their facts by
suggesting that Lyons involved more substantial interference with enjoyment of
property than Ward. See, e.g., Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch.
106 (C.A.); Hubbard v. Pitt [1976] 1 Ch. 142 (C.A.). In the same vein, some
commentators suggested that Lyons involved pressuring an employer whereas
Ward dealt with persuading fellow workers. See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 47, at
212. However, the picketing was substantially the same in both instances.
Moreover, as the defendants in Ward were persuading the employees to give
strike notice, they were clearly interfering with the employer's conduct of
business in the same fashion as the picketers in Lyons. The cases are simply not
convincingly distinguishable on their facts.
133. See sources cited infra note 135.
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required an independent illegality to ground a section 7
watching or besetting violation-most subsequent cases and
commentators found Ward's affirmative ruling to be both
more authoritative and preferable as a policy matter."'
That dispute, however, could be obviated by Lyons'
alternate holding that peaceful persuasion was per se a
common law nuisance. In other words, Lyons' ruling that
picketing of any kind 'would invariably constitute a
nuisance meant that Ward's requirement of an independent
illegality would always be satisfied. Lyons' broad conception
of common law nuisance, then, could undermine picketing
even if the more liberal Ward decision were followed on the
statutory issue. On this view, the question of the CPPA's
construction ultimately collapsed into the other dispositive
question whether Lyons was correct in its view that
peaceful picketing was per se a nuisance at common law.
' Regarding the common law issue, even Ward contained
elements that did not bode well for labor. For one thing, it
failed to expressly overrule Lyons, leaving the status of
common law picketing unresolved and subject to
inconsistent rules. Courts remained free when dealing with
non-immunized picketing to apply the rule of either case.13
134. For the position that Ward was the better decision, see CHRISTIE, supra
note 13, at 19; DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 39, at 852; WEDDERBURN, supra
note 13, at 222-25; Bercusson, supra note 87, at 272-76; Coleman, supra note
34, at 615; Finkelman, supra note 7, at 88-91; Richard Kidner, Picketing and
the Criminal Law, 1975 CRI. L. REV. 256, 264 (1975). Ward was followed in
Fowler v. Kibble [1922] 1 Ch. 487, where Lord Sterndale declared, without
mentioning Lyons, that "if what is done is not actionable apart from the section
it is not made so by reason of it." See also Elsey v. Smith [1983] I.R.L.R. 292
(Sh. Ct.); Galt v. Philp [1984] I.R.L.R. 156 (H.C.J.); Kenneth Miller, Comment,
Galt v. Philp, 1984 INDUS. L.J. 111, 113-14. On the other hand, a number of
cases approved Lyons. See, e.g., Thompson-Schwab v. Costaki [1956] 1 W.L.R.
335 (C.A.); Hubbard v. Pitt [1976] 1 Q.B. 142 (C.A.); Mersey Dock & Harbour
Co. v. Verrinder [1982] I.R.L.R. 152 (Ch.). This led a commentator to observe in
1984 that it would be unwise to assume that Ward would be followed in the
future. See Carty, supra note 39, at 611. Until the 1980s, in any event, there
were few prosecutions under section 7, making the debate over its requirements
insignificant. See supra note 88. The other area of disagreement with respect to
the CPPA, whether peaceful picketing was included in the picketing exemption,
was obviated by passage of the Trade Disputes Act shortly thereafter. It
expressly added the phrase "peaceful picketing" to the immunity. See infra
notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Fowler [1922] 1 Ch. at 487; Hubbard [1976] 1 Q.B. at 142;
Verrinder [1982] I.R.L.R. at 152; Elsey [1983] I.R.L.R. at 292; CHRISTIE, supra
note 13, at 19, 33-34; WEDDERBURN, supra note 13, at 224-25; Bercusson, supra
note 87, at 272-76; Carty, supra note 39, at 610-12; Davidson, supra note 39, at
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Lyons' survival became increasingly relevant in the late
twentieth century when the statutory immunity narrowed
significantly and growing numbers of picketers were
relegated to common law status.
In addition, Ward never elucidated the analytic and
factual bases of its ruling on common law nuisance.
Although the court found no evidence of nuisance on the
given facts, it declined to hold that peaceful persuasion
could never be a nuisance. Lord Justice Moulton merely
observed that persuasion would be unlawful "if the means
employed are wrongful,""6 and that in the instant case there
was "throughout a complete absence of evidence" of
anything that would constitute a nuisance."' Similarly,
Lord Justice Vaughan Williams simply stated that "there is
no evidence that the comfort of the plaintiffs or the ordinary
enjoyment of the Botolph Printing Works was seriously
interfered with.... ." ' Although the judges reversed a jury
verdict, their opinions provided no specific guidance as to
what constituted a nuisance in the context of picketing. 9
The result of these ambiguities was that, if the
boundaries of nuisance were coextensive with those of
lawful picketing, those boundaries remained exceedingly
elusive. This state of affairs derived not only from the
unresolved conflict between Lyons and Ward over the
status of peaceful picketing per se, but also from the further
uncertainty under Ward as to what a court in any given
case would consider a nuisance. The indeterminate contours
of nuisance offered the twentieth-century judiciary considerable opportunity to adapt and reinterpret nuisance law
to erode statutory protections for picketing, a development
reinforced by the equally ambiguous nature of the
legislative "success" also attained by the unions in 1906.

351-52; Finkelman, supranote 7, at 87-91; Roy Lewis, Picketing,in LABOUR LAW
IN BRITAIN 195, 199 (Roy Lewis ed., 1986).
136. Ward, Lock & Co. v. Operative Printers' Assistants' Soc'y, 22 T.L.R.
327, 330 (C.A. 1906).

137. Id.
138. Id. at 329.
139. One can only speculate as to the reasons for the lack of specificity.
Perhaps it was the desire to minimize conflict with a recent precedent, a belief
that nuisance suits required case-by-case adjudication or a reluctance to seek
precision while the issue was before Parliament.
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B. "Victory" in Parliament:The Trade Disputes Act of 1906
In terms of clarifying the relationship between peaceful
picketing and nuisance, Parliament fared no better than
the Court of Appeal when it considered the issue later that
same year. Responding to the showing of electoral strength
by the Labour Party in 1906, the new Liberal government
quickly drafted a bill recognizing the unions as legal
entities. Initially, it followed the Royal Commission's
recommendation and introduced a bill allowing certain
suits against a trade union for the torts of its agents.
However, Labour Party and union pressure on Parliament's
Liberal members, as well as the fact that many Liberals
had pledged support to the union position during the
election campaign, forced the cabinet to abandon its own
bill and endorse instead the TUC's proposed version.14
The resulting Trade Disputes Act of 1906 (TDA)"'
reversed Taff Vale by restoring the total immunity from
liability of trade unions as entities. In addition, it protected
individuals from "economic torts" (judicially-created civil
liabilities for civil conspiracy, intimidation and inducement
to break contracts).. provided the act complained of was
committed "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute."'
Continuing experience with adverse judicial
lawmaking had only reinforced the unions' suspicion of
positive legal rights and their preference for settling
conflicts through negotiation rather than formal regulation.
The 1906 Act reaffirmed the fundamental tenet that
industrial conflicts should be resolved by the parties rather
than subjected to judicial interference. Its passage was
140. See Fox, supra note 36, at 183; PELLING, supra note 15, at 125-26;
ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 201-02; Brown, supra note 55, at 126-27. The TUC
rejected corporate status for the unions because they desired to "have as little to
do with the Law Courts as possible." 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 6, 20. The TUC bill was presented as a private member's bill every year
between 1902 and 1905. It was defeated in 1902 and 1903 but passed its second
reading by a majority of 39 in 1904 and by a majority of 122 in 1905. See
TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 56 (1906); JENKINS,
supra note 113, at 396.
141. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47.
142. Id. § 1; see, e.g., Simpson, supra note 5, at 162-63.
143. The "golden formula" covered sympathetic strikes, secondary disputes,
and eventually recognition disputes. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8,at 241.
Again, a strike outside the statutory immunity was not necessarily illegal; its
lawfulness then became a question of the general law. Id. at 244.
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immediately hailed as a "dramatic victory" for unions. 4
In regard to picketing, the TDA gave unionists
increased protection from legal liability by replacing the
proviso to section 7 of the CPPA with a new section:
T

It shall be lawful for one or more persons acting on their own
behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or
firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend
at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or
carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for
the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information,
or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from
working.14

This formulation was narrower than the 1875 Act in one
respect: it created an immunity only for actions undertaken
during a "trade dispute," leaving the legality of nonindustrial picketing wholly to the common law. However, in
all other respects the Act was more expansive. In addition
to reversing Lyons by expressly restoring for industrial
144. WEBB & WEBB, supra note 16, at 608; see ASKWITH, supranote 93, at 95
(claiming that the Act was regarded as a "charter of liberty" by trade unionists);
MAHN ET AL., supra note 6, at 36 (describing the statute as the "cornerstone of
trade dispute law"); MORGAN, supra note 7, at 185 (stating that unions saw the
TDA as their "magna carta"); HENRY PELLING, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LABOUR

PARTY 22 (4th ed. 1972) (commenting that the Act was one of the two "Labour
successes" of 1906); EWING, supra note 5, at 6 (declaring that the 1906 Act was
the basis of the "freedom to strike" in Britain); William E. Forbath, Courts,
Constitutions and Labor Politics in England and America: A Study of the
Constitutive Power of Law, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 31 (1991) (noting that the
TDA gave English labor "an extraordinary freedom from legal restraints");
Kidner, supra note 88, at 34 (stating that the Act was a statute of "fundamental
importance" often considered "an immutable foundation of principle based on
well debated theory"). Lord Halsbury, on the other hand, not surprisingly said
of the Act that "anything more outrageously unjust, anything more tyrannical, I
can hardly conceive." Quoted in ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 202.
145. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 2(1). The TDA did not repeal the CPPA except for
the proviso, which it replaced with section 2. Id. Though the basic principle of
immunity for picketers remained unchanged after 1906, there was later a
change in language; whereas the Trades Disputes Act stated that it "shall be
lawful" to attend, the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 134, used the
formulation that attendance "shall not of itself constitute an offence." The Trade
Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 15, reenacted the "it shall be
lawful" language. Although the "it shall be lawful" formulation appears more
expansive, arguably providing a "right" to picket, courts have rejected this
interpretation, the House of Lords concluding that the choice of language did
not involve a change in meaning. See Broome v. D.P.P. [1974] App. Cas. 587,
601 (H.L.).
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picketers the peaceful persuasion exemption that
Parliament had intended in 1875, it provided in clear and
affirmative language that "attending" for peaceful
persuasion "shall be lawful" in both a civil and criminal
sense. The new statute thus went beyond the CPPA in
immunizing picketing not only against CPPA criminal
penalties but also, presumably, against forms of nuisance
as well. 4 ' As a judge observed in the first reported case to
arise under the Act, the effect of this section was "perfectly
clear": "It legalized for the first time, by positive enactment,
a course of action which might otherwise, if carried out in a
certain manner, have amounted to a nuisance at common
law .... 1147
The statute, however, contained the seeds of its own
undoing. Although the addition of the phrase "peaceful
persuasion" expressly overturned Lyons and thereby
immunized private nuisance in the form of economic
pressure, the statute failed to define "peaceful picketing' or
to clarify what other types of nuisance, if any, would enjoy
statutory protection. Further, in creating an immunity for
certain unspecified acts of peaceful picketing within a trade
dispute, the TDA failed to resolve the Lyons-Ward conflict
over whether peaceful picketing outside the immunity-for
example, picketing for an unprotected purpose-was
necessarily a common law nuisance.14 Ostensibly promoting
the objective of "abstentionism," the statute in fact left
critical matters to judicial elaboration.
Ironically, the Act's failure to delineate legitimate
146. See CITRINE, supra note 8, at 445; HEDGES & WINTERBOTTOM, supra
note 69, at 128.
147. Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Comm'rs [1908] 2 Ir. R. 214, 225 (KB.); see,
e.g., 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, 1 48 (stating that the
proposed bill would legalize attendance of any number of persons even though it
might constitute a nuisance); M.A. Hickling, Police Interference with Peaceful
Picketing, 28 MOD. L. REV. 707 (1965) (noting that section 2 legalized conduct
that might otherwise be a nuisance).
148. It was arguable on the one hand that a statutory immunity for peaceful
persuasion in the context of a trade dispute would not have been necessary if
picketing were lawful at common law; on the other hand, it was also arguable
that express mention of "peaceful persuasion" was required simply to make
clear that Lyons did not represent the law, statutory or otherwise. Most
subsequent commentators treated the issue as simply unresolved. See sources
cited supra note 135. The TDA also did not resolve the problem addressed in
Lyons and Ward whether the CPPA, which remained in force, should be
interpreted to require an independent illegality to ground a section 7 offense.
See supra note 134.
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methods of picketing or to clarify the impact of the statute
on nuisance law was regarded at the time as a victory for
unions. The government bill had originally provided that
picketers could attend "peaceably and in a reasonable
manner" rather than "for the purpose of peacefully
persuading." Labour members, however, rejected this
formulation because they distrusted judicial interpretation
of the phrase "reasonable manner." One Labour member
explained that "in the Courts of law they would have in the
interpretation of this Act to face a body of men.., whose
sympathies on all these points were not with them."49 Even
the Liberal Home Secretary conceded that there might be
"decisions as to what was 'reasonable' as various as the
tribunals invoked." 5 ' The Labour Party preferred a clause
based on "purpose," that is, one that would immunize any
method of attendance so long as the purpose was peaceful
persuasion or communication. Under pressure from the
Labour Party and the TUC, the government reversed itself
and adopted the unions' "purpose" approach.' 5 '
The rejection of any consideration of the "manner" of
picketing meant, however, that Parliament declined to
commit itself to defining what types of nuisances the
statute immunized. Ambiguities surrounding this question
149. 164 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 891-92 (Nov. 9, 1906) (Mr. David
Shackleton); see 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 197 (July 27, 1906) (stating that

they "had had experience to show that any loophole of the kind provided by the
words 'peaceable and reasonable manner' was used to make picketing
impossible altogether") (Mr. Keir Hardie); 163 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 143637 (Nov. 1, 1906) ("For the purpose of defining 'reasonably' there was no test of
the word except the opinion of the Judge or the jury ... one Judge might find a
certain set of facts reasonable to-day, and another Judge might find the same
set of facts unreasonable to-morrow.") (Mr. Rutus Isaacs); id. at 1473 ("use of
the words 'in a reasonable manner' was a trap") (Mr. L. Atherley-Jones); 164
PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 893 (Nov. 9, 1906).
150. 163 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1420 (Nov. 1, 1906). Similarly, Sir
William Robson, the Solicitor General, acknowledged that trade unionists were
not likely to receive fair consideration from the courts, noting that if persons
thought trade unions to be "cruel and evil organizations" their minds would be
affected in applying legal doctrine. 155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1490 (Apr.
15, 1906); see 205 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1556-57 (May 3, 1927) (stating
that "legal people had their prejudices against trade unions and could not
prevent their judgments being coloured by those prejudices") (Sir William
Robson); 167 PARL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 286 (Dec. 12, 1906) (declaring that the
Commons struck out "in a reasonable manner" because "it would open the door
for very wide construction by different tribunals as to what was a reasonable
manner") (Lord Coleridge).
151. Kidner, supranote 88, at 49.
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were exacerbated by strategically motivated and obviously
misleading statements on the floor of the House,
illustrating the unreliability of rhetorical debate as a true
measure of legislative intent. The Labour Party obviously
supported a "purpose" approach because it would offer
greater latitude for picketers than would a "reasonable
manner" test. During the debate, however, many Labour
members attempted to assuage their opponents by
reassuring them that the clause barely affected existing
law. They insisted that the bill was merely remedial,
abrogating Lyons and restoring the exemption for peaceful
persuasion intended in 1875 but not providing any broader
immunity against
nuisance. For example, David
Shackleton, who had repeatedly introduced the TUC
version as a private member's bill prior to 1906, proclaimed
that Labour's objective was merely to sweep the legal
decisions aside and institute a "re-statement of the law as
they understood it to be and as everybody else understood it
to be up to six years ago."'52
Conversely, the Tories, who shortly after the Act's
passage would press for its narrow construction, warned
during the debates that an exemption based on "purpose"
would legitimate a multitude of nuisances. They suggested
that in addition to authorizing the private nuisance of
economic pressure, it would immunize from legal action
such public nuisances as obstructing the highway through
"mass" picketers. A "reasonable manner" test would imply a
"reasonable number," a Conservative member from Lambeth insisted, but a test based on purpose would make it
impossible to prevent ten thousand or even two million
people from "attending" in front of a man's house.5 3 Indeed,
152. See, e.g., 155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 49 (May 30, 1906) (stating that
a hundred men picketing one "would be a nuisance and could be dealt with by
the common law. It was not proposed to abrogate the common law but to remove
the limitation imposed on picketing by the law courts.") (Mr. Keir Hardie); id. at
1504 (May 25, 1906) (claiming they "were not asking for any privilege in regard
to the common law") (Mr. David Shackleton); 163 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.)
1430 (Nov. 1, 1906) (insisting that Labour did not desire to remove common law
penalties on picketers who committed an annoyance) (Mr. Richard Bell); id. at
1472 (stating that the bill did not legalize anything now unlawful); id. at 1478
(declaring the purpose of Act was to reverse Lyons) (Mr. Clement Edwards).
153. 155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1498 (Apr. 25, 1906) (Mr. Stewart
Bowles); 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 188 (July 27, 1906) (declaring that it
was "monstrous" for the bill to give power to any number of persons to attend
and that a considerable number of persons attending would be an annoyance)
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one peer conjured up the fearful prospect that the phrase
would allow a gathering of a thousand people to assemble
outside a house "to persuade a footman to leave his
employment."'54 The secretary to the Employers' Parliamentary Council, in testimony before the Royal Commission
on Trade Disputes, put the argument dramatically and
succinctly. If Parliament accepted the bill, he declared, "the
common law of nuisance in any case of picketing would be

abrogated." 5'

The Liberal government for its part attempted to
appease all parties and ended up taking inconsistent
positions on the issue of the legislation's effect on existing
law. On some occasions it soothed Tory concerns, countering the argument that the bill accorded labor
"exceptional privileges" by asserting that, on the contrary,
it only restored rights that the judges had snatched away.
For example, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime
Minister, contended that it was unfair "to taunt the unions
who have been deprived of their legal rights by this action
of the Judges with seeking a privilege when they come to
this House in search of a remedy."'56 Similarly, the Solicitor
General announced that the bill did not confer any
exceptional immunity on trade unions but only removed
"exceptional disabilities" contrary to the general spirit of
the law.'57 According to Lord Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor,
(Viscount Turner).
154. 167 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 278 (Dec. 12, 1906). According to Lord
Russell, the phrase "it shall be lawful" would authorize industrial picketers to
do what others could not do, namely, commit the public nuisance of street
obstruction. He noted that the authorities had dealt very severely with a small
gathering of suffragettes outside Mr. Asquith's house. Id.; see 163 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (4th ser.) 1495-96 (Nov. 2, 1906) (claiming that the TDA legalized what the
suffragettes were doing, which was a common law nuisance) (Mr. John
Rawlinson). The Conservative Unionist Sir Edward Carson similarly
complained that by focusing on the purpose of the picketing rather than its
manner, the clause legalized both public and private nuisances. 163 PARL. DEB.,
H.0. (4th ser.) 1425 (Nov. 1, 1906); id. at 1428-29 (stating that a "great
nuisance" was not forbidden by this clause) (Mr. A.J. Balfour); id. at 1498
(observing that if the clause was passed they could not in future deal with
common law nuisances) (Mr. A.J. Balfour); id. at 1470 (noting that "under cover
of this clause it would be lawful for a large number of people to come outside the
house of any man") (Lord Cecil).
155. 1906 ROYAL COMMIsSIoN MInUTEs OF EVIDENCE, supra note 83, 3208.
156. 155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 53 (Mar. 30, 1906).
157. Id. at 1483; see, e.g., 108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 309-10 (1902)
(pointing out that trade unions were only asking for the restoration of what
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the purpose of the bill "is to place the law in the position in
which every Englishman thought it was from the Norman
Conquest onward." 5 '
It was difficult, however, for the government to argue
that the clause did not immunize a broad range of
nuisances because it had originally supported the phrase
"reasonable manner" in its own bill precisely on the ground
that such wording was both necessary and sufficient to
prevent the authorization of nuisances such as mass
picketing. Early in the debates, Attorney General Sir John
Walton defused attempts to amend the Liberal bill to limit
expressly the number of permissible picketers by assuring
members that "reasonable manner" implied "reasonable
number."'59 The government's turnabout in scrapping its
carefully defended "reasonableness" clause and adopting
the TUC's "purpose" language placed him in an untenable
position. Indeed, his opponents charged him with "absolute
misrepresentation."'
Nonetheless, Walton subsequently
assured members that the bill was "as stringent in its
present form as it was in the form in which the Government
originally proposed it."' If an excessive number of people
Lord Cairns announced was the intention of the 1875 Act) (Sir Robert Reid);
155 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 26 (Mar. 30, 1906) (claiming that unions did not
want any specially created privilege but only to be restored to their original
position) (Mr. Walter Hudson); 164 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 155 (Nov. 5,
1906) (declaring that there was no attempt to confer a privilege on trade unions
but only to bring them back to the ordinary law) (Mr. Clement Edwards).
158. 166 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 692 (Dec. 4, 1906).
159. See 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1608 (Aug. 3, 1906). A member
moved that it should be lawful for persons "not exceeding three" to attend
peaceably and in a reasonable manner. 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 183 (July
27, 1906) (Mr. Stewart Bowles). The Attorney General responded that he did
not want to put a fixed limit on the number of picketers because it would
depend on the circumstances; he was not opposed to the phrase "reasonable
number," but he thought that the words "reasonable manner" governed the
question of numbers. Id. at 196; see TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTY-NINTH
ANNUAL REPORT 57-58 (1906).

160. 164 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 883 (Nov. 9, 1906); see 163 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (4th ser.) 1418, 1422-24, 1460 (Nov. 1, 1906) (complaining that the
Attorney General had refused amendments because words were in the bill, "yet
he was now prepared to abandon the position by which he prevented
Amendments being moved") (Mr. Clavell Salter, Sir E. Carson & Sir Frederick
Banbury).
161. 164 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 914 (Nov. 9, 1906); see 163 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (4th ser.) 1433, 1500 (Nov. 2, 1906) (describing the new test as "more
effectual" and a "better guarantee for individual liberty and public order")
(Attorney General Walton). G.R. Askwith, the Liberal conciliator, testified to
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embarked on the mission of persuasion, he declared, it
could be inferred that the object was not
162 "peaceful
persuasion" but rather intimidation or coercion.

In contrast, on other occasions the government
conciliated Labour and insisted that the bill indeed
protected picketers against charges of nuisance. Sir Charles
Dilke, one of the most prescient members of Parliament and
a major supporter of the Trade Disputes Bill, moved the
addition of a clause stating that attendance for the purpose
of picketing should not constitute either a private or public
nuisance. 6 The amendment ultimately failed by a narrow
margin,' but only because the Attorney General insisted
during the debate that, though picketing was a common law
nuisance, the bill "put picketing upon an entirely new
footing."' 5 It contained not a mere proviso but "a distinct
declaration" that certain actions-unfortunately unspecified-were invulnerable to nuisance law.'66
the Royal Commission in 1904 that legalizing peaceful persuasion would not
prevent persons from suing in nuisance. 1906 ROYAL COMMISsION MINUTES OF
EVIDENCE, supranote 83,
120, 122.

162. 163 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1421 (Nov. 1, 1906). Mr. Atherley-Jones
similarly stated that the section merely reiterated the law in Lyons and that
men who committed a nuisance could be "rigidly dealt with." Id. at 1429-30; see
id. at 1436 (insisting that picketers who obstructed the street were not
attending merely for the purpose of peacefully persuading or communicating)
(Mr. Rufus Isaacs).
163. 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1655 (Aug. 3, 1906). Dilke claimed that
the amendment was necessary because Mr. Askwith, testifying before the Royal
Commission, had indicated that picketing might be a public or private nuisance.
Id. at 1655-56. Similarly, referring to court decisions, David Shackleton stated
that the "whole danger of the situation" was that without the amendment
certain powers conferred by the clause "could be knocked out by a charge of
nuisance." Id. at 1657. Mr. Atherley-Jones agreed that without the amendment
the "clause was perfectly illusory and afforded no protection in respect of
nuisance." Id. at 1658.
164. The amendment failed by only five votes, 127 to 122. See 162 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1660 (Aug. 3, 1906); TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THIRTY-

NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 59 (1906). Keir Hardie claimed that the Chief
Government Whip sought to induce members to vote against the amendment by
threatening to thwart progress on the bill and by insisting that anyone who
voted for the bill was "playing this fellow's [Hardie's] game." 162 PARL DEB.,
H.C. (4th ser.) 1661 (Aug. 3, 1906); see Kidner, supra note 88, at 50 (suggesting
that at a meeting on October 24, 1906, Labour members decided to support the
amendment in order not to wreck the bill).
165. 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1657 (Aug. 3, 1906); see GWYNN, supra
note 113, at 367.
166. 162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1657 (Aug. 3, 1906); see GWYNN, supra
note 113, at 367; TRADES UNION CONGRESS, supra note 164. The Attorney
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With the government equivocating on the statute's
impact on nuisance and Conservative and Labour members
further muddying the waters for political reasons, Parliament ultimately left the precise meaning of section 2 to
judicial resolution.16 ' Although the addition of "peaceful
persuasion" obviously immunized union picketing against a
Lyons claim of private nuisance, it was unclear whether it
also insulated picketers against such nuisances as creating
noise, blocking access, or obstructing the highway. For A.J.
Balfour, the leader of the Conservative Party, the question
of nuisance "was a difficult point, because lawyers were not
always clear or agreed upon it, and when the experts were
both obscure and contradictory the unfortunate layman was
placed in a very embarrassing position."'68
In later decades, courts restrained picketing by
capitalizing on the vagueness of both Ward and the TDA,
neither of which had resolved the critical question of the relationship between the labor statutes and nuisance law.
Regrettably for unions and their allies, both "dramatic
victories" of 1906 rested on flawed foundations.
IV. "VICTORY" UNDONE: JUDICIAL EXPLOITATION OF

NUISANCE, 1906-1980

Between 1906 and 1980 the judiciary, continuing to
embody a nineteenth-century individualist ethic unsymGeneral also equivocated by stating that any picketing that was "reasonable"
would be held by a court to be lawful and "could not be held to be a nuisance."
162 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1657 (Aug. 3, 1906). Further, he suggested that
picketers would otherwise have been liable to an action or prosecution,
indicating that he believed that the statute immunized against obstruction of
the highway (public nuisance) as well as the Lyons nuisance of economic
pressure. Id. at 1655-56.
167. A leading Liberal lawyer and future Lord Chancellor, R.B. Haldane,
defended this approach by stating that he did not want the CPPA to immunize
a nuisance but preferred to leave the definition of nuisance to case-by-case
adjudication. R.B. Haldane, The Labourerand the Law, 82 CONTEMP. REV. 362,
372 (1903). Other Liberal government officials, however, recognized the dangers
of this approach. Commenting on Haldane's approach, Askwith observed that
this method would "enormously increase litigation, because you could only get
by dint of litigation at the various facts that would constitute a nuisance, and it
would make the law and its results more uncertain than it is at present." 1906
ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supranote 83, S 216.

168. 163 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1475 (Nov. 2, 1906). Balfour added that
regarding what the TDA permitted combinations to do, there was an "absolute
divergence of opinion in the lawyers on both sides." Id. at 1476.
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expanded the range of picketing that

constituted a nuisance and correspondingly contracted the
TDA immunity to exclude the behavior so defined. It
accomplished this result by exploiting the flexibility in
nuisance law as well as the open texture of the TDA.
Hardly coincidentally, the widening scope of nuisance and
reinterpretation of the 1906 Act exactly paralleled the
evolution of new picketing stratagems.

169. The continuing bias against labor was noted in a famous speech by
Winston Churchill as Home Secretary in 1911, when he told the House of
Commons:
[W]here class issues are involved, it is impossible to pretend that the
courts command the same degree of general confidence. On the
contrary, they do not, and a very large numbef of our population have
been led to the opinion that they are, unconsciously no doubt,
biased ....It is not good for trade unions that they should be brought
into contact with the courts, and it is not good for the courts.
26 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1021-22 (May 30, 1911). Similarly, Lord Scrutton,
speaking before the University Law Society in 1920, acknowledged the
partiality of the courts in issues regarding labor: "I am not speaking of
conscious impartiality; but the habits you are trained in, the people with whom
you mix, lead to your having a certain class of ideas.... It is very difficult
sometimes to be sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial
position between two disputants, one of your own class and one not of your
class." The Work of the Commercial Courts, 1923 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 6, 8 (1923);
see, e.g., H.J. Laski, Actors in the Drama,in THE MARTYRS OF TOLPUDDLE 148-50
(W.M. Citrine ed., 1934) (referring to "the persistent inability of English judges
to understand the very nature of Trade Unionism" and the fact that "any judge
who does not take the greatest care to guard himself against bias may easily
find himself interpreting the issues of a labour case upon assumptions which
condemn Trade Unionists before the issue is heard"). Though judicial
antagonism muted between the mid-1920s and mid-1960s, when unions were
weak or war was in progress, it reasserted itself after 1965 when organized
labor again posed a serious threat to the social order. See Wedderburn, supra
note 5, at 238, 241 (referring to the "refusal or inability (or both) of the judges to
bow the knee of the common law to a balance of power that offends its
philosophy"); Wedderburn, supra note 12, at 78 (noting that the eras of judicial
creativity against the unions were coterminous with periods when the middle
classes perceived unions as a threat to the social order, especially in the 1960s
and between 1976 and 1979); Lord Wedderburn, The New Politics of Labour
Law, in TRADE UNIONS 497, 511-12 (W.E.J. McCarthy ed., 2d ed. 1985)
(commenting that "many of today's judicial hearts still beat in rhythm with the
1891 declaration of Lord Bramwell"). Though the House of Lords reversed a
series of extreme anti-union opinions issued by the Court of Appeal in 19791980, the Law Lords nonetheless viewed the immunities as "repugnant" and
"unpalatable" and invited the government to propose appropriate legislation. Id.
at 512.
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A. Nuisance Law and Picketingfrom the Trade Disputes
Act to the General Strike of 1926
1. Legal Doctrine: Contractingthe Immunity. After 1906
the courts reverted to the restrictive judicial approach of
the 1890s, soon targeting the seemingly broader immunity
of the TDA. Inasmuch as the new Act reversed Lyons and
conferred immunity on strikers who inflicted "economic
pressure" during a trade dispute, the picketing cases now
generally involved charges of public nuisance by obstructing
the highway. Any stationary activity in the street was
indisputably a nuisance,' and the operative question was
therefore only whether the act of obstruction fell within the
statutory immunity. Given the ambiguity surrounding the
scope of the statute in relation to nuisance, judges were
able to interpret "attending for the purpose of
communication or peaceful persuasion" to strip unionists of
any meaningful protection. In the guise of an analysis
based on "purpose," courts circuitously reintroduced the
notion of "reasonable manner" that Parliament had
explicitly rejected in 1906. If strikers used "unreasonable"
means-for example, gathering in numbers considered
excessively large to accomplish a permitted purpose-courts
inferred that the picketers' purpose must be coercion or
intimidation rather than peaceful persuasion. Moreover,
though Parliament had specifically eschewed a numerical
limitation on picketers, 7 constables and judges increasingly adopted a highly restrictive quantitative definition of
"reasonable" picketing72

In addition to resurrecting the concept of "reasonable
manner" as a test of "legitimate purpose," courts further
restricted the immunity by narrowly construing the right to
"attend" for permissible objectives. Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners,'73 for example, held that "attendance"
included neither trespassing on private company property
nor violating local property regulations directed against
nuisances. Jim Larkin, an Irish labor leader, addressed a
strike meeting on the quayside during the Belfast dock
170. See Vorspan, supra note 41, at 976. The authorities frequently
employed nuisance in this period to curtail the activities of groups such as the
suffragettes. Id. at 982-90.
171. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
172. See infra note 184.
173. [1908] 2 Ir. R. 214 (IB.).
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strike of 1907. Although he was in fact exhorting a crowd of
one hundred and fifty men to return to work, the justices
convicted him of violating a harbor bylaw banning unauthorized meetings and nuisances.174 Relying on the 1906 Act,
Larkin urged that attendance "at" a house or place included
the word "in." In other words, he claimed that the Act
conferred a power to enter private premises to effectuate
the statutory purpose of peaceful persuasion. Pressed in
oral argument, Larkin's attorney conceded that such a
statutory construction would permit picketing not only in
an open area such as the dock but also in an enclosed yard
or workshop. Mr. Justice Wright thought that contention so
absurd as to be "incapable of argument."175 His colleagues
agreed that the peaceful picketing exemption might
immunize some nuisances but did not permit the violation
of local bylaws or picketing on company property. 176 Larkin
was the first of many cases where courts construed the
TDA's statutory authorization to permit only bare
"dttendance," defined narrowly as an exceedingly limited
physical presence rather than as encompassing reasonable
efforts to persuade. Whereas Larkin employed such an
analysis to remove trespass from the immunity, later cases
would use it to exclude nuisance as well.
2. Official Action: Common Law Nuisance Prosecutions.
In the two decades following the TDA's passage, authorities
were minimally hampered by the immunity and frequently
resorted to public nuisance or Highways Act prosecutions to
control "mass picketing." This labor tactic was especially7
ubiquitous in the volatile years preceding World War I,'
174. The bylaw, promulgated in 1881 pursuant to the Harbours, Docks, and
Piers Clauses Act 1847, stated: "No person shall, without permission in writing
from the secretary, preach, read aloud, lecture, address any crowd or assembly
of persons, sing, or perform on any musical instrument, nor shall any person
commit any nuisance ... ." Id. at 215.
175. Id. at 228. He further conceded in oral argument that taking his
position to its logical conclusion, an employer could "attend" in the home of his
workmen or at union meetings. Id. at 230-31.
176. Id. at 221, 226, 232; see M'Cusker v. Smith [1918] 2 Ir.R. 432 (KB.)
(finding it unlawful for a picket to enter the hall of a pub to persuade customers
not to patronize it). The Larkin court did not specify what types of nuisance
would be immunized by the statute.
177. The Prime Minister stated in 1927 that in the past twenty years there
had been a movement "from constitutional action to direct action" and that
individual picketing had "at times given place to mass picketing." 205 PARL.
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when escalating tension between workers and employers
and an upsurge of rank and file activism fueled a major
wave of strikes.1 8 The government played an increasingly
interventionist role, using the doctrine of highway
obstruction as an effective prosecutorial instrument for
dispersing or limiting picketers. For example, when the
military was sent to preserve order in the South Wales coal
mines in 1910, General Nevil Macready warned the local
strike committee either to limit the picketers at mine
entrances or risk having them "moved on" for causing an
obstruction.'79 Many strikers, he noted, were surprised to
learn that it was illegal to congregate on the highway"'
Similarly, during the general unrest of 1911, the Home
Office issued a circular to local police chiefs essentially
dismissing Parliament's decision in 1906 to reject a
"reasonable manner" test. Relying on an opinion of the law
officers, the government directive maintained that when
the number of picketers was "disproportionate in size to
what is needed for lawful purposes," union members
forfeited their statutory protection. 'During the dock strike
that same year, the Home Office again advised the police to
circumvent the TDA by finding picketers so numerous as to
cause an obstruction.' When national miners' and dockers'
strikes again posed major public order problems for authorities in 1912, the Home Secretary directed constables to
make "full use of the law on street obstruction."'83 In this
period police adopted for the first time the numerical
standard of six to distinguish protected from unprotected
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1655 (May 4, 1927).
178. See RODGER CHARLES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
BRITAIN, 1911-39, at 42-47 (1973); GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE DEATH
OF LIBERAL ENGLAND 214-330 (1935); BEN TILLETTI, HISTORY OF THE LONDON
TRANSPORT WORKERS STRIKE 3-8 (1911); James E. Cronin, Strikes and the
Struggle for Union Organization:Britain and Europe, in THE DEVELOPIENT OF
TRADE UNIONISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 1880-1914, at 55, 57

(Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Hans-Gerhard Husung eds., 1985).
179. See 1 NEVIL MACREADY, ANNALS OF AN ACTivE LIFE 147-48 (1925).
180. See MORGAN, supranote 7, at 158.
181. Id. at 168, 181.
182. See BARBARA WEINBERGER, KEEPING THE PEACE?: POLICING STRIKES IN
BRITAIN, 1906-1926, at 105 (1991). The police also defended their action against

picketers during the seamen's strike in Cardiff in 1911 by claiming that large
crowds caused obstruction outside the shipping office. Id. at 81.
183. Quoted in MORGAN, supra note 7, at 175. He reminded the police that
picketers were not allowed to congregate in unlimited numbers and should not
obstruct the highway. Id.
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picketing and regularly8 4 arrested larger groups of picketers
on obstruction charges.
The use of nuisance offered the government many
advantages. A generic doctrine not formally related to labor
law and lacking the public order implications of more
serious crimes, it allowed authorities to characterize strike
action "neutrally" as a simple street offense. Further,
obstruction had minimal requirements-proof of the
presence of a few stationary picketers in the street was
sufficient-and thus avoided evidentiary problems raised by
charges under the CPPA. In 1911 the Home Office
specifically instructed the Metropolitan Police to use the
common law on obstruction rather than the 1875 Act
because it was less cumbersome to apply.'85 Finally, nuisance allowed the government and police to claim that
rather than inhibiting workers, they were simply vindicating an important right of public passage.'86 Although
industrial picketers were better situated than political
picketers in this period-suffragettes were not permitted to
obstruct the highway even as individuals' 87 -the numerical
restriction to six or fewer operated as a significant
constraint on picketing operations."S
World War I temporarily dammed the torrent of
strikes,'89 but industrial conflict quickly reasserted itself
184. See ROGER GEARY, POLICING INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES: 1893-1985, at 39
(1985); MACREADY, supra note 179, at 147-48; MORGAN, supra note 7, at 179;
TRADES UNION CONGRESS, FORTY-SixTH ANNUAL REPORT 238 (1913);
WEINBERGER, supra note 182, at 60; see also, e.g., 12 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
1435-36 (Nov. 1, 1909) (stating that a large group of union picketers were
marched to the police station and fined for obstruction); id. at 1809 (Nov. 3,
1909) (noting that additional picketers in the same dispute were charged with
obstruction).
185. See WEINBERGER, supra note 182, at 113; see also MORGAN, supra note
7, at 179, 185-86, 196-98 (observing that in the period 1910-1912 the Home
Office turned its back on the 1875 and 1906 labor laws).
186. See Vorspan, supra note 41, at 988-89.
187. See id. at 982-88.
188. See WEINBERGER, supra note 182, at 105.
189. During the war itself, the first year saw an industrial truce but in 1915
industrial unrest reappeared. The Munitions Act in July of that year introduced
a new governmental policy of compulsory arbitration, and in 1916 Parliament
created a Ministry of Labour that appealed to the trade unions to renounce
strikes for the duration of the war. Although strikes continued, most were of
short duration and the government made little use of its power to prosecute
even munitions workers for their participation. See M.B. HAMMOND, BRITISH
LABOR CONDITIONS AND LEGISLATION DURING THE WAR 230-37 (1919).
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after the peace. A succession of strikes in 1919-1920, a
national mining lockout in the spring of 1921, and sporadic
disputes in the engineering, shipbuilding, docks, and coal
mining industries from 1922 to 1926 generated substantial
social unease. This widespread unrest culminated in the
extensive but ultimately ineffectual nine-day General
Strike of May 1926.190 All the strikes in the 1920s involved

significant amounts of picketing, and authorities continued
to treat massive groups of picketers as outside the scope of
the TDA immunity. For example, the Home Secretary,
observing that unemployed men assembled in large
numbers near dock entrances during the General Strike,
declared that the presence of a large body of men was
inconsistent with peaceful persuasion. "There is a very clear
distinction to be made," he announced, "and it is made in
law between peaceful persuasion, an individual act, and
mass intimidation, which is quite a different thing."91
Similarly, the Solicitor General maintained that "when a
very great number of people are brought together, far
greater than is necessary to persuade individual workmen,"
such conduct was not "peaceful picketing at all."'92 Based on
this premise, authorities made effective use of the law on
"large-scale obstruction" throughout the General Strike. "3
The twenty years following the TDA thus saw courts
and the government institute techniques for dealing with
the statute that would dominate official responses to labor
190. See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 188, 197; MARGARET MORRIS, THE
GENERAL STR
52-53, 64-69, 308-11 (1976); WEINBERGER, supra note 182, at 6.
191. 196 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 820 (June 2, 1926). The Home Secretary
even took the position that the TDA did not immunize against any obstruction
at all. As he announced to the House of Commons, under the Act of 1906 there
was "no right at all to hold meetings upon or otherwise to obstruct the
highway." Id. at 819.
192. 195 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 783 (May 10, 1926).
193. MORGAN, supranote 7, at 201-02; see MORRIS, supra note 190, at 52, 65,
69; A.L. Goodhart, The Legality of the General Strike in England, 36 YALE L.J.
464 (1926). George Lansbury claimed that in the last days of the General Strike
the police stopped picketing of all sorts, including a man in Glasgow who was
imprisoned for doing nothing more than holding up his hand to a tramway
driver. 196 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 801 (June 2, 1926). He also contended
that many workmen were put into prison "on the score that they interfered with
someone and prevented the due transport of goods from one place to another."
Id. Accordingly, during the strike the General Council of the TUC asked
picketers "especially to avoid obstruction and to confine themselves strictly to
their legitimate duties." Quoted in TONY CLIFF & DONNY GLUCKSTEIN,
MARXISM'S TRADE UNION STRUGGLE: THE GENERAL STRIKE OF 1926, at 201 (1986).
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picketing in periods of industrial strife. Judges limited the
immunity by interpreting "attending for the purpose of
persuasion" to exclude mass picketing, trespass on company
premises, and infringement of local regulations. With
regard to enforcement, the focus shifted from private employer suits based on Lyons-conduct now immunized by
the TDA-to criminal prosecutions for public nuisance by
highway obstruction. The police, enjoying substantial
discretionary powers, applied a simple numerical standard
limiting picketers to six or fewer persons. Basic patterns of
doctrinal interpretation and official enforcement had now
been established.
B. Strengthening JudicialAutonomy in a Periodof
Quiescence, 1926-1965
Almost four decades of relative quiescence in labor
relations followed the General Strike. During the depression trade unions ceased to regard the strike as a primary.
weapon and picketing became exceedingly infrequent.
Although the Conservative government enacted rigorous
controls over picketing in the Trade Disputes Act of 1927,195
enforcement of its picketing provisions was rare.'96 The

194. See, e.g., CITRINE, supranote 8, at 25; DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supranote
KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 262;
Bellace, supranote 3, at 133.
195. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch.
22, declared picketing calculated to intimidate any person in the place picketed
to be a criminal "watching or besetting." In itself this did not change the
existing law, but the act defined "intimidation" broadly as conduct likely to
cause a reasonable apprehension of injury, including "injury to a person in
respect of his business, occupation, employment or other source of income." The
law was further confused by a provision stating that it was a criminal offense to
watch or beset a person's residence for the purpose of persuading any person to
work or abstain from working. The wording suggested that notwithstanding the
immunity, the exercise of peaceful picketing near any residence was unlawful.
Id. § 3(4). The Act was repealed by the Labour Government shortly after the
war. Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 52.
196. See, e.g., DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 39, at 844 (noting that after
1926 there was a period of quiescence in labor relations); CYRIL GRUNFELD,
MODERN TRADE UNION LAw 442-43 (1966) (commenting that the lack of
picketing prosecutions in the sixty years after 1906 was due to the restraint of
trade unions and sensible enforcement by the police); M.A. Hickling, The
Judicial Committee and Trade Disputes, 24 MOD. L. REV. 375, 376 & n.2 (1961)
(remarking that the "absence of picketing cases from the law reports is a
remarkable tribute to the tolerance shown in England").

39, at 844; GEARY, supra note 184, at 48;
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Second World War further muted industrial conflict, and

beginning in 1951 a protracted period of economic
prosperity fostered a generally cooperative relationship
between employers and trade unions.
Nonetheless, there were still occasional police
prosecutions and private actions against picketers for
obstruction of the highway.'97 In addition, in 1937 the Supreme Court of Ireland announced a major new doctrinal
principle. Ferguson v. O'Gorman9. established that judicial
analyses of the TDA immunity and common law nuisance
would proceed on independent tracks. That is, parliamentary intent in providing an immunity for peaceful
persuasion and the social policy embodied in the TDA were
irrelevant to determining what constituted a "reasonable
use" of the streets at common law.
Fergusonwas the first reported case since Lyons where
an employer sued in private nuisance. Inasmuch as the
company based its nuisance claim on blocked access to its
premises rather than economic pressure, the case
illustrated the refocusing of nuisance lawsuits against
unionists on notions of physical rather than commercial
obstruction following the TDA's reversal of Lyons. It also
revealed a successful attempt by picketers to manipulate an
exemption for processions in common law obstruction
doctrine through the tactical device of parading back and
forth along the street.
The 1880s had consolidated a distinction between
stationary assemblies, which the courts treated as

197. For example, Agnes v. Ryan [1938] Ir. R. 512, was a suit brought by the
proprietor of a retail dairy in Dublin against picketers from the Irish Union of
Distributive Workers who paraded on the public highway in front of the public
entrance and informed potential customers that the creamery refused to employ
union labor. The proprietor sued in private nuisance for interference with her
employees and for causing injury to her business. She claimed that the
immunity was inapplicable because the employees had voluntarily rejected
joining a union and there was therefore no "trade dispute" within the meaning
of the act. The court agreed, also finding the conduct of the defendants to be a
wrongful nuisance. "Nothing could have been more damaging than the
picketing of premises in a congested thoroughfare like Henry Street.... ."Id at
524; see, e.g., Brendan Dunne Ltd. v. Fitzpatrick [1958] Ir. R. 29 (applying a
"reasonable method" test and finding that large numbers of picketers exceeded
the immunity); WEDDERBURN, supra note 13, at 225 (describing how picketers
during the Savoy Hotel strike of 1947 were convicted of obstructing the passage
of vehicles by lying down in the highway).
198. [1937] Ir. R. 620.
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they9
nuisances per se, and moving demonstrations, which
regarded as legitimate exercises of the "right to passage.'
Subsequently, picketers exploited the favored status of
processions by moving in a circle and asserting a "right to
pass" along the highway. By the 1920s, in fact, many
unionists believed that movement was essential to a
protected picketing campaign. As one striker declared,
pickets, you were only allowed one
"[y]ou had to be mobile
0
stationary picket.""'
In Ferguson the Irish Union of Distributive Workers
and Clerks mobilized four to six picketers to parade two
abreast along twenty feet of road during a strike against a
hairdressing establishment in Cork. The company responded by initiating a suit against the unionists in trespass and
nuisance. Its trespass claim was that the picketers were not
using the highway, which the proprietors technically
owned, for purposes of legitimate passage. Its private
nuisance claim was that the picketers were obstructing the
access of vehicles and pedestrians to the plaintiffs
premises, thereby physically impeding the company from
carrying on its business.2 0 ' The picketers defended their use

199. See Vorspan, supranote 41, at 976-82.

200. Quoted in MORGAN, supra note 7, at 218. There are many examples of
the use by unions of parading picketers between the 1880s and 1930s. See, e.g.,
R. v. Hibbert, 13 Cox C.C. 82, 83-85 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1875) (stating that
picketers walked up and down in front of plaintiffs factory); Judge v. Bennett
52 J.P. 247 (Q.B.D. 1888) (reporting that picketers paraded before premises of
boot and shoe manufacturers); M'Giveran v. Auld 21 R. (J.) 69 (1894) (stating
that men with posters marched back and forth along the pavement); 1894
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, 1 22 (noting that the police did
everything they could "to keep the men moving about a little, or else charged
them with obstructing the thoroughfare"); R. v. Wall, 21 Cox C.C. 401 (1907)
(reporting that picketers marched up and down in front of draper's business); 12
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1435-36 (Nov. 1, 1909) (commenting that the
National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades' Association had picketed a company
on Bond Street by parading back and forth along nineteen yards of pavement);
McCusker v. Smith [1918] 2 Ir. R. 432, 437 (KB.) (reporting that eight picketers
who paraded in front of struck pub claimed that "mere parading in front of a
house" was not unlawful); Agnes v. Ryan [1938] Ir. R. 512, 514 (discussing how
picketers in Dublin paraded back and forth in front of struck dairy carrying
placards); Brendan Dunne v. Fitzpatrick [1958] I.R. 29 (noting that parading
occurred in the vicinity of struck furniture company); 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 83, T 2699 (describing picketing as parading
before premises with banners and sandwich boards).
201. Ferguson[1937] Ir. R. at 623.
202. Id. at 624.
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of the street as an exercise of their legal right to passage."'
Mr. Justice Johnston rejected the plaintiffs application
for an interlocutory injunction, possibly influenced by the
fact that the numbers of picketers did not exceed what was
by now the accepted limit of six. Larkin had ruled that the
TDA did not authorize picketing on private property, he
reminded the plaintiff. Where else could it occur, he
queried, if not on a public street "at or near" the employer's
business? The plaintiffs construction of the Act, in other
words, would in effect repeal it.2"4 Though this decision was
unusual in exonerating the unionists, it was hardly radical
as a matter of labor policy. Indeed, the government and
police had long acknowledged that six picketers-especially
circling picketers-could invoke the immunity.
In contrast, the trial judge, in affirming the denial of an
injunction, broke significant new doctrinal ground. Mr.
Justice Meredith declined to base his conclusion on an
interpretation of the immunity, which in fact he construed
rather ungenerously, but rather propounded an unexpectedly sweeping approach to the common law rights of
picketers on the highway. Uncertain whether the immunity
applied to the street obstruction at issue-presumably
viewing the TDA as immunizing only against the Lyons
form of nuisance2 5 - the judge reasoned that the statute
nonetheless had a bearing on the definition of "reasonable
use" of the highway at common law.20 6 Picketing was usually
performed on the highway, he commented, and thus the
TDA constituted a statutory recognition that such an act
was not necessarily a trespass or a nuisance.0 7 Although
picketers must respect the fundamental right of the public
to pass, and certain types of picketing might be unlawful,
labor legislation suggested that trade union picketing might
be a reasonable use of the street.0 8 In reaching his
203. Id. at 631.
204. Id. at 627-28. He distinguished Larkin on the ground that it involved
picketing on private property rather than on a public street. Id.
205. He stated that section 2 did "not extend the rights of members of the
public as to the legitimate use of the highway, or prevent what would otherwise
be an infringement of the right of the owner of the soil from being a trespass or
a nuisance." Id. at 629.
206. Id. at 631.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 632-33. In order to make picketing an unreasonable use of the
highway and therefore a trespass, he observed, it would be necessary to import
into the trade union acts a general hostility to picketing not possible in light of
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conclusion, the judge was also influenced by the fact that
the picketers were mobile. He remarked that the picketing
was a form of "traffic on the highway concentrated on a
limited portion."20 9 Mr. Justice Meredith thus offered a
vision of a common law receptive to legislative change and
appropriately informed by parliamentary developments.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion of a common law responsive to legislative determinations and reverted to Johnston's statutory immunity
theory. Lord Sullivan observed for the court that in
enacting the TDA, Parliament "cannot reasonably have
contemplated that such a house or place would be situated
in a waste or no man's land."21 Unless the right to "attend"
was the right to attend on the highway, he concluded, such
right could not be exercised at all.21 ' The Supreme Court
held, that is, not that picketing was a reasonable use of the
highway but rather that the TDA authorized a use that
would otherwise be a common law violation-even though
the picketing at issue involved movement. Thus the court
decisively rejected Meredith's premise that common law
rules should reflect legislative determinations of public
policy.
Though favorable to picketers, the final decision in
Ferguson held worrisome aspects for unions. It approved
the immunity only in the case of a handful of picketers who
kept continuously on the move, and it upheld judicial
autonomy to interpret nuisance without regard to parliamentary policy judgments. It was an inauspicious omen
for the future of aggressive picketing, which was shortly to
become once again a staple feature of English economic life.
C. The Judiciaryand the Resurgence of MilitantPicketing,
1965-1980
In the mid-1960s militant union activity exploded
throughout England, triggering a judicial response that
resurrected the patterns established fifty years earlier.
Courts expanded the scope of common law nuisance to
defeat new union strike tactics while simultaneously
the TDA. Id. at 633.
209. Id. at 632.
210. Id. at 648.
211. Id.
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contracting the TDA to exclude newly identified nuisances
from the coverage of the picketing immunity. "Abstentionism" thus disappeared in the context of picketing long
before its formal statutory renunciation in the 1980s.
1. The New Union Militancy. The 1960s inaugurated
another era of severe industrial volatility. Militant shop
stewards, newly self-confident in a period of sustained full
employment, demanded wages and working conditions in
excess of levels acceptable to national union leaders. By
1965 the burgeoning number of "wildcat strikes" had
become a serious problem,212 and the government established a Royal Commission known as the Donovan
Commission to reevaluate the framework of industrial
relations.1 3 Despite bipartisan agreement that changes
were desirable, the traditional reluctance to regulate labor
relations inhibited the Commission from offering any
ambitious recommendations.2 4 It devoted little attention to
picketing and found section 2 of the TDA to be "reasonably
satisfactory."215 Nor did successive Labour and Conservative
212. See RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK, INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY 20
(1984); DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supranote 39, at 238-54; PELLING, supra note 15,
at 267-72; Klarman, supra note 3, at 1594-95.
213. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND
EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS, 1965-1968, Cmnd. 3623 [hereinafter DONOVAN
REPORT].

214. The Commission recommended a formal but primarily voluntary
restructuring of workplace procedures along American lines and the
establishment of an industrial commission to assist in this task. In 1969 the
Labour Government responded to the Donovan Commission with a White
Paper, In Place of Strife, that broadly accepted its proposals. It recommended
the creation of an administrative commission on industrial relations,
registration of labor unions and employers' associations, compulsory voting
prior to strikes and amenability of unions to tort judgments except in
connection with a labor dispute. FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY, IN PLACE OF STRIFE: A POLICY FOR
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 388 (1969) [hereinafter IN PLACE OF STRIFE]; see Lorraine
M. McDonough, The Transferability of American Law: Can an American
Transplant Take Root in British Soil?, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 504, 513 (1992). The
document produced a bitter split in the Labour Party, and the government
withdrew its proposals after strenuous opposition from the TUC. See, e.g., TONY
BENN, TRADE UNIONISM: A STRATEGY FOR THE NINETEEN-EIGHTIES 6 (1983);
CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 212, at 21; KAHN ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-17; ERIC
SHAW, DISCIPLINE AND DISCORD IN THE LABOUR PARTY 164-65 (1988);
McDonough, supra, at 514; Charles Y. Rowley, Toward a PoliticalEconomy of
British LaborLaw, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1135, 1139 (1984).
215. DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 213,
875. The Commission did,
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governments institute any significant changes in the
legislative regime governing picketing. Although the Conservative administration enacted a restrictive labor statute
in 1971,216 and Labour restored union rights in 1974 and
1976,21 the picketing immunity itself remained essentially
unaltered.218
however, recommend revision of the picketing immunity to permit the peaceful
persuasion of any customer or potential customer of an employer in dispute and
to remove protection from picketing a person's residence. Id.
875-76. In Place
of Strife did not propose any changes in the law of picketing, declaring that "the
present law does not place any unreasonable limitations on picketing, and that
properly enforced it provides sufficient safeguards against violent or
intimidatory behaviour." IN PLACE OF STRIFE, supra note 214, 99.
216. Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (IRA), ch. 72. The Act attempted to
implement a comprehensive legal framework similar to the NLRA. See
McDonough, supra note 214, at 515, 521. It considerably restricted trade union
immunities, exposed unionists to liability for "unfair industrial practices," and
narrowed the definition of "trade dispute." See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note
4, at 282-87. The TUC refused to cooperate with the new legislation, which
consequently fell quickly into disuse. See Rowley, supranote 214, at 1139.
217. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (TULRA) of 1974, ch. 52,
and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 1976, ch. 7,
broadened the definition of trade dispute, removed some restrictions on the
closed shop and expanded immunity against economic torts. The latter
extension was necessary because in the 1960s and 1970s courts developed the
tort of inducing breach of contract and created (or revived) the torts of
intimidation and interference with business by unlawful means. See, e.g.,
Rookes v. Barnard [1964] App. Cas. 1129 (H.L.) (tort of intimidation); Stratford
v. Lindley [1965] App. Cas. 269 (H.L.) (tort of indirectly inducing breach of
contract); Torquay Hotels v. Commissioners [1969] 2 Ch. 106 (C.A.) (tort of
interfering with performance of a contract); Langston v. AUEW [1974] I.C.R.
180 (C.A.) (tort of interference with the "right to work").
218. The picketing exemption in the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, ch. 72,
which repealed the TDA, stated in section 134:
(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect where one or more
persons (in this section referred to as 'pickets'), picketing in
contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, attend at or near
(a) a place where a person works or carries on business, or (b) any
other place where a person happens to be, not being a place where he
resides, and do so only for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
information from him or peacefully communicating information to him
or peacefully persuading him to work or not to work. (2) In the
circumstances specified in the preceding subsection, the attendance of
the pickets at that place for that purpose (a) shall not of itself
constitute an offence under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection
of Property Act 1875 (penalty for intimidation or annoyance by violence
or otherwise) or under any other enactment or rule of law, and (b) shall
not of itself constitute a tort.
Thus the section essentially followed section 2 of the 1906 Act but implemented
the recommendation of the Donovan Commission to remove protection from
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Stability in the formal statutory law, however, belied
significant changes in picketing practices. Secondary
picketing emerged as a major weapon of industrial conflict,
especially in the 1970s when national disputes became
increasingly common.219 In addition, labor adopted more
provocative and combative tactics, including physical
obstruction of the road by massive numbers of "demonstrators" who supported a small number of "official"
picketers stationed at factory entrances. For the first time
picketing also involved vigorous attempts to block vehicles,
an innovation that unions considered necessary because of
technological changes. Employees now generally arrived at
work by car or coach rather than on foot, and traditional
forms of persuasion were ineffective against motorized
strikebreakers.220 Unions also used their growing strength
and access to vehicles to dispatch "flying picketers" to
isolated areas to picket a broader range of secondary
facilities.22' In addition to exerting commercial pressure on
employers by obstructing replacement workers, picketers
also sought more broadly to damage the national economy
as a means of forcing the government to support higher
wage levels. 2
These more strident tactics first appeared during the
picketing a person's home. In 1974, the Labour Government replaced the IRA
with the Trade Unions Labour Relations Act of 1974, ch. 52, § 15, which
returned to the formulation of the 1906 Act.
219. See, e.g., DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 39, at 844 (observing that
after 1971 "picketing re-established itself as a major weapon of industrial
conflict"); KAHN ET AL., supranote 6, at 19 (commenting on the rise in the 1970s
of a national debate over picketing and secondary action); Kidner, supra note
134, at 256 (stating that picketing practice had changed considerably in recent
years, with increasing use of secondary activity to make strikes more effective);
J.E. Trice, Methods of and Attitudes to Picketing, 1975 CRIM. L. REV. 271, 271
(noting that between 1960 and 1970 there were 28,000 strikes and "picketing
has become an essential tactic"); see also MARTIN HOLMES, THE LABOUR
GOVERNmENT, 1974-79, at 137 (1985); KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 262;
RICHARD KiDNER, TRADE UNION LAW 199 (1979); Bellace, supra note 3, at 133;
Drake, supra note 87, at 212; Rowley, supra note 214, at 1155. See generally
Roger W. Rideout, Power, Picketers and the Closed Shop, 1979 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 199, 202.

220. See

KARN-FREUND,

supra note 8, at 263; Nick Blake, Picketing, Justice

and the Law, in POLICING THE MINERS' STRIKE 107 (Bob Fine & Robert Millar

eds., 1985); Kidner, supranote 134, at 261.
221. See TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 5, 142; Rowley, supra note
214, at 1154; see also Rubin, supra note 120, at 64.
222. See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 39, at 845; KAHN-FREUND, supra
note 8, at 261-62; Rowley, supranote 214, at 1154.
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national coal strike in the winter of 1972-the first national
strike in the industry since 1926-when miners picketed
electrical power stations to prevent oil from being used as a
substitute for coal.2" The dispute culminated in a blockade
by picketers of the Saltley coke depot that provoked serious
conflict with the police." That same year national strikes
erupted in the dock and construction industries, also
involving violent clashes between police and picketers.225
"[W]e are getting longer and bigger strikes," a Labour M.P.
remarked, "and they are more difficult to settle."226 Later in
the decade major civil strife occurred during a strike at the
Grunwick Film Processing Laboratories in North London.227
The changes in prevailing strike patterns-national
disputes, protracted stoppages and truculent union
strategies-brought picketing to renewed prominence and
precipitated a vigorous response from the authorities.
2. The Police Reaction. As earlier in the century, the
police made effective use of the criminal law of highway
obstruction. Nuisance remained more reliable, easier to
enforce, and more ostensibly evenhanded than the CPPA.228
223. See Trice, supra note 219, at 275-76 (noting that picketing during the
strike was very successful, with 1000 miners picketing on a single day in
February).
224. See id. at 275; Lewis, supranote 135, at 195-96.
225. See Lewis, supra note 135, at 196; Rubin, supra note 120, at 57; see also
R. v. Jones, 59 Cr. App. 120 (C.A. 1974) (arising out of violent episode during
building strike).
226. 830 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 178 (Jan. 31, 1972); see TAYLOR, supra
note 6, at 16-17 (observing that the number of short strikes dropped and
national confrontations increased).
227. The Grunwick dispute involved attempts by the Association of
Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) to obtain
recognition at the company. In June 1977 APEX initiated mass picketing to
heighten public awareness of the dispute, and there was significant violence on
the picket line. See TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 54 (1977); see also TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 347-52.
228. Prosecutions under section 7 remained rare through the 1970s. During
the miners' strike of 1972 and at Grunwick in 1977, no person was charged
under the section. See KIDNER, supra note 219, at 213; Kidner, supra note 134,
at 264. Noting this phenomenon, one commentator suggested that the reason
was fear of exacerbating labor disputes by enforcing a criminal provision
directed specifically against picketers. Bennion, supra note 87, at 72; see
Broome v. D.P.P. [1974] App. Cas. 587 (H.L.) (prosecution commenting in oral
argument that the 1875 Act had fallen into disuse); DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra
note 39, at 844 (remarking that the police rarely used the CPPA in the 1970s
because they preferred general public order charges such as obstruction of the
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The statutory offense of willful obstruction under the
Highways Act conferred a power of arrest, and its
elements-obstruction and lack of "lawful authority or
reasonable excuse"-were easily satisfied. There was no
need to prove specific intent; an obstruction need only be
partial or potential; and "reasonable excuse" continued to
require a connection with passage.129 As a TUC delegate
complained in 1876, when police arrested members of a
peaceful picket line, it was "very difficult indeed to come
before a magistrate and be cleared of an obstruction
charge.""' Accordingly, police frequently resorted to
nuisance to control mass picketing in major disputes,
especially during the miners' strike of 1972231 and the
Grunwick dispute of 1977,232 and they generally limited the
number of picketers to six.233 Their actions, especially in
highway and obstruction of a constable); Bercusson, supra note 87, at 273-76
(discussing difficulties in enforcing the CPPA).
229. See MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra note 47, at 31-32; Bennion, supra
note 87, at 68-69.
230. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH ANNUAL REPORT
450 (1976). A charge of highway obstruction could also be the predicate for the
offense of obstructing a constable in the exercise of his duty pursuant to the
Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act or the Police Act 1964. See infra note
297. This offense occurred when a constable anticipated that picketing did or
might obstruct the highway and asked a picketer to disperse; any person who
disobeyed the request was liable to arrest for obstructing the officer. See, e.g.,
Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool [1965] 3 All E.R. 99 (Cr. Ct.), affd sub
nom. Tynan v. Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91; Kavanagh v. Hiscock [1974] 1 Q.B. 600;
KIDNER, supra note 219, at 206 (observing that obstructing a constable
generally occurred when a demonstrator committed an obstruction of the
highway and refused a request to move); Rodney Austin, The Miners' StrikePublic OrderProphylactics,1986 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 227, 233.
231. During the miners' strike Reginald Maudling, the Home Secretary,
confirmed that "pickets were arrested for obstructing the footway and
obstructing the police." 830 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 417w (Feb. 10, 1972).
Two weeks later he again acknowledged that a large number of people were
charged with offenses "mainly of the more normal character of obstruction and
that kind of thing." 831 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1486 (Feb. 24, 1972); GEARY,
supranote 184, at 74.
232. Between June 1977 and January 1978, 532 people were arrested on the
picket line including 106 for obstruction of the highway and 208 for the related
offense of obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty. See 942 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 136 (Jan. 17, 1978); KIDNER, supranote 219, at 200; GEARY,
supra note 184, at 85, 87 (observing that picketers were "moved on" or arrested
for obstruction); Phil Scraton, From Saltley Gates to Orgreave:A History of the
Policing of Recent IndustrialDisputes, in POLICING THE MINERS' STRIKE 145, 152
(Bob Fine & Robert Millar eds., 1985).
233. See TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL
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assisting working employees to cross picket lines, cost them
the image of neutrality they had maintained in less contentious times. 4 Though police employed their massive
discretion to treat picketers tolerantly in less turbulent
periods or situations,135 in the new and more hostile climate
they again found nuisance a highly serviceable doctrine. 6
3. The JudicialResponse. Courts ratified police actions
by refining nuisance doctrine and adapting the immunity
specifically to meet the new challenges. Reflecting the prior
decades of relative tranquillity, in 1960 the classic labor
treatise, Norman Citrine's Trade Union Law, was sanguine
about judicial treatment of the unions. "[N]owadays," it
proclaimed, it was "not unlikely" that courts would consider
peaceful picketing to be a reasonable use of the highway
quite apart from section 2 of the TDA. 37 In addition, it
suggested, the immunity justified such nuisances as

REPORT 456 (1985) (recalling that at Grunwick there was "a restriction on the

number of picketers on the gate"); Scraton, supra note 232, at 152.
234. See GEARY, supra note 184, at 132; Lewis, supra note 135, at 216-17
(noting that charges of partiality occurred most notably during the Grunwick
dispute of 1977, the Stockport Messenger dispute of 1983, and the miners'
strike of 1984-1985).
235. See Bercusson, supra note 87, at 292 (declaring that it was an "open
secret" that the police often turned a blind eye to mass picketing); Kidner, supra
note 134, at 261 (stating that the police informally allowed picketers to
approach lorries to prevent confrontations among picketers, police, and
strikebreakers); Rubin, supra note 120, at 63 (noting that most picketing was
carried on to the satisfaction of the police); Trice, supra note 219, at 281
(suggesting that the infrequency of arrests indicated tolerance on the part of
both picketers and police). The government consistently maintained that the
police had operational independence with regard to picketing. For example,
when asked about five miners arrested near Charrington's Coal Depot in
London during the miners' strike of 1972, Reginald Maudling, the Home
Secretary, responded: "The enforcement of the law in the Metropolitan Police
District is the responsibility of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and
I have no authority to issue instructions to him on the manner in which the
police should deal with picketing." 830 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 417w (Feb.
10, 1972).
236. Many observers testified to the frequent use of obstruction charges
during the decade. See, e.g., KIDNER, supra note 219, at 200-04; Bennion, supra
note 87, at 68; V. Craig, Picketing and the Law, SCOTS LAW TimES 137 (1975);
Kidner, supra note 134, at 256-57; Rideout, supra note 219, at 203; Wallington,
supra note 39, at 107-08; see also Lewis v. Dickson [1976] R.T.R. 431 (Q.B.)
(security officer at British Leyland, working "to rule" in inspecting cars at
entrance to plant, arrested for highway obstruction).
237. See CITRINE, supra note 8, at 461.
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highway obstruction, marching back and forth, and chanting in unison. 38 Confronting virulent forms of picketing in a
period of industrial 23 turbulence,
courts quickly dashed
9
Citrine's expectations.
The judiciary mounted a four-pronged attack on
picketing. First, it dealt explicitly and thoroughly with the
persistent problem of mass picketing, announcing that even
anticipated obstruction of the highway by a group of
picketers constituted an indictable nuisance. Second, it
targeted the new tactic of stopping vehicles, declaring it to
be unprotected by the TDA and a common law obstruction
of the highway. Third, it invalidated the union's primary
defense to a nuisance charge, the claim that moving
picketers were exercising a right to passage. Finally, it
expanded the preventive powers of the police to encompass
picketing that raised the mere possibility that a nuisance
would be committed. Again, courts utilized the doctrinal
process of broadening nuisance doctrine to cover new union
tactics while concomitantly interpreting the immunity to
exclude them.
a. Mass Picketing.Mass picketing, first appearing as an
accompaniment to the "new unionism" at the end of the
nineteenth century, dominated the labor landscape after
the mid-1960s. Judges conclusively established that the
TDA did not immunize picketing in groups-obviously an
obstruction of the highway-because excessive numbers
indicated a purpose outside the immunity's scope. In
addition, they broke new ground in Tynan v. Chief

238. See id. at 451; Hickling, supranote 147, at 708 n.7 (stating that section
2 legalized conduct that might otherwise constitute a nuisance); Wedderburn,
supra note 4, at 166 (claiming that TDA justified trespass or nuisance to the
extent necessary to effect picketing).
239. The first sign of renewed judicial concern about picketing came in Bird
v. O'Neal [1960] App. Gas. 907 (P.C.), a decision of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council on appeal from the West Indies Court of Appeal. The court
found picketing in front of a drug store involving the performance of a steel
band, threats and blocked access to be an actionable nuisance. Though not
pronouncing on the legality of peaceful picketing per se, it suggested-by not
considering the Leeward Islands equivalent to section 2 as a defense-that a
shouting crowd of picketers was necessarily an actionable nuisance regardless
of the fact that it occurred in a trade dispute. That is, the court made clear that
shouting picketers were a nuisance and that no immunity encompassed such
conduct. See Wedderburn, supranote 4, at 166.
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Constable of Liverpool24 ° in finding that mass picketing that
might "possibly" cause an obstruction was a public
nuisance.
Tynan arose when three hundred out of eight or nine
thousand workers struck a plant of the English Electric
Company in Liverpool in 1964. Following a recommendation in "the
union's book of instructions that they
"move around, 4 ' forty picketers circled the plant outside
the main entrance, laying the foundation for a defense
based on their right to pass along the highway. The circling
maneuver halted vehicles arriving at the transport gate,
where picketers handed drivers a leaflet about the strike."
Tynan, chairman of the strike committee, refused a police
order to desist from circling. "No," he insisted, "we want to
make a test case of it." 4 ' He was arrested and convicted by
a stipendiary magistrate of willfully obstructing a constable
in the execution of his duty.
The Recorder of Liverpool, Judge Chapman, broadly
interpreted the requirements of nuisance, concluding that
picketing was an unreasonable use of the highway at
common law if it merely posed a possibility of obstruction.
Even if the picketing took place on the edge of the highway,
he reasoned, "its natural result would be to bring vehicular
traffic on the highway to a standstill and to impede
pedestrians using the highway, if and when a vehicle or a
pedestrian came up to it." 4 The constable thus had reasonable ground for thinking that "the potential notional
obstructions" would become "almost inevitabl[y], and
certainly as a real possibility, an actual positive
obstruction."45 Although use of the concept of potential obstruction was not unusual in nuisance law, it seemed
misguided in circumstances where it negated parliamentary intent in enacting the labor statutes. Tynan
followed the precedent of Ferguson in refusing to consider
the TDA as relevant to the definition of "reasonable use" of
the highway at common law.
240. Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool [1965] 3 All E.R. 99, 106 (Cr.
Ct.), affd sub nom. Tynan v. Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91.
241. Tynan [1965] 3 All E.R. at 102, 104.
242. The strikers, who were all white-collar workers, were "not in the least
ruffianly types" but rather "decent, well-mannered, orderly people." Id. at 102.
243. Id. at 101.
244. Id. at 105.
245. Id.
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Judge Chapman also rejected Tynan's immunity
defense through an analysis of both the picketers' purpose
and the meaning of "attendance." First, the picketers had
not evinced a proper purpose because their excessive
numbers and circling technique hindered rather than
facilitated the objective of communication.24 A few men
lined up as a "guard of honour" on each side of the entrance,
he remarked, would have better achieved the purposes of
the TDA.247 Obviously, one of the objects of the strikers was
to bring traffic to a standstill.2 48 The judge even suggested
at one point that only a solitary striker could legitimately
use the TDA as a defense.249 Second, although the right to
attend might legalize certain obstructions that were
common law nuisances, it did so only to the extent that
attendance could not "reasonably take place at all without
producing that result."250 Mass picketers, he declared, were
not reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislatively
authorized act of attendance.'
The Divisional Court affirmed the Recorder on
essentially the same grounds. Lord Widgery began his
opinion by observing that the picketers' conduct was clearly
a common law nuisance,2 and thus the sole question was
whether the unreasonable use of the highway was
authorized by the TDA. On this point he accepted the lower
court's determination that as a factual matter the picketers
were not attending only to communicate and peacefully
persuade, even though that finding itself was entirely
inferential. That is, Lord Widgery conceded that the
picketers may have had a proper purpose, but he found that
the immunity was inapplicable because they had the
additional purpose of obstructing the highway. He reached
this conclusion based not on proof of a common purpose to
obstruct but only on an inference from the fact of the
obstruction itself.

246. Id. at 104.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. If there were a strike at the Ritz hotel, he observed, several hundred
strikers could not gather in Piccadilly and "bring the whole of the traffic to a
standstill." Id.
250. Id. at 103.
251. Id. at 104. The courts suggested that two or three picketers would be
sufficient to cope with cars and pedestrians. Id.
252. Id. at 105.

1998]

POWER OFNUISANCE LAW

657

This circumscribed approach to "purpose" was supplemented by an equally constrained view of "attendance."
The appellate opinion adopted the narrowest possible
interpretation of the term, construing the statute as simply
a rejection of Lyons rather than an effort to extend any
broader protection to picketers. Capitalizing on the
ambiguities of the 1906 Act, Lord Widgery suggested that
the legislation did not immunize against public nuisances
such as highway obstruction but only against private
nuisance in the form of economic compulsion. "One should
not, in my judgment, regard section 2 as being primarily a
highway section," he declared. 253 Finally, he rejected
Tynan's argument that section 2 made picketing a lawful
use of the highway and that the lack of any actual
obstruction was relevant.254 Tynan thus accelerated the
judicial attack on mass picketing by expanding nuisance in
the labor context to include mere potential obstruction of
the highway, by holding the immunity inapplicable if a
proper purpose was accompanied by an inferentially
illegitimate one, and by interpreting "attendance" to
immunize
only economic pressure and-just possibly-a
few persons standing in the street.255
A few years later, in Broome v. Director of Public
Prosecutions,25 6 the House of Lords gratuitously confirmed
Tynan's holding that mass picketing forfeited the
exemption due to its illegitimate purpose. Even though
there was no evidence of mass picketing in Broome, Lord
Reid took the opportunity to approve Tynan's reasoning

253. Id. at 106. He noted that Lyons treated picketing as a nuisance quite
apart from any obstruction of the highway and that the statute rejected Lyons
in the context of trade disputes. Id.
254. Id.
255. The Donovan Commission, continuing its work while Tynan was sub
judice, declined to respond to invitations to reform the law on mass picketing
either to permit or prohibit it, though it intimated that mass picketing was not
necessary to effectuate any legitimate purpose. "It is not clear however why
mass picketing is required simply to communicate information, and the
advocates of this proposal did not suggest that they desired it for any other
purpose than to demonstrate solidarity, which can be done equally well by other
means ....It should be recalled that the prime objects of picketing are to make
known the existence and the facts of the dispute and peaceably to persuade
persons to abstain from working. Obstruction or intimidation is unlawful and
no change in this respect has been advocated by anybody." DONOVAN REPORT,
supra note 213, T 874-75.
256. [1974] App. Cas. 587 (H.L.).
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that picketers who assembled in unreasonably large
numbers exhibited the unauthorized purpose of preventing
free passage. Lord Salmon similarly observed that although
in theory magistrates could decide that a crowd of picketers
intended only peaceful persuasion, no reasonable bench of
magistrates was "likely to reach such a conclusion." 25 7 By

the 1970s courts had conclusively established that mass
picketers inevitably committed an unprotected act of
nuisance.
b. Stopping Vehicles. The second picketing tactic that
courts invalidated through nuisance law was the more
recent and controversial strategy of blocking the movement
of cars and trucks. Trade unionists strongly believed that
the right to persuade was meaningless unless picketers
could obstruct the passage of motorized vehicles.258 In
Tynan, for example, the defendant argued that even if there
were no right to stop a pedestrian, who could easily be
approached on foot the section nonetheless authorized
detaining a driver? The court responded bluntly that
section 2 of the TDA did not permit picketers to block
vehicles.26 ° In the same year the TUC formally requested
the Donovan Commission to expand the immunity to allow
picketers to communicate with people whether "in a vehicle
or on foot."26' The Commission reported that nothing in the
section prevented such communication-presumably
picketers could shout at truck drivers as they sped by-and
declined to authorize picketers to stop vehicles in order to
speak with their occupants. "[I]t would be impossible," the
Commission reasoned, "to define such a right in terms
which would avoid considerable obstruction to the highway
and serious risk of personal injury to the picketers
257. Id. at 604; see B.W. Napier, The Limits of Peaceful Picketing, 33
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 196, 199 (1974).
258. See, e.g., DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 39, at 845 (reporting that
the TUC was particularly concerned to obtain a right to address drivers); Robert
East et al., The Death of Mass Picketing, 12 J.L. & SOCy 305, 306. (1985)
(commenting that "modem transport had destroyed personal contact and
reduced picketers' opportunities to communicate with and persuade others");
Kidner, supra note 88, at 261 (remarking that trade unions had pursued a right
to stop on the basis that a right to communicate could not be effective in
relation to vehicles without it).
259. Tynan v. Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91, 107.
260. Id. (Lord Parker, concurring); see Napier, supra note 257, at 198.
261. DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 213, 874.
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themselves."262
In Broome the House of Lords itself addressed the issue,
placing its imprimatur on Tynan's contraction of the
immunity and applying it specifically to the question of
stopping vehicles. During a national builders' strike in
1972, John Broome, a trade union official, held a poster in
front of a lorry attempting to deliver supplies to a
construction site in Stockport. The driver wished to cross
the picket line, but Broome refused to move out of the way
and held up the lorry for nine minutes. Though the incident
was peaceful-involving not even an angry exchange of
words 2 -Broome was arrested and charged with obstruction under the Highways Act. He argued that his
action was justified both because the statute authorized
peaceful persuasion and because he was using the highway
reasonably. Unexpectedly, the Stockport justices dismissed
the charge, accepting Broome's argument that nine minutes
"Cwas not an unreasonably long time for the defendant to
spend in exercising his statutory right peacefully to seek to
persuade a person not to work."" The Divisional Court,
however, disagreed. Inasmuch as it was "beyond argument"
that the defendant had obstructed the highway under the
common law,266 Lord Widgery reasoned, the only question
262. Id. In practice there was considerable variety as to what the police
allowed. Many officers permitted picketers to stop lorry drivers and ask them
not to cross picket lines. See Craig, supra note 236, at 138 (recounting that
during the 1972 miners' strike the police stopped lorries and allowed picketers
to talk to drivers); Kidner, supra note 88, at 261 (noting that the police
sometimes allowed picketers to approach vehicles to prevent confrontations);
Trice, supra note 219, at 280 (indicating that during the 1972 miners' strike the
police assisted picketers to stop lorries). Other constables, however, rigorously
enforced the law. A Labour member stated during the coal strike of 1972 that
"[tloday we see lorry drivers being paid to drive through picket lines, and in
certain areas-not all-there seems to be an unfortunate alliance between the
police and certain industrial companies." Although some picketers had the
cooperation of the police, "there have been places where that is not so," causing
the death of one picketer knocked down by a lorry that failed to stop when
entering a plant. 830 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1283-84 (Feb. 8, 1972). Another
member of Parliament claimed that at Saltley the police prevented peaceful
picketers of the NUM and TGWU from talking to lorry drivers. Some non-union
lorry drivers had been told by their employers that if they came away with a
full load they would receive a bonus and if not they would lose their jobs. Id. at
1289.
263. Broome v. D.P.P. [1974] App. Cas. 587 (H.L.).
264. Id. at 589.
265. Hunt v. Broome [1973] 1 Q.B. 691, 693.
266. Id. at 696; see Napier, supranote 257, at 199.
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was the correct interpretation of the immunity.261 In this
regard the proper inquiry was not what was reasonably
necessary to persuade peacefully, but only what was
268
reasonably necessary to secure bare physical presence.
The objective of bare attendance, he emphasized, while
possibly sanctioning oral and visual methods such as
speaking and exhibiting posters,69 did not encompass the
obstruction of a vehicle or person.
On appeal the Lords affirmed, all agreeing that the
immunity did not reach the obvious nuisance of stopping a
vehicle.2 There were variations, however, in the approaches of the judges. Lord Reid opted for the widest view
of the immunity, suggesting that "attendance" included
signaling or inviting a driver to stop and, if he complied,
attempting to persuade him not to proceed.2 7' Even this
action would otherwise be a crime or a tort, he noted,
particularly if more than a few picketers were acting in
concert.272 However, he cautioned that there was no
statutory right to restrict the personal freedom of the
driver, as this would imply that a motorist had a statutory
duty to stop.273 "One is familiar with persons at the side of a
road signaling to a driver requesting him to stop. It is then
for the driver to decide whether he will stop or not. That, in
my view, a picket is entitled to do."274 The picketer's legal
rights, in other words, resembled those of a hitchhiker.27
Lord Morris exhibited a slightly different emphasis.
Rather than focusing on the meaning of "attend," he
inferred improper purpose from the existence of the
obstruction. He concluded, that is, that the fact of a

267. Broome [1973] 1 Q.B. at 696-97.
268. Id. at 700. Lord Widgery observed that initially the argument that the
Act only rendered lawful the act of attendance appeared to him remarkably
narrow, because it was improbable that Parliament would have gone to all the
trouble to legalize something not likely to be unlawful at all. But further
research had convinced him that attendance would otherwise have been
unlawful as a section 7 violation or a trespass to the highway. Id. at 697-98.
269. Id. at 701.
270. All the judges rejected the argument that the statute made picketing a
reasonable use of the highway. Broome v. D.P.P. [1974] App. Cas. 590 (H.L.).
271. Id. at 597.
272. Id.
273. Id. Lord Reid also applied the traditional analysis that an improper
purpose could be inferred from the picketers' numbers. Id. at 597-98.
274. Id. at 597.
275. See Wedderburn, supranote 169, at 511.
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nuisance implied a purpose to commit it. Similar to Lord
Widgery in Tynan, Lord Morris took the view that Broome's
obstruction of a vehicle indicated a purpose not only to
peacefully persuade the driver but also to detain him
against his will.276
The narrowest opinion of all was offered by Lord
Salmon, who echoed the view that an obstruction was a
nuisance that both exceeded attendance and reflected an
improper purpose. "Attendance" did not empower picketers
to stop a person from using the highway to reach work, he
concluded, as that would be an "astonishing interference
with the liberty of the subject."277 Each person had "the
right to use the highway free from the risk of being
compulsorily stopped by any private citizen. ""' This
formulation, treating a striker as a "private citizen,"
implied that the statute conferred no special rights on
picketers at all.279 Lord Salmon found, as had Lord Morris,
that physically blocking access was proof that one of the
picketers' purposes was to prevent entry. '"Men are usually
presumed to intend the natural consequences of their
acts. 280
Highway obstruction thus served a dual function in the
case. First, the act of standing in the street and obstructing
vehicles was unquestionably a nuisance. Second, the act of
276. Broome [1974] App. Cas. at 590. Attendance did not involve a right to
stop or other reasonable means to further a statutory purpose; this would
involve "reading into the section words which are not there." Id. at 599.
277. Id. at 603. Parliament, he noted, would not have done so without
making "its intention plain by express and unambiguous language." Id.
278. Id.
279. Lord Salmon stated that because the statute immunized the otherwise
unlawful act of "attendance," it was not meaningless if it did not permit
stopping vehicles. Id.
280. Id. at 604. Viscount Dilhorne, joined by Lord Hodson, also adopted a
narrow view of the immunity. He agreed with Lord Reid that picketers could
"invite persons and vehicles to stop" but that they could do nothing else. Id. at
601. He rejected Broome's assertion that the statute was meaningless if it did
not permit the stoppage of vehicles, observing that it legalized attendance,
which would otherwise be obstruction of free passage along the highway. Id. at
600. Even if the section as it stood was meaningless, "it would be wrong in the
absence of Parliamentary intent to interpret it at the expense of other people's
rights." Id. As to the difference between the formulation in the 1906 Act and the
1971 Act-the fact that the TDA specified that attendance "shall be lawful"
whereas the IRA provided that it "shall not of itself constitute an offence or a
tort"-Viscount Dilhorne concluded that the change of language did not involve
any change of meaning. Id. at 601.
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obstruction forfeited the immunity by exceeding mere
attendance and demonstrating a purpose to obstruct. The
entire analysis, as seemingly complicated as it was, reduced
itself to a single proposition. Exactly the same conductcommitting the nuisance of obstruction-both eradicated
the statutory protection and constituted the predicate
offense for a prosecution under the general law. Broome, a
decision of the nation's highest court, represented a
culmination of the activist judicial effort to narrow the
picketing rights of trade unionists through the instrument
of nuisance. It made nuisance central to the analysis of
lawful picketing and left picketers who detained drivers
defenseless against a nuisance charge of highway
obstruction. Further, it reoriented the discussion toward
the importance of protecting the rights of nonstrikers,
equating
strikers
with
ordinary
citizens-even
hitchhikers-lacking any special legislative immunity.28 '
When the Labour Party returned to power shortly after
Broome, the TUC renewed its campaign for legislation that
would enable picketers to communicate with occupants in
vehicles. 2 In 1975 the Labour government moved in this
direction by proposing to insert into its Employment
Protection Bill a right for picketers to communicate with
pedestrians and drivers. 283 The bill, however, only permitted
attempts to persuade "falling short of obstruction of the
highway."28 The Congress found the provision unsatisfactory for obvious reasons, and the enactment failed in the
House of Commons.85 Broome thus remained the author-

281. Kavanagh v. Hiscock [1974] 1 Q.B. 600, reiterated that there was no
right as such to picket but only an immunity that did not encompass even the
right to ask a driver to stop. According to Lord Widgery, it was "fundamental to
a proper understanding of the present case that there was no right in any of
these picketers to stop the progress of the vehicle unless the driver wished to
stop." Id. at 610. The House of Lords thought that this point was covered by
Broome, which said there was no right to approach vehicles, and refused leave
to appeal. See KRDNER, supranote 219, at 204; Napier, supra note 257, at 199.
282. See Craig, supranote 236, at 138; Kidner, supranote 134, at 261.
283. See Bercusson, supranote 87, at 286; Lewis, supranote 135, at 198.
284. See Kidner, supranote 134, at 262 n.26.
285. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH ANNuAL REPORT 75

(1976). Several Labour M.P.s did not vote because they viewed the clause as
useless. See Bercusson, supra note 87, at 286 n.43. The legislation also
engendered opposition from the police, who thought that enforcing a right to
stop vehicles would infringe their neutrality. See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra
note 4, at 85.
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itative interpretation of existing law on the issue of
stopping vehicles.
c. CirclingPicketers. In addition to crippling the tactics
of mass picketing and blocking vehicles, courts eliminated a
standard defense that demonstrators had used against
nuisance charges for almost a century: the assertion of a
right to passage along the highway. Labor picketers as well

as other protesters had employed it since the

1880s,

286

but

when picketing became more ambitious, better organized,
and more threatening in the 1960s, the judiciary explicitly
rejected this defense. In so doing, it immediately brought a
longstanding labor practice to a virtual halt.
Tynan 2 -was once again the major case. In his decision,
Judge Chapman declared circling to be impermissible on
two grounds: it demonstrated an unprotected legislative
purpose, and it failed to constitute a legitimate exercise of
the right to passage. According to the court, the circling
maneuver did not effectuate the purposes of the 1906 Act
but was simply a device to bring vehicular traffic to a
standstill.28 Although the picketers asserted that "they
were exercising their ordinary common law right of passing
and repassing," the judge regarded their argument as "a
They were not exercising a right to pass, he
thin one.
objected, merely because their "blockage took the form of a
revolving circle. 2 11 In fact, it would have made no difference
if, "instead of being stationary, they produced the same
291
result by walking round and round in an unbroken circle."
Ironically, in the context of political processions such as
anti-nuclear marches-where the demonstrations were not
only patently unrelated to actual travel but the participants
286. See cases cited supranote 200. In these reported cases the court did not
reach the merits of the defense because unionists were invariably convicted of
offenses other than obstruction. However, in one case, M'Cusker v. Smith,
[1918] 2 Ir. R. 432, 428 (MB.), the judge stated in dictum that parading would
be legitimate if the picketers did not enter the premises. Picketers continued to
use the parading technique as standard practice after Ferguson. See, e.g., Bird
v. O'Neal [1960] App. Cas. 907, 913 (P.C.) (appeal taken from West Indian
Court of Appeal); Piddington v. Bates [1961] 3 All E.R. 660, 661 (Q.B.).
287. Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool [1965] 3 All E.R. 99 (Cr. Ct.),
aff'd sub nom. Tynan v. Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91.
288. [1965] 3 All E.R. at 104.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 103.
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lacked any special legislative protection-courts were
accepting precisely such an argument predicated on
movement.
As a consequence of Tynan, strikers in
England, in contrast to those in America, ceased to parade
along the pavement and instead simply stationed
themselves at the entrances to company premises." 3
A decade later a High Court judge confirmed in dicta
that circling failed to afford industrial picketers a common
law defense. In Hubbard v. Pitt,294 a case involving social
workers who picketed a real estate agency in London, Mr.
Justice Forbes validated the distinction between processions and stationary assemblies on the highway. A
peaceful march was lawful as an exercise of the right of
passage, he proclaimed whereas a stationary meeting or
demonstration was not. However, he followed convention
in treating a labor picket-even if circling-as a stationary
assembly. He cited Tynan for the proposition that it was
pointless for labor picketers to attempt "a colourable
pretence" of passage by moving around.296 Thus in the 1960s
and 1970s courts not only extended highway obstruction
doctrine to encompass new picketing tactics, but they also
expressly invalidated in the case of unions a primary
defense against nuisance that labor picketers and other
groups had utilized for nearly a century.
d. Preventive Action. The final prong in the judicial
assault on picketing involved the discretionary power of the
police to disperse picketers based on anticipated harm to
the public. The Divisional Court had first conferred such
preventive common law authority on constables in the 1936
case of Duncan v. Jones,297 which upheld the right of an
292. See, e.g., R. v. Clark (No. 2) [1964] 2 Q.B. 315 (Crim. App.) (holding
that a procession conducted by the Committee on Nuclear Disarmament might
be a reasonable use of the street).
293. See, e.g., Bellace, supra note 3, at 134 (comparing English and
American picketing activity in terms of movement).
294. [1976] 1 Q.B. 142.
295. Id. at 157.
296. Id.
297. [1936] 1 IKB. 218. A constable who preventively used common law
Duncan powers and faced resistance effected an arrest for the crime of
"obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty" pursuant to section 2 of
the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., ch. 75, § 2, or
the Police Act, 1964, ch. 48, § 51. See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 47, at 264;
AvROM SHERR, FREEDOM OF PROTEST, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE LAW 125 n. 1 (1989);
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officer to preemptively restrain a political assembly based
on reasonable anticipation of a breach of the peace. In 1961
the Divisional Court extended this doctrine to a situation of
industrial picketing in Piddington v. Bates.298 Although
Piddington also involved a potential breach of the peace,
the case had critical implications for the role of nuisance in
picketing law. In introducing the Duncan rule into the labor
context, it paved the way for courts to apply preventive
concepts to anticipated nuisance in Tynan a few years later.
Piddingtonarose during a 1959 strike against the Free
Press in London, a small company employing non-union
labor whose personnel remained at work during a printing
dispute. Eight employees were working inside the premises
when two vehicles drew up containing eighteen union
picketers. Two picketers positioned themselves at each of
the premises' two entrances. When Piddington, a member of
the union, attempted to join the two back-door picketers, a
constable told him that two at each door were sufficient.
"I'm going there and you can't stop me," Piddington replied,
pushing past the constable. "I know my rights."29 The
situation involved no disorder, violence, or obstruction of
the highway. In such peaceful circumstances, the defendant
contended, the constable had no right to restrict the
number of picketers to two. Indeed, he argued, two
picketers were insufficient to communicate either with
workers, who generally entered and left en masse, or with
lorry drivers who delivered materials to the premises. The
magistrate, however, accepted the constable's view that
picketing by three persons might have produced intimidation and a breach of the peace."
On appeal, Lord Parker held the law to be "reasonably
plain.""' An arrest was proper if a constable reasonably
anticipated a real possibility of a breach of the peace.
Moreover, the picketers enjoyed no TDA immunity because
their numbers implied an unprotected purpose. Eighteen
unionists were not necessary to picket only eight workers,
and therefore the police officer reasonably suspected "something more than mere picketing to communicate infor-

PETER THORNTON, PUBLIC ORDER LAw 93 (1987).

298.
299.
300.
301.

[1960] 3 All E.R. 660 (Q.B.).
Id. at 661.
Id. He found Piddington guilty of obstruction of a constable. Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
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mation or peaceably persuade.""°2 Although Lord Parker
was troubled by the apparently arbitrary limitation of the
picketers to two at each entrance, he left it to the police
officer to take such steps as he thought proper."3
Piddington thus established four propositions. First, it
confirmed that courts could circumvent the statutory
immunity by inferring unprotected purposes from unreasonable means, particularly the presence of "excessive"
numbers of picketers. Second, in finding that more than two
picketers at the entrance to a workplace was unjustifiable,
it sanctioned an exceptionally restrictive quantitative test
in determining "reasonableness." 4 Third, by validating the
particularized factual judgments of a constable, the case
vested extensive discretion in the police to regulate the
picket line. Finally, the decision was significant for endorsing in the picketing context the Duncan notion that police
could preventively reduce the number of picketers based on
anticipated consequences. The importance that the government attached to the case was indicated by the Home
Secretary's immediate circulation of the judgment to all
police chiefs." 5
In 1974 Kavanagh v. Hiscock. 6 carried the preventive
approach even further, upholding a constable's discretionary power not merely to reduce the number of picketers
but to eliminate them entirely. Kavanagh linked the
preventive common law powers established in Piddington
with the rigorous concepts of highway obstruction developed in Tynan and Broome. ° Significantly, it allowed a
constable to disperse picketers in advance based not on
anticipated breach of the peace but merely on the poten302. Id.
303. Id. He stated "all these matters are so much matters of degree that I,
for my part, would hesitate, except on the clearest evidence, to interfere with
the findings of the'magistrates." Id.
304. The General Secretary of the TUC expressed to the Home Secretary his
concern that the case might motivate the police to limit arbitrarily the number
of picketers. See Drake, supranote 87, at 214 n.9.
305. Id.
306. [1974] 1 Q.B. 600.
307. There was also dictum involving preventive action in Tynan. Judge
Chapman suggested that the police would have acted properly in removing the
picketers even if no actual obstruction had occurred, thus upholding preventive
action against picketers based solely on highway obstruction that was, in itself,
merely anticipated. Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool [1965] 3 All E.R. 99,
105 (Cr. Ct.), affd sub nom. Tynan v. Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91.
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tiality of an obstruction of the highway.
The case involved a 1973 electricians' strike at a
building site in Lambeth for St. Thomas' Hospital. After
several weeks of picketing, thirty or forty people including
the defendant assembled outside the hospital gates. By
prior arrangement with the police, four men wearing
armbands were designated as the "official" picketers. As a
coach carrying working electricians was about to depart
through the gates, the police formed a cordon of twenty-four
officers on each side of the entrance. Removing even the
official picketers from the immediate area, they prevented
anyone from speaking to or approaching the coach driver.
The police chief explained that on previous occasions large
numbers of picketers had shouted at the workers and that a
recurrence of such conduct might precipitate violence.
Peter Kavanagh, a member of the Transport and
General Workers' Union (TGWU), noticed that the four
official picketers had been cleared from the gateway.
Attempting to break through the cordon to speak to the
coach driver, he pushed against Alan Hiscock, a constable,
who told him to "[k]eep moving and stop pushing." "You
can't tell me what to do, you little squirt," Kavanagh
replied, punching Hiscock in the back. Shouting and
swearing as he pushed past another officer, Kavanagh was
arrested and convicted of obstructing a constable."'
On appeal the defendant argued that removing the four
official picketers amounted to a complete denial of the
strikers' right to peacefully persuade the driver. "If the
police action in the present case is lawful," insisted Lord
Gifford, counsel for Kavanagh, "no possibility exists of
picketing."3°9 However, Lord Widgery-also a member of the
court in Tynan and Broome-observed that there were
several justifications for police action in clearing a path for
the coach. First, the constable had a reasonable
308. [1974] 1 Q.B. at 602-03.
309. Id. at 604. During argument before the Divisional Court, Lord Gifford
contended that it was lawful for picketers to gesture to a driver to stop, invite
him to enter into conversation, and try to persuade him not to continue his
course of conduct. He observed that the essence of picketing was not
demonstrating but attempting to persuade non-strikers. The prosecution
argued that picketers were not entitled to stop vehicles because in Broome only
Lord Reid had suggested that attendance included a right to approach a driver
to stop and listen. It supported Lord Widgery's view in the Divisional Court that
the methods of persuasion were limited to oral or visual methods. Id. at 604-05.
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apprehension based on past experience that the picketers
would stop the vehicle, thereby interfering with the rights
of the driver and passengers. Second, the constable
reasonably feared that there would be disorder or at the
least threatening language. Finally, police officers had "the
general duty to regulate the use of the highway by
competing users, and to make sure that everybody gets a
fair share." 1° The statute, he reminded unionists, did not
create a positive right to persuade but merely an immunity
for bare "attending."311
Kavanagh's significance lay mainly in its extreme
preventive implications. It invested the police with common
law powers to restrain even lawful picketing within the
immunity." Further, it allowed them to do so on either of
two grounds, to avoid a breach of the peace or to prevent an
anticipated nuisance such as highway obstruction. The case
further suggested that the police could use their highway
powers to prevent picketers from even inviting or signaling
a driver to stop. Kavanagh invoked the Duncan rule as
applied to picketing by Piddington and extended it to the
most minimal form of anticipated interference with passage. Under its authority, the police could literally prevent
any type of picketing at all. The discretionary police power
to limit the number of picketers based on anticipated
disorder or nuisance was probably the most serious
limitation on the freedom to picket in the 1970s.3 13
4. Counterpoint: Non-Industrial Picketing. The
treatment of non-industrial picketers provides an
illuminating perspective on the treatment of labor picketers
in the same period. Picketing by groups other than
employees first became prominent in the 1970s when
political and consumer organizations began boycotting

310. Id. at 608.
311. Id. at 609-10. Lord Reid had used the term "right" in Broome, and thus
Lord Widgery felt obliged to clarify that his Lordship had not meant that there
was a "right" to picket, but only that there was a statutory immunity. Mr.
Justice Boreham agreed and further stated that the police were doing no more
than was reasonably necessary to prevent a breach or the peace or an
obstruction. Id. at 611.
312. See Case Comment, CRIM. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1974).
313. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 264; R.D. Hendry, The Liability of
the Masses, 7(1) LIVERPOOL L. REV. 156, 164 (1985); Napier, supra note 257, at
200.
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companies to publicize their objectives and inflict economic

pressure. " Non-industrial picketing was theoretically, of
course, even less protected than industrial picketing. The
right to "attend," which generally allowed at least a
technical obstruction to the highway by fewer than six
persons, applied only to actions in furtherance of a trade
dispute. 15 Strict common law doctrines were therefore fully
applicable to situations of political or consumer picketing.
Hubbard v. Pitt, 16 a 1976 decision of the Court of
Appeal, confirmed the rigid rules governing non-industrial
picketing and also held important implications for labor
picketing. First, the case provided a baseline to compare the
rights of immunized as opposed to non-immunized picketers
and thereby to ascertain the effectiveness of the picketing
immunity. Second, it stood as a major authority on the
common law rights of picketers; as such, it would have
growing importance when labor's statutory immunity
shrank dramatically in the 1980s. Third, it again revealed
the elasticity of nuisance as courts molded it to defeat
another new picketing strategy, the consumer boycott.
Fourth, it was the first major picketing case since Lyons to
involve private nuisance in the form of economic pressure,
and it revitalized the sharply restrictive rule that Lyons
had announced at the end of the nineteenth century.
Hubbard arose in 1975 when a pro-tenant group in
Islington began to picket the offices of local real estate
agents whom they suspected of conspiring with property
developers in a gentrification scheme. The picketers, mostly
middle-class social workers, believed that large scale
renovation was encouraging landlords to harass rental
tenants. On three consecutive days in March, members of
the group "attended" on the public sidewalk in front of the
agents' offices, displaying placards and distributing leaflets.
They repeated this tactic for three hours each on succeeding
Saturdays. The real estate agents, Prebble & Company,
sued for an injunction based on nuisance to the highway,
conspiracy to unlawfully use the highway, and defamation.
In the High Court, Mr. Justice Forbes granted an
314. See Kidner, supra note 134, at 267 (suggesting in 1975 that nonindustrial picketing was a recent phenomenon).
315. Persuasion directed at suppliers or customers even by industrial
picketers was unprotected. See GRUNFELD, supra note 196, at 452-53; KAHNFREUND, supra note 8, at 265.
316. [1976] 1 Q.B. 142 (CA.).
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interlocutory injunction on the ground that use of the
highway for non-industrial picketing was per se a common
law public nuisance. He distinguished Ward, which had
declared that picketing was not necessarily a common law
nuisance, by pointing out that it had involved an industrial
dispute and was influenced by the contemporaneous
passage of the TDA. 17 If peaceful picketing were lawful
when done by any citizen, the judge reasoned, it would have
been unnecessary to pass a statute legalizing peaceful
picketing in the special context of a trade dispute.318 The
public had "a right to go on every part of the highway," he
proclaimed, and any act that made passage "less
commodious" was a public nuisance. Conceding that an
obstruction would be permissible if reasonable, he insisted
that any reasonable use of the street must be related to
passage and that picketing obviously did not satisfy that
qualification.319
Although Mr. Justice Forbes decided the case on the
ground of public nuisance, the Court of Appeal affirmed his
grant of an injunction on the alternate theory of private
nuisance. In so doing, the court disinterred and revitalized
the Lyons concept that imposing economic pressure was a
nuisance per se. Further, it extended the concept beyond
the context of a trade dispute to a non-union attempt to
boycott a private company."2 Lord Stamp observed that the
real estate firm might well succeed in showing that the
picketers interfered with enjoyment of property by putting
"pressure on the company to surrender to the defendants'
317. Id. at 154.
318. Id. Lord Gifford, attorney for the defendants, relied on Ward to argue
that the social workers were using the highway reasonably. According to Mr.
Justice Forbes, all Ward decided was that three picketers did not constitute a
common law nuisance. Id.
319. Id. at 150-51. Thus, a court should consider not the "behavior expected
of a reasonable picket, but whether the behavior of these picketers amounted to
an unreasonable user of the highway," and this question could only be answered
by reference to passing and repassing. Id. at 151. Turning to Lord Gifford's
argument that every subject had an inalienable right to picket, analogous to
freedom of speech, Mr. Justice Forbes concluded that "no such general right to
picket as that for which Lord Gifford contends exists at all." Id. at 158.
320. It disapproved the trial court's reliance on public nuisance. Lord Stamp
noted that much of what was said by the judge in the court below was not
directed to the question of private nuisance but was concerned with the extent
of the public's right to use a highway. "In the result I cannot regard the judge's
conclusions of law as a satisfactory application of the law to the facts which he
found." Id. at 180.
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demands."321 Similarly, Lord Orr observed that "there was a
serious issue to be tried" on the Lyons' claim.322
The plaintiffs reliance on Lyons forced the court to
confront Ward, its most recent precedent on the issue, and
the judges adopted the strained position that the two cases
were consistent on the law but distinguishable on their
facts. Lord Stamp insisted that Lyons and Hubbard both
differed from Ward in that the latter case involved only
picketers' attempts to persuade employees to become
members of a union rather than an effort to pressure an
he
employer. "Which side of the line the case falls,"
trial." 323
concluded, must "depend on the facts found at the
Lord Orr agreed that Lyons and Ward were on "two sides of
question was on which
a dividing line" and that the crucial
324
side of that boundary a case lay.
As in Ward, however, the court failed to locate the
supposed "dividing line." Indeed, the fact that it found a
cognizable Lyons claim meant that such a line was illusory.
To follow Lyons and treat picketing as invariably a
nuisance precluded simultaneously invoking Ward's ruling
that a nuisance might or might not exist on a given set of
facts. All three cases were identical in involving peaceful
picketing that exerted commercial pressure on an employer.
Under Lyons such picketing was per se a common law
nuisance, not something that might or might not be a
nuisance; in contrast, under Ward bare economic pressure
was not cognizable as a nuisance at all. The court's
invocation of Ward was in fact meaningless and its
resurrection of Lyons a warning shot to picketers of all
types.
Hubbard was also notable because it found peaceful
picketing impermissible on two wholly separate grounds.
The lower court treated it as per se a public nuisance
through obstruction of the highway, and the Court of
Appeal viewed it as per se a private nuisance through
economic compulsion. In subsequent years both views
would consistently inform the treatment of labor picketing
outside the statutory immunity.

321.
322.
323.
parties,
324.

Id. at 183.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 183. Weighing the balance of convenience between the two
he found it to favor the employers. Id. at 183-85.
Id. at 189.
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The decision included an impassioned dissent by Lord
Denning. Gathering together earlier scattered notions of
picketing as a reasonable use of the highway, Denning
denied that the picketers in the case had committed a
public nuisance:
[T]here was nothing in the nature of a public nuisance here. No
crowds collected. No queues were formed. No obstruction caused.
No noises. No smells. No breaches of the peace. Nothing for which
an indictment would
lie, nor an action on the relation of the
325
Attorney-General.

On the issue of private nuisance, Lyons had "not stood the
test of time."26 It had been superseded by Ward, which
rejected the notion that picketing was unlawful per se. In
the instant case, Lord Denning concluded, there was no
unreasonable conduct because the picketers consisted only
of a small number of young people who had arranged their
demonstration in advance with the police. 27 Courts must
recognize, he proclaimed, "the right to demonstrate and the
right to protest on matters of public concern."" 8
In spite of its generous tone toward protest generally,
Lord Denning's opinion held adverse implications for
unionists. Although industrial picketing was governed by
statute and other types of picketing by the common law, he
observed, "broadly speaking, they are in line the one with
the other."3 29 "Why," he asked, "should workers be allowed
to picket and other people not?" 33° It was, of course, a
question that illuminated starkly the mentality of the

325. Id. at 175. If there was no public nuisance, Lord Denning continued,
there could be no question of an individual suing based on particular damage.
There was also no action in trespass because the company did not own the
pavement, which was vested in the local authorities. They had not complained,
"nor could they, since no wrong has been done to their interest." Nor was there
any evidence of conspiracy to injure. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 172-73.
328. Id. at 178.
329. Id. at 177. He treated Ward as a non-industrial picketing case, noting
that it was decided on the common law of torts, did not involve the picketing
immunity and was handed down prior to the TDA. "It covers picketing, not only
in furtherance of a trade dispute, but also in furtherance of other disputes or
other causes." Id. at 176. He also seemed to suggest, as had the court in
Ferguson, that the statutory immunity had no bearing on the interpretation of
the common law. Id. at 176-77.
330. Id. at 177.
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English judiciary. The obvious answer-that Parliament
had expressly so provided-was for Lord Denning simply
not sufficient. Though he supported a right to protest, his
decision effectively eradicated the special protection that
Parliament had conferred on organized labor."3 '
5. The Legal Significance of the 1960s and 1970s. In
the period 1965-80 industrial strife and provocative
picketing tactics-especially those instigated by secondary
picketers in the context of national strikes-again made
picketing a bitterly contentious issue. Courts adapted and
widened the concept of public nuisance to cover mass
picketing, blocking drivers, and potential nuisances, even
as they invalidated a claim of passage as a defense. In
addition, courts augmented further the discretionary
powers of the police by enabling them to disperse picketers
even prior to commission of an anticipated nuisance. By
1980, in consequence, even a bare handful of picketers
standing as sentinels at a doorway to company premises
was a nuisance that required a special protective immunity.
Correspondingly, courts contracted the immunity to apply
only to this extraordinarily limited type of picketing. They
accomplished this, first, by inferring that picketers who
participated in mass picketing, blocking vehicles, or circling
demonstrated an improper motive; and, second, by
concluding that Parliament only intended to effectuate bare
"attendance," which necessarily excluded these tactics.
Although the traditional immunity still governed the rights
of union picketers, courts had altered its construction to
331. See Bercusson, supra note 87, at 275 (observing that Lord Denning reduced the worker "to the unprotected status of an ordinary citizen"). Lord
Denning was in fact hostile to unions. Even a sympathetic biographer, Edmund
Heward, conceded that Denning was regarded as "anti-trade union." EDMUND
HEWARD, LORD DENNING: A BIoGRAPHY 108, 134 (2d ed. 1997). For example,
when speaking at a graduation ceremony in Canada in April 1979, he stated
that "the greatest threat to the rule of law today is posed by the big trade
unions." Id. at 139. A typical judicial statement of Lord Denning appeared in
Express Newspapers v. McShane [1979] I.C.R. 210, 218 (C.A.), where he insisted
that the words of the labor statute
are not to be construed widely so as to give unlimited immunity to lawbreakers. They are to be construed with due limitations so as to keep
the immunity within reasonable bounds. Otherwise the freedom of
ordinary individuals to go about their business in peace would be
intruded beyond all reason.
See HEWARD, supra, at 138.
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accommodate the realities of reinvigorated industrial
action, fully realizing the opportunities to inhibit union
picketing presented to them by the critical ambiguities of
1906.
As a result of the doctrinal changes in this period, police
enjoyed even greater discretion to enforce nuisance law.
Combined with a swollen nuisance law, the shrinking
immunity meant that by the end of the 1970s public
nuisance was technically available in every case of effective
picketing. Underenforcement was inevitably the norm, and
police were able to employ nuisance selectively in situations
where they perceived a particular threat to social stability.
Their preferred nuisance offense in these decades was
highway obstruction. Industrial picketers were insulated
from private nuisance by the TDA, and certain tacticsespecially stopping vehicles-offered obvious occasions for
the invocation of obstruction doctrine. The availability of
plausible nuisance charges against picketers in every
circumstance of industrial action meant that even where
police and unionists attempted to reach an informal
accommodation, nuisance law provided an additional
weight on the scales in favor of the authorities.
In the 1970s a number of academic commentators
sympathetic to unions-though not generally trade
unionists themselves 332-began to consider the limitations
inherent in a system of immunities and to advocate a right
to picket that courts could balance against the public's right
to passage and the economic rights of employers.333 The

332. See, e.g., DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 4, at 369 (noting that the
Labour Party never seriously considered renouncing the system of immunities);

PELLING, supra note 28, at 81 (observing in 1979 that the unions still remained
largely loyal to their tradition of collective laissez-faire); TAYLOR, supra note 6,
at 170 (stating that there are "no stronger champions of the dogmas of laissezfaire in collective bargaining in British society than the unions"); Simpson,
supranote 5, at 162; Wedderburn, supra note 169, at 509-10.
333. See, e.g., Guy Goodwin-Gill, Judicial Reasoning and the Right To
Picket, 1975 L.Q. REv. 173, 177 (arguing that the right to picket should be a

qualified right, balanced against the right of others to use the highway); Kidner,
supra note 134, at 263 (arguing that reasonable picketing for the relevant
purposes was not an unreasonable use of the highway and that the right to
picket should be balanced against the common law right to passage); Peter
Wallington, The Case of the Longannet Miners and the Criminal Liability of
Picketers, 1972 INDus. L.J. 219, 228 (arguing for the creation of a statutory
right for a reasonable number of persons to picket peacefully and to stop
persons or vehicles).
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judges, however, were not receptive to the notion of
granting positive law status to labor picketing by
recognizing it as a reasonable use of the highway. Indeed,
not only did rigid common law rules on obstruction continue
to govern in the non-industrial context, but the Court of
Appeal revived Lyons to cope with the new phenomenon of
consumer picketing. By the end of the 1970s nuisance law
increasingly held picketers-industrial as well as nonindustrial-in its tenacious grasp. It was to prove even
more useful in the 1980s, when a legislative revolution
exacerbated labor's declining status at common law.
V. NUISANCE LAW AND THE END OF COLLECTIVE
LAISSEZ-FAIRE
In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government radically restructured the industrial relations regime,
bringing to an official close the era of collective laissez-faire:
In a series of anti-union enactments, Parliament removed
the protection of the immunity from large numbers of
picketers and thereby rendered them wholly vulnerable to
nuisance law. Equally important, in the new political
climate judge-made nuisance law flowered luxuriantly in
both traditional and novel forms.
A. ParliamentaryRejection of Abstentionism
Public concern with mass picketing and other militant
strike tactics intensified during the "winter of discontent" of
1978-1979, when unions in both public and private sectors
demanded substantial wage increases, engaged in major
secondary activity,"4 and disrupted essential public

334. See Bellace, supra note 3, at 119. Unions justified secondary picketing
by the need to maintain a balance of industrial power at a time when employers
operated on a "multi-plant, multi-company, and multi-national basis" and the
state played a larger role as employer and manager of the economy. See Lewis,
supra note 135, at 198. The government's Green Paper on Picketing, Trade
Union Immunities, attributed the increase in secondary picketing to easier
transport and communication, greater organization of picketing-sometimes by
unofficial groups rather than union leaders-and the increased formalization of
the closed shop. The report commented that no one in 1906 "could have foreseen
how damaging the scope for organizing secondary industrial action would
become as a result of the interdependence of modem industries and improved
communication." TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 5, 99.
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services. 35 Aggressive strike action and other perceived
abuses of union power significantly contributed to the
Conservative victory in 1980.36 Capitalizing on labor
weakness in a period of high unemployment and economic
decline, the new government quickly moved to dismantle
the statutory framework of the preceding century. A series
of parliamentary enactments replaced collective laissezfaire with a complex scheme of industrial regulation."7 The
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 and the Trade Union
Act of 1984 narrowly redefined "trade dispute," abolished
the immunity of trade unions as entities and revived the
economic torts for mostforms of secondary action and for
strikes not authorized by a secret ballot of the membership.3 8
335. DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 4, at 444, 457-58. Strikers who
aroused the most opposition were road haulage workers who rationed the
movement of essential supplies and grave diggers who delayed burials. See id.
at 444; HOLMES, supranote 219, at 135-46.
336. See EWING, supra note 5, at 149-50; Bellace, supra note 3, at 119.
337. See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 4, at 459; Klarman, supra note 3,
at 1597. According to Labourites, in 1980 Conservatives launched an attack
upon the unions because they were the "main obstacle that stands between
their objective of restoring Victorian capitalism and its realisation." BENN,
supra note 214, at 6; see MICHAEL FOOT, ANOTHER HEART AND OTHER PULSES:
THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE THATCHER SOCIETY 196 (1984) ("[Tthe 1979-83 period
will be seen as a most painful interlude for Britain and the Western world,
when all the lessons of the post-1945 experience were senselessly cast aside in a
sudden but fortunately not fatal reversion to the doctrine of a shameful,
shameless laissez-faire.").
338. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42; Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46; Trade
Union Act, 1984, ch. 49. The 1980 Act restricted the general tort immunities of
1974 and 1976 in three ways: section 16 provided that they did not apply to
picketing except at a picketer's own place of work; section 17 provided that they
did not apply to secondary action unless undertaken by employees of firms that
purchased from or supplied the employer in dispute; and section 18 provided
that they did not apply where a person induced an employee of one employer to
break a contract to compel employees of another employer to join a particular
union. The Employment Act of 1982 eliminated tort immunity for union funds
and narrowed the scope of "trade disputes" to issues arising wholly or mainly
between workers and their employers, thus inhibiting unions from engaging in
politically oriented industrial action such as striking against denationalization.
Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, §§ 15, 18. The 1984 Act legislated a code of
"union democracy," requiring membership ballots every five years for principal
officers and prior to engaging in any form of industrial action. Trade Union Act,
1984, ch. 49, §§ 1, 10-12. Additional legislation in 1988 attacked the closed shop
and prohibited union sanctions against members who refused to participate in
lawful industrial action. Employment Act, 1988, ch. 49, §§ 3, 10-11; see EWING,
supra note 5, at 10-13; Ewan McKendrick, The Rights of Trade Union
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The legislation also targeted picketing because, as a
government report observed, its use in industrial disputes
had been the subject of "widespread and increasing public
concern in recent years."339 The legislation implemented
three major changes in picketing law. First, provoked by a
national steel strike in early 1980 marked by extensive
secondary activity and much violence,34 ° Parliament narrowed the scope of the picketing immunity to cover only
primary picketing at a worker's own place of work.341 This
provision significantly contracted the scope of statutory
protection because labor had begun in the 1970s to direct
much of its picketing at secondary targets.
Second, in a measure intended to encourage employers
themselves to regulate picket lines, the Employment Act of
1982 rejected the basic tenet that union funds enjoyed immunity from legal action.342 This meant that employers

could more easily obtain interlocutory injunctions against
Members-Part I of the Employment Act 1988, 17 INDUS. L.J. 141 (1988);
Kiarman, supra note 3, at 1597-98; Rowley, supra note 214, at 1157-58. The
labor statutes were consolidated in the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act (TULRECA), 1992, ch. 52; the restriction of picketing to a
worker's own place of work was contained in section 220.
339. TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 5,

1 165; see BENN, supra note

214, at 2 (observing that the new legislation was aimed at making effective
picketing illegal); Simon Auerbach, Legal Restraint of Picketing: New Trends;
New Tensions, 16 INDUS. L.J. 227, 242 (1987).
340. See Lewis, supra note 135, at 196. Picketers were arrested for
obstruction of the highway during the strike. See GEARY, supra note 184, at 89.
341. The Employment Act 1980 created a new "substituted" section 15 of
TULRA 1974, which provided:
It shall be lawful for a person in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute to attend (a) at or near his own place of work, or (b) if he
is an official of a trade union, at or near the place of work of a member
of that union whom he is accompanying and whom he represents, for
the purpose only of peacefully obtaining or communicating information,
or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.
Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 16(1). Previously, there had been no distinction
at law between primary and secondary picketing. Workers whose picketing fell
outside the new section 15 also lost immunity from the economic torts, because
the Act provided that nothing in TULRA section 13, which set forth these
immunities, "shall prevent an act done in the course of picketing from being
actionable in tort unless it is done in the course of attendance declared lawful"
by TULRA section 15. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 16(2).
342. Section 14 removed the immunity for acts done by the union itself,
section 15 extended liability to actions endorsed by a responsible person, and
section 16 met the concern that employers could bankrupt a union with huge
damage claims by setting a tariff of maximum awards. Employment Act, 1982,
ch. 46, §§ 14-16.
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picketing in private civil tort actions.343 In addition, unions
that disobeyed injunctions faced criminal fines and
sequestration of assets.344
Third, the government formally validated the
restrictive quantitative approach to picketing in a "Code of
Practice on Picketing" issued in conjunction with the
Employment Act of 1980.2"5 The Code reinforced both
judicial theory and police convention by advising that
picketers should generally not exceed six at any entrance to
a workplace.146 Although the Secretary of State for Employ-

ment insisted that the Code did not define the law but
merely offered "practical guidance,"347 the document had a
pervasive influence on judicial and police determinations as

to when picketing was reasonable.3 48 As a Labour M.P.
343. Prior to 1982 it was procedurally difficult for employers to obtain
injunctive relief in picketing cases because injunctions could be pursued only
against named individuals and in some circumstances employers had difficulty
ascertaining picketers' names. Picketers were not legally obligated to supply
their names and addresses and, because the injunction was sought under the
civil law, the employer could not enlist the help of the police. TRADE UNION
IMMUNITIES, supra note 5, T 172. But see Auerbach, supra note 339, at 230
(noting that even prior to 1982 it was "probably rare in practice for plaintiffs to
experience serious difficulties").
344. See EWING, supra note 5, at 149; MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra note
47, at 30; Auerbach, supra note 339, at 227; Note, The Labour Injunction
Revisited: Picketing,Employers and the Employment Act 1980, 12 INDUs. L.J.
129 (1983).
345. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT, CODE OF PRACTICE ON PICKETING
(1981) [hereinafter CODE OF PRACTICE].
346. Id.
31. The Code disclaimed the intention of narrowing police discretion on the picket line, because the chief constables had stated flatly that
they did not require operational guidance from the government. See Bercusson,
supra note 87, at 227; Lewis, supra note 135, at 200. However, the Code stated
that numbers larger than six were likely to provoke fear and resentment among
those seeking to cross the line "even where no criminal offense is committed."
CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 345,
31. If a picket did not leave a picket line
when requested to do so, the police could arrest the picketer for obstruction of
the highway or obstruction of a constable. Id. 28.
347. 992 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 647 (Nov. 13, 1980). He adamantly
denied that "we are indulging in what some people have termed back-door
legislation." Id.
348. The Code was admissible in evidence in courts and tribunals, see id. at
655 (statement of James Prior, Secretary of State for Employment), and was
relevant to civil liability for nuisance as well as to criminal prosecutions for
obstruction, breach of the peace, watching or besetting and intimidation. See,
e.g., Roy Lewis, Codes ofPractice on Picketing and Closed Shop Agreements and
Arrangements,44 MOD. L. REV. 198, 200 (1981). This may have not been "law as
such," critics charged, "but it operates very like law." Robert Baldwin & John
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remarked on the floor of the House, "the administration of
the criminal law, especially in relation to obstruction of the
highway, is being decided."349 Despite the continuing broad
discretion of the police in matters of enforcement, 30 a 1983
study found that the police regularly applied the recommended maximum of six picketers as the standard legal
norm.351

With the exception of the Code, the end of the
abstentionist regime did not produce governmental
regulation of picketing per se but instead reined in the
immunity and unleashed the general law. Most industrial
picketing was now outside the immunity, either because it
was not primary picketing at an employee's place of work
under the new statutes,' because it involved a nuisance
that was not encompassed by "attendance," or because it
demonstrated a non-immunized purpose. The massive
relegation of industrial picketers to common law status,
conjoined with the greater availability of civil actions and
widespread public hostility to unions, spurred a substantial
increase in suits against picketers. A member of the TUC
General Council expressed dismay that in the first six
months of 1980 more people were charged with picketing
"than in any period in our history for the last fifty
offenses
3 53
years.

Houghton, CircularArguments: The Status and Legitimacy of Administrative
Rules, 1986 PUB. L. 239, 264-65 (observing that the Code was promulgated to
influence the law and courts and officials paid great attention to it); see
Bercusson, supra note 87, at 228 (commenting that with respect to a criminal
trial for obstruction, it did "not require much imagination to forecast the result
when a magistrate takes a relevant bit of the Code between his teeth").
349. 992 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 717 (Nov. 13, 1980). The labor
movement rejected the Code in its entirety. See id. at 655; Lewis, supra note
135, at 201.
350. See EWING, supra note 5, at 145; KAHN ET AL., supra note 6, at 89-90
(noting that the police sometimes used their discretion to turn a blind eye to
obstructions of the highway); East et al., supra note 258, at 306.
351. Peter Wallington, Policing the Miners' Strike, 14 INDUS. L.J. 145, 148
(1985).
352. Even picketing one's own place of work could have unlawful secondary
effects. See Charles D. Drake, Code of Practiceon Picketing,9 INDUS. L.J. 46, 46
(1980).
353. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 389 (1980).
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B. ContinuingJudicialInterventionism in the Early
Thatcher Years: Privateand Public Nuisance
The larger scope of non-immunized common law
operations, together with the possibility of private civil
suits against unions, resurrected the unresolved debate
between Lyons and Ward over whether picketing as a form
of economic pressure was per se a common law nuisance. In
a social and political environment hostile to picketing,
courts accommodated employers by applying Lyons' notion
of economic compulsion-already revived in the nonindustrial context in Hubbard-to industrial actions for the
first time since the early twentieth century.
The breakthrough came in Mersey Dock & HarbourCo.
354 a suit brought in 1981
v. Verrinder,
by the Port Authority
of Liverpool against TGWU members. Picketing the
entrance to two container terminals, the union sought to
ensure that the Port of Liverpool employed only union
haulage contractors by forcing it to boycott shipowners who
hired nonunion "cowboy" drivers. When lorry drivers
refused to cross picket lines, effectively bringing business at
the port to a standstill, the Authority sued in nuisance.
None of the picketers worked at the dock premises and
therefore the immunity did not govern. Applying the
general law, the High Court granted an interlocutory
injunction restraining the picketing as likely to constitute a
nuisance even though "[t]he personal conduct of the
individual picketers appears to have been exemplary."35
Mr. Justice Fitzhugh followed judicial convention in
claiming that Lyons and Ward fell on two sides of a dividing
line; that is, on any given set of facts picketing might or
might not be a private nuisance. In this case, he concluded,
the behavior of the picketers differed from that in Ward
,because the goal of limiting business to union drivers was
effectively an attempt to "regulate and control the container
traffic."35 In finding that picketing to pressure a company to
354. [1982] I.R.L.R. 152 (Ch.). An earlier sign of the vitality of Lyons came
in Thompson-Schwab v. Costaki [1956] 1 W.L.R. 335 (C.A.), where the Court of
Appeal suggested that streetwalking could constitute a private nuisance by
interfering with the reasonable enjoyment of adjacent premises. It cited Lyons
for the proposition that physical interference with property was not necessary
to support an action for private nuisance. Id. at 341.
355. [1982] I.R.L.R. at 153.
356. Id. at 155.
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operate in a certain manner was a private nuisance, the
court paid homage to Ward but, as in Hubbard, actually
treated picketing as a nuisance per se. Exerting economic
pressure was inevitably the object of any effective
picketing. 57
In the bitter Messinger Newspaper dispute of 1983, the
High Court again invoked the Lyons concept of private
nuisance to restrain picketing. The National Graphical
Association (NGA), a powerful trade union in the
newspaper publishing industry with a loyal following of
over 100,000 members, instituted mass picketing against
a
course toofexin theplanned
Newspaper
the
Messenger
358 When Group
the company
dispute.
recognition
pand without a closed shop from its Stockport plant to
associated companies in Bury and Warrington, the union
organized primary picketers at Stockport as well as
secondary picketers at these other locations. The chairman
of the company, Eddie Shah-whom the court characterized
as the unions' "most hated and despised enemy" 59 -sued
the NGA on various theories including private nuisance.
Mr. Justice Caulfield granted a permanent injunction
against the picketing in Messinger Newspapers Group, Ltd.
v. National GraphicalAssociation."' First, he dispelled the
union's immunity by finding that the picketing was not
peaceful and that the picketers' motive was the unlawful
one of compelling the plaintiff to accept a closed shop.36
Second, applying the common law, he identified a nuisance
in the blocked access and the fact that the NGA picketed

357. Verrinder indeed took the unionists by surprise as they did not expect
that their peaceful picketing would provoke any legal action. See KAHN ET AL.,
supranote 6, at 177-78.
358. Messinger Newspaper Group Ltd. v. National Graphical Assoc. [1984]
I.R.L.R. 397, 399 (Q.B.).
359. Id.
360. [1984] I.R.L.R. 397.
361. Id. at 402. He also concluded that there was no "trade dispute" at Bury
and Warrington because the action was an unlawful secondary boycott. Id. at
406. By transferring work from the establishment where the dispute had arisen
to another location, the Messinger Group was able to exploit the prohibition in
the Employment Act of 1980 against picketing at a location other than the
worker's own place of work. It was obviously ineffective for the NGA to assign
picketers to prevent supplies from entering and leaving an empty factory at
Stockport. See, e.g., John Gennard, The Implications of the Messenger
Newspaper Group Dispute, 15 INDUS. REL. J. 7, 15 (1984).
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the plaintiffs premises "with accompanying obstruction.""2

Although the judge did not cite Lyons, he incorporated its
notion of pressuring a company. The picketing, he
remarked, "was an organized, beautifully organized, attempt to prevent the plaintiff carrying on its business. ""'
The increased litigiousness of employers in the 1980s
was also reflected in a growing number of private suits
based on "particular damage" that companies suffered from
a union's obstruction of public passage. In Messinger, for
example, the court found the union guilty of public as well
as private nuisance for its use of techniques of mass
picketing, highway obstruction and stopping vehicles.
Applying Tynan in the context of a private suit, it concluded
that the company suffered particular damage from the
public obstruction because non-striking employees were
forced to arrive early at work and barricade themselves into
the building.3 " The greater ease of civil actions in the 1980s,
362. [1984] I.R.L.R. at 406. The court noted that in private nuisance the
obstruction need not be successful; impeding access was sufficient. Id. The
judge stressed the fact that the strikebreakers endured gestures, shouting,
abuse, veiled threats ("we know where your children go to school"), incessant
phone calls, foul language and frightening episodes such as the shaking of the
minibus in which they traveled. Id. at 402-03. There were determined attempts
to stop lorries entering or leaving the premises. This was " 'mobocracy' at its
worst... a determination on the part of the defendant to wreck the plaintiffs
business because of the plaintiffs refusal to accept a closed shop." Id. at 403.
The court thus seemed to find that picketing that made entering or leaving a
premises less pleasant, such as enduring violence and threatening language,
might amount to private nuisance. See BENSON, supranote 47, at 210.
363. [1984] I.R.L.R. at 403. The court awarded damages of £125,051 and
issued a permanent injunction restraining the picketing. For other
developments concerning the litigation, see CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 212, at
29; Gennard, supranote 361, at 8-14.
364. [1984] I.R.L.R. at 406. Another noteworthy case of private nuisance
was Norbrook Laboratories Ltd. v. King [1983] N. Ir. 306 (C.A.). King, the
branch secretary of the TGWU in Ireland, organized a picket line to protest the
dismissal of seven employees at a workplace for expressing interest in joining
the union. The picketers and their cars blocked access to the building, and
Norbrook sued King, inter alia, for damages in private nuisance and trespass.
The court found that King had committed unlawful picketing by standing in
front of a car, using language threatening to drivers ("we will remember you for
this"), and organizing picketers that were excessive in number. Id. at 324. One
judge observed, however, that a momentary instruction to stop vehicles to
attract the attention of the drivers and put the strikers' case, standing alone,
would be excusable on the "de minimis principle." Id. The court ordered a new
trial to identify the damages arising from the trespass and nuisance violations
as opposed to those resulting from inducing workmen to break their contracts of
employment, which it found protected by the immunity conferred by Article 64
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conjoined with the loss of the immunity, thus generated a
growing number of employer actions in private nuisance
utilizing a wide range of nuisance theories. 65
Despite this new emphasis on employer civil suits, the
government did not abandon its own practice of prosecuting
strikers for public nuisance and highway obstruction.
Enforcement of nuisance law remained a matter of police
discretion, and even in the 1980s the police often declined to
enforce the law strictly. 66 However, in volatile situations
they frequently resorted to obstruction law, especially when
they feared exacerbating labor disputes by enforcing
criminal provisions directed specifically against picketers. 6
In the case of industrial picketing, an obstruction
charge was available whenever the number of picketers
exceeded six. Unions therefore generally stationed no more
than six official picketers at a workplace entrance while
gathering a large number of demonstrators nearby.368 There
was never a strike "where we have had only six picketers,"
one TUC official acknowledged. "[T]hey have always been
attended by a considerable number of demonstrators. 69
of the Industrial Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1976.
365. A scholar who analyzed 38 industrial disputes between 1980 and 1982
discovered that despite the tradition of not using civil remedies, the threat of an
injunction was significant; that is, the Employment Act of 1980 created "live
ammunition" as far as picketing was concerned. S. Evans, The Labour
Injunction Revisited: Picketing, Employers, and the Employment Act 1980, 12
INDUS. L.J. 129, 146 (1983).
366. See, e.g, EWING, supra note 5, at 145; MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra

note 47, at 32 (stating that highway obstruction was so flexible in the case of
stationary picketing that the police effectively "licensed" picketers by not
enforcing the law strictly); Brian Bercusson, Picketing,Secondary Picketingand
Secondary Action, 9 INDUS. L.J. 215, 227 (1980) (observing that "the enormous
discretion of the police on picket lines is not disturbed by any directions or even
advice as to how they should exercise it"); East et al., supra note 258, at 306;
Lewis, supra note 135, at 211 (commenting that in practice the police exercised
a wide discretion, sometimes stopping vehicles so that picketers could briefly
communicate with drivers); John McIlroy, "The Law Struck Dumb?"-Labour
Law and the Miners' Strike, in POLICING THE MINERS' STRIKE 81 (Bob Fine &
Robert Millar eds., 1985).
367. See Bennion, supra note 87, at 72; see also, e.g., BENSON, supra note 47,
at 260 (commenting that the two crimes most frequently committed on the
picket line were public nuisance or its statutory equivalent under the Highways
Act and watching or besetting under the CPPA); MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra
note 47, at 46.
368. See Davidson, supra note 119, at 139; Wallington, supra note 351, at
153.
369. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL
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This ploy may have protected the official picketers, but
demonstrators fell afoul of the strict rules on obstruction
that governed non-immunized strikers.
The stringent judicial approach to unprotected labor
picketers was illustrated in Jones v. Bescoby,37° where Mr.
Justice Forbes applied the strict rules on street obstruction
enunciated in Hubbard to a case of industrial action. During a 1983 strike against Halifax General Hospital, Bescoby
and fellow unionists prevented delivery vehicles from
entering the hospital driveway, and as a result trucks soon
backed up and blocked part of the street. The police
arrested the unionists for willful obstruction under the
Highways Act. Although the magistrates acquitted the
defendants,37 ' the appellate court reversed. Mr. Justice
Forbes reiterated that a person could exercise passage only
when using the highway as a highway, and in this case the
defendants were
372 not "exercising any right to use the
highway at all."
In addition to expanding the use of highway
obstruction, the Divisional Court in the 1980s held
picketers liable for trespass in the first reported decision on
this issue since Larkin in 1908. 373 British Airports Authority
v. Ashton374 involved a 1982 dispute between the British
Airports Authority (BAA) and the TGWU, the union
representing ramp workers at Heathrow Airport. Adhering
to the Code of Practice, the Metropolitan Police permitted
limited picketing at entrances to the airport but not at
locations within its perimeter. Picketers nonetheless
appeared at some of the interior control points, causing
delivery vehicles to turn away. When the strikers defied a
constable's request to leave, they were arrested."' Following
REPORT 457 (1985).

370. Crown Office List 161/83 (Q.B. 1983), available in LEXIS, Enggen
Library, Cases File.
371. The magistrates found that although the obstructions were actual and
deliberate, they were transitory-lasting no more than a few minutes apieceand did not constitute an "unreasonable use of the highway." Id. This case was
one example-Broome and BAA were others-where a court declined to defer to
magistrates' determinations of reasonable behavior, suggesting the strength of
judges' feelings on the issue of picketing.
372. Id. He remitted the case to the justices with a direction to convict.
373. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
374. [1983] I.R.L.R. 326 (Q.B.).
375. The police originally brought the action in the magistrates' court, but
the Airports Authority took over the appeal, apparently as a test case. Id. at
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Larkin, the court concluded that the immunity did not
confer a right to attend on land against the will of the
owner or to suspend the operation of any bylaws regulating
the use of property. Although BAA's private ownership was
subject
to a public right of access that did not include
"access for the purpose of picketing.";36
Reflecting the coalescence of legislative and judicial
activism, the early 1980s thus saw a wider scope for the
common law, a greater incidence of employer civil suits, and
the revitalization of older anti-union cases such as Lyons
and Larkin. The miners' strike of 1984-1985, a watershed in
British industrial relations, accelerated those tendencies
and also generated a wholly new theory of labor nuisance.
C. Picketingand the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985:
The Reinvention of Nuisance
The miners' strike, beginning in March 1984 and
continuing for a full year, was the longest and most violent
industrial conflict in decades. 77 It was precipitated by an
announcement by the National Coal Board (NCB) that it
would close a colliery in South Yorkshire, which fueled fear
that the government proposed to close all pits regarded as

uneconomic at a cost of 65,000 jobs. 37 8 The disorder as-

331. The justices found the picketers guilty of violating Byelaw 5(58), which
provided that no person could remain at the airport after being requested by a
constable to leave. Importing a requirement that the request be fair and
reasonable in the circumstances, the Divisional Court remitted the case to the
magistrates to determine if this was indeed the case. Id. at 330.
376. Id. In a subsequent case, Rayware Ltd. v. TGWU [1988] 3 All E.R. 583
(C.A.), company premises were on a private trading estate three quarters of a
mile from the highway entrance. The union established picketers at the
entrance to the highway. The Court of Appeal, construing "at or near the place
of work" in a geographical sense and a "common sense way," declared that such
picketing was lawful. It should be noted, however, that if the picketing had not
been held to be within the statutory term, the plaintiffs' site could never have
been lawfully picketed.
377. See EWING & GEARTY, supranote 12, at 103; Roger Benedictus, The Use
of the Law of Tort in the Miners'Dispute,14 INDUS. L.J. 176, 176 (1985).
378. See ILD. Ewing, The Strike, The Courts and the Rule-Books, 14 INDUS.
L.J. 160, 160 (1985); Tony Weir, A Strike Against the Law?, 46 MD.L. REV. 133,
137-38 (1986). By 1983 the NCB had a deficit of £485 million and coal had been
heavily subsidized for years. See Edwin R. Render, Comparative Role of the
Judiciary in the 1984-85 British Coal Strike, 16 COMP. L.J. 317, 321 (1995). In
March 1984 Ian MacGregor, Chairman of the National Coal Board, informed
the NUM of the need to close the mines and reduce production. Id. at 322. In
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sociated with the strike was far worse than anything that
had occurred at Saltley, Grunwick or Warrington. Almost
fifteen hundred officers were injured, at least two picketers
were killed and the police worked fourteen million hours of
overtime at an estimated cost of £140 million.379 Culminating in a decisive defeat for the mineworkers, the
strike was probably the most litigated industrial dispute in
Britain since World War Ij8 Both public and private nuisance theories again proved useful tools against militant
picketing.
1. Criminal Nuisance. Despite the new Thatcher
legislation facilitating private civil actions, when the strike
began the government followed the advice of local police
chiefs and relied primarily on the criminal law. Lord
Denning claimed that it was "high policy decided at Cabinet
level" not to use the new statutes but "to call out, instead,
hundreds and hundreds of police."38 ' Direct policing, the
government believed, would allow greater political control
and fine tuning than actions brought by employers in civil
courts. 82 Moreover, treating the strike as a law and order
issue dissociated from industrial relations appeared to be
the best means of mobilizing public support and presenting
state intervention as non-partisan. 83 The National Council
on Civil Liberties described the strike as "the most massive
and sustained deployment of the police ever experienced in
Britain,"384 and the dispute raised the issue of police

the same month the South Wales and other area branches went out on strike; in
May the national executive committee of the NUM endorsed the action of the
area branches, and in June the national executive appointed a national
committee to coordinate industrial action. Thomas v. NUM [1985] 2 All E.R. 1, 7
(Oh.).
379. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 12, at 103; Weir, supra note 378, at
133-34.

380. See Helen Carty, Picketingon the Highway: Nuisance,Harassment and
the Numbers Game, 1985 PUB. L. 542; Ewing, supranote 378, at 174.
381. Quoted in Mclroy, supranote 366, at 79.
382. Id. at 85. The government was pleased by the use of the Employment
Acts in the Messenger strike, but it considered that using them against a
relatively weak printing union at one company was different from doing so in a
national coal strike. During the miners' strike the government exerted direct
pressure on the National Coal Board not to utilize the employment acts. Id. at
84-85.
383. Id.

384. Quoted in Lewis, supranote 135, at 217.
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neutrality in an acute form."' Among the crimes that the
police employed against picketers were the ostensibly
impartial offenses of public nuisance and its statutory
analogue, willful obstruction of the highway.
Early in the strike some police forces permitted strikers
direct contact with drivers, and the National Union of
Miners (NUM) enjoyed substantial success in turning
vehicles back from the collieries. Abruptly changing policy,
the police began to prohibit workers from waving vehicles to
the side and to threaten drivers who stopped their trucks
with charges of highway obstruction.386 In Nottinghamshire, for example, the police interpreted instructions that
picketers should not "impede the free flow of traffic" to
mean that even official picketers had to remain on the
pavement where they could not speak to drivers. 87
Combined with use of their discretionary powers to restrict
the number of picketers to six,388the police transformed the
right to "attend" into the right of a few picketers "to wave
farewell to the back of a speeding Rolice van hurrying
through a massed cordon of officers." During the strike
640 miners were arrested in England and Wales for
obstruction of the highway and 1682 for the related offense
of obstructing a constable."
385. The NCCL pointed to provocative police behavior on picket lines, the
use of thousands of police to ensure the passage to work of a handful of mine
workers, and the extensive use of road blocks to deny the passage of "presumed
picketers." See id; EWING & GEARTY, supra note 12; at 104-12; Bob Fine &
Robert Millar, Introduction: The Law of the Market and the Rule of Law, in
POLICING THE MINERS' STRIKE 1, 14-15 (Bob Fine & Robert Millar eds., 1985);
John McIlroy, Police and Picketers: The Law against the Miners, in DIGGING
DEEPER, ISSUES INTHE MINERS' STRIKE 101, 107 (Huw Beynon ed., 1985) (claiming that military-style policing was aimed not at regulating but at stopping all
picketing).
386. See Fine & Millar, supra note 385, at 13.
387. See MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra note 47, at 177.
388. See, e.g., TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 456 (1985); Baldwin & Houghton, supra note 348, at 264;
Carty, supranote 380, at 544.
389. Blake, supra note 220, at 107-08.
390. See MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra note 47, at 163; see also GEARY,
supra note 167, at 137, 141. Arthur Scargill, the President of the Union, was
found guilty of obstruction at Orgreave. See Weir, supra note 378, at 145. The
government also brought 643 charges under the CPPA for watching or
besetting, the first significant use of this section in living memory. See EWING &
GEARTY, supra note 12, at 109. However, as the CPPA did not carry a power of
arrest, charges of besetting generally followed arrests on other grounds. See
Wallington, supra note 351, at 151. In addition, 4314 miners were arrested
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The miners' strike also saw the first use of a systematic
policy of establishing road blocks against "flying picketers."391 This "intercept" strategy was designed to seal off the
mining communities and impose tight controls over the
number and movement of strikers. If the police were not
satisfied that miners planned to picket at their own work
sites, they directed the drivers to turn around or face arrest
for obstruction. According to an official estimate, in the six
months from March to September 1984 the -police blocked
the passage of 290,000 "presumed picketers. 3
The Divisional Court upheld the intercept policy in
Moss v. McLachlan,393 a case involving a convoy of sixty to
eighty Yorkshire miners on their way to picket collieries in
Nottinghamshire. Although the police had no information
that a volatile situation existed at any of the four local pits,
they stopped the strikers at a roadblock a few miles from
their destination and arrested forty picketers who refused
to turn back. Relying on Piddington, the court held that,
owing to the proximity of the pits and the availability of
cars, the constable reasonably apprehended an imminent
and immediate threat of a breach of the peace. 31 Moss
extended police powers beyond Piddington in that the
constable was not even present at the pit to make a direct
assessment of the situation.3 5 The state, it appeared, was
itself free to obstruct the highway and infringe the workers'

under Piddingtonpowers and 1109 for criminal damage. See GEARY, supra note
167, at 137.
391. See, e.g., GEARY, supra note 167, at 137; Robert East & Philip Thomas,
Freedom of Movement: Moss v. McLachlan, 12 J.L. & SOCY 77, 77-78 (1985).
The legal validity of road blocks was confirmed by legislation coming into effect
after the strike was over. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 6;
see MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supranote 47, at 141.

392. See Blake, supra note 342, at 112; East & Thomas, supra note 391, at
77-78.
393. [1985] I.R.L.R. 76 (Q.B.).
394. Id. at 79. Although Moss required an "imminent or immediate" threat
to the peace, in practice the police stretched the decision considerably. One
roadblock was set up in London to stop Kent miners travelling to unknown
destinations over a hundred miles away in the counties of Nottinghamshire and
Warwickshire. See East et al., supra note 258, at 308-09; East & Thomas, supra
note 391, at 78.
395. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 230, at 227-30 (criticizing Moss for
extending a constable's power to prevent a breach of the peace to a situation
where the constable was not "on the spot"); A.L. Newbold, Picketing Miners and
the Courts, 1985 PUB. L. 33, 34.
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right to passage on the flimsiest grounds." 6
2. Employer Civil Suits. Though the government relied
predominantly on police action in the early months of the
strike, the prolongation of the conflict saw increasing resort
to the civil law.3 The civil initiative came not from the
NCB or any of its major customers-the Central Electricity
Generating Board, the British Steel Corporation, or British
Rail-but from the Read companies, small haulage
contractors with commitments to convey coke from British
Steel's Port Talbot plant to various customers. When mass
picketing interfered with deliveries, the Read companies
sued the South Wales NIUM for damages and an
injunction.398 In April 1984 a judge granted an interlocutory
injunction restraining the NUM "from stopping, approaching or in any other way interfering with the free passage of
the plaintiffs' vehicles."399 The injunction was apparently
based on the plaintiffs' particular damage-the loss to their
haulage business-caused by the union's obstruction of the
highway. 00 When the union failed to comply with the injunction, the plaintiffs instituted contempt proceedings.
0° held that the
The court in Richard Read, Ltd. v. NUM"t
immunity did not apply because the picketing was nonpeaceful secondary picketing. Further, it found union officials guilty of numerous breaches of the injunctions
resulting in "serious interference with and disruption of the
trade and business of both companies."4 2 The court fined

396. Even in the case of minor criminal offenses such as obstruction, during
the miners' strike the courts granted bail only on the condition that a person
agree not to picket except at his or her own place of work. This in effect granted
the NCB an injunction against picketing, and the policy aroused considerable
opposition. See Blake, supra note 220, at 114-15; Louise Christian, Restriction
Without Conviction: The Role of the Courts in Legitimizing Police Control in
Yorkshire, in POLICING THE MINERS' STRIKE, supra note 385, at 120, 124-29;
McIlroy, supranote 385, at 113-14.
397. See Fine & Millar, supranote 385, at 15.
398. See Benedictus, supra note 377, at 177. The NCB did apply successfully
for an interlocutory injunction three days into the strike, but it discontinued the
proceedings and took no further action out of fear of uniting working and
striking miners. Id.
399. Richard Read (Transport) Ltd. v. National Union of Miners (S. Wales
Area) [1985] I.R.L.R. 67, 69 (Q.B.).
400. See Benedictus, supra note 377, at 180.
401. [1985] I.R.L.R. at 68.
402. Id. at 71.
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the NUM £50,000 and, upon the union's failure to pay,
sequestrated its assets." 3 Thereafter picketers ceased to
interfere with drivers at Port Talbot, 40 4 again demonstrating
the utility of private civil nuisance actions encouraged by
the Thatcher legislation of the early 1980s.05
3. Employee Nuisance Suits: A New Synthesis. From a
doctrinal perspective, the most significant case arising from
the miners' strike was Thomas v. National Union of
Miners.41' The decision was notable in two respects. First,
reflecting the prevailing emphasis on the rights of
individual workers, the plaintiffs were not employers but
working miners.0 7 Second, the High Court created for the
non-striking miners a new form of nuisance that fused
theories of public and private nuisance as well as notions of
physical and psychological obstruction. Superimposing
concepts of passage drawn from Tynan and Broome on the
notion of economic pressure developed in Lyons, the court
created a new synthetic tort actionable by a new class of
plaintiffs. This development demonstrated the plasticity of
nuisance law in accommodating the altered goals of a new
government.
The miners' strike was solid in South Wales between
March and November 1984, when a small number of miners
returned to work in vehicles organized by the NCB and
protected by a large police escort. By January 1985, 270 of a
total work force of 21,000 men had resumed work. At each
of five collieries the union arranged with the police to
403. Id.; see Render, supra note 378, at 325.
404. See Benedictus, supra note 377, at 178.
405. See Mcflroy, supra note 385, at 88. The effectiveness of the civil law
was largely due to the plaintiffs ability to obtain sequestration of assets upon a
union's nonpayment of a judgment. In this case Price Waterhouse seized
£707,000 from the union's bank accounts until it purged its contempt fines. See
id. at 89. A commentator noted that the Stockport Messinger, miners' and News
Internationaldisputes demonstrated "that the possibility of incurring crippling
fines or sequestration must be taken very seriously by any union contemplating
the use of picketing as a central tactic in a major dispute." Auerbach, supra note
339, at 227.
406. [1985] 2 All E.R. 1 (Ch.)
407. According to some accounts, the "return to work" movement was
organized by NCB managers and did not actually reflect individual workers
exercising their civil liberties. Moreover, the NCB arranged for the government
to pressure chief constables to secure a passage to work for strikebreakers. See

MCCABE & WALLINGTON, supra note 47, at 131-32.
408. Thomas [1985] 2 All E.R. at 7.
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mount an official picket line at the gates. In addition,
approximately fifty to seventy demonstrators gathered
behind police lines, far enough back from the road to allow
buses conveying the mine workers to enter the colliery
unimpeded. As the buses passed, the picketers and
demonstrators shouted insults such as "you scabby
bastards," "you're dead," and "kill the scabs." 9 The mine
workers sought an injunction to restrain the picketing,
claiming that it involved various offenses including
nuisance by obstruction of the highway.41 °
Mr. Justice Scott thought that the statutory immunity
might cover the six official picketers but did not apply to
the demonstrators, reaching his conclusion on the usual
ground that the presence of large numbers indicated that
the demonstrators' purpose was something other than
peaceful persuasion., n The judge recognized, however, that
merely because picketing did not fall within the immunity,
it was not necessarily unlawful. Its legality depended on the
common law of tort, and on the facts he could not find an
actionable tort. Public nuisance by highway obstruction was
not available because, though the picketing may have
obstructed the highway, it did not interfere with the
workers' access by bus and consequently caused no
particular damage. 2 Traditional private nuisance was also
not possible because the plaintiff workers lacked the
essential prerequisite for suit, a property interest in land.413
Rather than taking the analysis to its logical conclusion
409. Id. at 8.
410. Id. at 1-2. They also claimed that the picketing constituted assault,
interference with contract, intimidation and watching or besetting under
section 7 of the CPPA. Id. at 2.
411. Id. at 20. The union claimed that the demonstrators were not picketers
organized by the union but rather spontaneous supporters. The judge found,
however, that the local lodges had played a significant role in arranging the
attendance of large numbers of persons and that there was no difference in law
between a picketer and a demonstrator. Id. at 25, 27.
412. Id. at 21.
413. In addition, there was no assault because, cocooned within their
vehicles and surrounded by police, the mine workers had no genuine fear of
immediate physical violence. Nor was there interference with contract, because
work was being done as the NCB wanted. Id. The judge did not actually decide
whether the picketing was criminal within section 7, which until the miners'
strike had virtually never formed the basis of a successful prosecution, see
Thomas & Todd, supra note 88, at 379, but he did follow Ward in requiring an
independent tortious illegality for a CPPA violation. Thomas [1985] 2 All E.R.
at 18-19.
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and denying recovery, the judge peremptorily created a new
variety of the tort of nuisance. Lyons had made clear, he
declared, that unreasonable interference with the rights of
others was actionable in tort. Although nuisance was
traditionally confined to activity that infringed on the use
or enjoyment of land, there was no reason why it should not
also protect the enjoyment of other rights such as the right
to travel to work on the highway.
The tort might be described as a species of private nuisance,
namely unreasonable interference with the victims' rights to use
the highway. But the label for the tort does not, in my view,
matter. In the present case, the mine workers have the right to
use the highway for the purpose of going to work. They are, in my
judgment, entitled under the general law to exercise that right
without unreasonable harassment by others.414

Following Ward, he concluded that neither primary nor
secondary picketing was per se a common law nuisance.415
Whether the picketers in any given case were committing a
nuisance would depend on the particular circumstances.
"The law must strike a balance," he declared, "between the
rights of those going to work and the rights of the
picketers."416
The harassment at issue, however, was in his opinion
clearly unreasonable. "A daily congregation on average of
50 to 70 men hurling abuse and in circumstances that
require a police presence and require the mine workers to
be conveyed in vehicles do not in my view leave any real
room for argument."4 7 Given the temper of the local
communities, he suggested, mass picketing was inherently
unreasonable and intimidating.418 To support this proposition he conjured up the specter of "a large number of sullen
men lining the entrance to a colliery, offering no violence,

414. Thomas [1985] 2 All E.R. at 22.

415. Id. at 30.
416. Id. at 22. He noted that the result might depend on prevailing ideas
about conduct. Perhaps it was legitimate in 1896, when Lyons was decided, to
regard peaceful picketing as per se a common law nuisance; but attitudes had
already changed by 1906 when Ward was decided, and by 1985 they had altered
even further. Id. at 30.
417. Id. at 22.
418. Id. at 15, 26. He also stated that mass picketing, in blocking the
entrance to premises, was per se both a common law nuisance and a OPPA
offense. Id. at 30.
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saying nothing, but simply standing and glowering."41. Thus
invoking Lyons' notion of pressure in the conduct of
economic life-albeit that suffered by employees rather
than employers-he set an unusually low threshold for
assessing unreasonable pressure. The suggestion that
"glowering" men constituted a nuisance harkened back to
the "black looks" that Baron Bramwell had found so
objectionable in Regina v. Druitt in 1867 almost a hundred
and twenty years earlier.42 °
Scott's new tort relied not only on Lyons but also on the
doctrine of highway obstruction. The mine workers, he
emphasized, had the right "to use the highway for the
purpose of going to work."4 1' Thomas thus creatively melded
both private and public nuisance into one combined action
that encompassed both obstruction of passage and pressure
in the pursuit of economic interests.
Utilizing Ward as well as Lyons, the decision ostensibly
affirmed a balancing test rather than a predetermined
concept of "reasonableness." 422 Nevertheless, as Scott's
opinion clearly implied, the right to use the highway to go
to work would invariably prevail over the interests of
picketers. In functional terms, therefore, "balancing"
afforded picketers no greater protection than a per se test.
In a political and legal climate inimical to trade union
power and supportive of the rights of individual workers, it
was not surprising that a court adapted nuisance not
merely to restrain picketers but to confer on their
419. Id. at 15.
420. See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
421. Thomas [1985] 2 All E.R. at 22.
422. Scott also adopted the quantitative approach to permissible picketing
within the immunity. Although he acknowledged that limiting the picketers to
any specific number would be arbitrary, he followed the guidance of the Code of
Practice on Picketing and restricted the number of picketers to six. Id. at 26-27.
Many commentators found his use of the Code to be troublesome. See, e.g.,
Benedictus, supra note 377, at 182 (predicting that the new tort of "unreasonable interference" would be proven by six picketers); Carty, supra note
380, at 544-45 (stating that legislation "by the backdoor source of the
Government's Code of Practice appears to have been accepted. The magic
number of six may come to be the dividing line between persuasion and
intimidation .... "); Simon Lee & Simon Whittaker, Rights, Wrongs, Law and
Non-Law: Miner Examples, 102 L.Q. REV. 35, 39 (1986) (claiming that by
making six picketers a condition of the injunction, Scott indirectly gave the
Code's provision the force of law and preempted police discretion). Scott
declined, however, to enjoin the South Wales branch from picketing at other
collieries or at premises other than collieries. Thomas [1985] 2 All E.R. at 29-31.
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adversaries a powerful new cause of action.423
D. After the Miners' Strike: The Disfavored Status of
IndustrialPicketing
Ironically, just as industrial picketers were suffering
from expanded legislative and judicial disabilities, courts
were developing a more genuinely flexible approach toward
non-labor picketers. In the aftermath of the miners' strike,
judges for the first-time considered the possibility that
stationary picketing in non-industrial contexts might be a
reasonable use of the street. Yet they refused to apply this
notion seriously to union activity, leading to the curious
result that non-immunized labor picketers actually came to
hold a disfavored status under the law.
The new relative position of industrial and nonindustrial picketers was evident in two 1987 decisions, one
involving political picketers and the other an industrial
dispute. Hirst & Agu v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,424
a case factually similar to Hubbard, involved a group of
animal rights activists who picketed a fur shop in Bradford.
The Divisional Court, echoing Lord Denning's dissent in
Hubbard, endorsed the view that stationary picketing
might be a reasonable use of the highway rather than a
nuisance. Mr. Justice Otton, for example, insisted that
freedom of protest on public issues should receive "the
recognition it deserves.'
In agreeing that the picketers'
conduct was not necessarily unlawful, however, Lord
Justice Glidewell quickly established that judicial tolerance
would not extend to industrial picketing. He stressed that a
highway obstruction "caused by unlawful picketing in
pursuance of a trade dispute"-presumably non-immunized
picketing--"cannot 426
be said to be an activity for which there
excuse."
lawful
a
is
This same view of the respective positions of industrial
and non-industrial picketing appeared in News Group
Newspapers Ltd. v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades

423. See Hendry, supranote 313, at 162.
424. 85 Cr. App. Rep. 143 (Q.B. 1997).
425. Id. at 152; see Suzanne Bailey, Willfully Obstructing the Freedom To
Protest?, 1987 PUB. L. 495, 499. Interestingly, Mr. Justice Otton had been a
member of the court in Moss v. Mclachlan [1985] I.R.L.R. 76 (Q.B.).
426. Hirst,85 Cr. App. Rep. at 150.
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'82.427 In January 1986 members of the principal typesetting

unions struck plants of The Sun, News of the World, The
Times and The Sunday Times in a dispute over the
introduction of new technology and recruitment of nonunion labor at a newspaper plant in Wapping."8 The publishers dismissed 5500 union members, shutting down Fleet
Street, and moved production of all four newspapers to the
new Wapping facility. The unions initiated mass picketing
of the Wapping plant and other sites, which precipitated
substantial violence429 and necessitated a large police
presence."' In addition to six official picketers, fifty to two
hundred people demonstrated daily and up to seven
thousand persons attended rallies on Wednesdays and

427. [1986] I.R.L.R. 337 (Q.B.).
428. See K.D. Ewing & B.W. Napier, The Wapping Dispute in Labour Law,
45(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 285, 286-87 (1986). Rupert Murdoch wished to cut
personnel by introducing computer-based technology for typesetting. He
claimed that the industry had worked for many years with three times as many
people as necessary at wages between two and five times the national average.
News Group Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R. at 341. The defendants for their part
thought that Murdoch had acted in- bad faith, intending from the outset to
transfer the newspapers to Wapping without the unions and to sack the
existing labor force. Id. A Labour member of Parliament proclaimed that in the
miners' strike "we were told that the dismissals were due to the fact that the
pits were uneconomic, but Murdoch has made £47 million out of the labour of
those whom he has sacked." 97 PARL. DEB., H.C.(6th ser.) 302 (May 8, 1986).
429. The picketers shouted out such threats as "[w]e'll get you" and "[y]ou
can't hide forever," threw missiles at employees and the police and occasionally
broke through police barriers and blocked the egress .of lorries. News Group
Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R. at 343-44. Most employees went to work each day in
a bus protected with barred windows to repel missiles. Id. at 344. The court
found that although some of this behavior was attributable, as the union
insisted, to a "lunatic fringe," some unionists were also involved. Id. Moreover,
the unions did nothing to discipline their members and continued to organize
events in the knowledge that nuisances would be committed. Id. at 353.
430. See, e.g., 97 PARL. DEB., H.C.(6th ser.) 284 (May 8, 1986) (complaining
of the number of officers the Home Office was forced to deploy during the strike)
(Home Secretary); 102 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 579-80 (May 8, 1986) (noting
that 1870 officers were sent to the News International plant and an additional
590 policed a march to Wapping) (Home Secretary). According to the Home
Office, by July 346 police had been injured at Wapping and 1098 people arrested. See id. at 581. Many Labour members objected to the level of police
violence. Tony Benn stated that he had spent four or five hours at Wapping and
saw scenes "that I hope not to live to see again." 97 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)
300 (May 8, 1986). According to another member of Parliament, the
metropolitan police at Wapping "are behaving with intolerable arrogance. They
appear to be unanswerable and unaccountable to anyone." Id. at 327.
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Saturdays."' The strike witnessed a resurgence of
involvement by outsider support groups not seen since the
Grunwick strike ten years earlier."' Demonstrations
impeded the movement of lorries, 3' and the police
instituted roadblocks under their authority to prevent
obstruction of the highway.4 In June seven private
plaintiffs-six corporations and one deputy advertising
manager for The Times at Wapping-brought suit to
restrain the picketing on grounds, inter alia, of public and
private nuisance. 5
Mr. Justice Stuart-Smith applied general nuisance law
because the picketers were engaging in non-immunized
secondary action. Exhibiting the more tolerant judicial
approach to stationary demonstrations evident in Hirst, he
ruled that marches, demonstrations and picketing were not
per se unlawful: "They are, so long as they are peaceful and
orderly, not actionable, even though they may cause some
inconvenience to others."43 In his view, a court should
balance "the rights of those who wish to demonstrate with
those who wish to exercise their rights of passage.'037 The
431. News Group Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R. at 343.
432. Auerbach, supranote 339, at 242.
433. News Group Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R. at 344. At other sites such as
Bouverie Street mass picketers obstructed the whole street, preventing the
movement of people and traffic until the police could force a passage. Id. at 345.
434. See, e.g., 92 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 306w (Feb. 20, 1986). A member
asked the Home Secretary whether he was aware that a major road had been
blocked by a mass of picketers: "When the Queen's highway is blocked in this
way, is it not essential that police remain in the area to ensure free passage?"
Douglas Hurd replied that the police were acting "to prevent breaches of the
peace and obstruction of the highway." 102 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 581 (July
21, 1986).
435. The plaintiffs claimed that the picketers committed four separate
torts-nuisance, intimidation, harassment and interference with the
performance of commercial contracts. News Group Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R.
at 346. The court found that the defendants had committed the tort of
intimidation by issuing threats that employees took seriously. Id. at 347. It also
found a likelihood that the plaintiffs would establish at trial that the unions'
use of unlawful means-nuisance and intimidation in delaying the departure of
lorries-had prevented TNT from performing a primary obligation of its
contract. Id. at 349.
436. Id. at 346.
437. Id. The defendants contended that the obstruction only affected a small
number of people, namely, the plaintiffs' employees. Mr. Justice Stuart-Smith
rejected this argument: "I am doubtful if it can ever apply to obstruction of the
highway, where it may be presumed that those who may wish to pass are
obstructed." Id. But in fact, he concluded, it did affect the public at large, and in
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opinion suggested, however, as had Scott's opinion in
Thomas, that a "balancing" test would never justify
picketing in large numbers. Obstructing the highway by
masses of people, the judge stressed, was not a reasonable
use of the highway but rather a nuisance, and he found for
the plaintiffs on both nuisance theories." 8
Revealingly, the judge permitted controlled processions
along the highway only, apparently, because he recharacterized the participants as ordinary non-industrial
political marchers. Mr. Justice Stuart-Smith stated that
those who took part "in marches and rallies, if they proceed
peaceably along the Highway"-in contrast to the official
labor picketers
and daily demonstrators-were not
"picketing.'"" Similarly, the six permissible picketers were
those who "attend at the plaintiffs' premises as opposed to
any event the plaintiffs' employees and the drivers constituted a sufficient class.
Id.
438. Id. at 347. On the question of the requisite damages for a private suit
in public nuisance, the judge concluded that the corporate plaintiffs suffered
particular damage from the costs of busing their employees and hiring extra
security; in addition, they had lost the services ofjournalists. Id. On the issue of
private nuisance, the judge found that the owners of the land adjoining the
highway at Wapping had a cause of action in private nuisance based on
interference with their right of access to the highway, and it was not necessary
for them to establish particular damage. Id. at 348. The individual employee
suffered particular damage because unlike the miners in Thomas who were
driven into the pit in a bus and suffered no damage, the assistant manager had
to travel by taxi or minicab instead of on foot and felt drained by the constant
pressure of coming to work through the picket line. She also felt unable to leave
the plant during the day for a meal or break. Id. at 347. The court also found
SOGAT guilty of an organizational tort in continuing to organize events with
the knowledge that a public nuisance such as obstruction of the highway would
be committed. Id. at 352-53; see Auerbach, supra note 339, at 237-38 (observing
that this ruling was a departure from traditional tort principles). Mr. Justice
Stuart-Smith refused to find for the plaintiffs on the harassment claim,
agreeing with the defendants that that Mr. Justice Scott should "not have
invented a new tort." News Group Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R. at 348. In his
view it was not sufficient to find an unreasonable interference with the rights of
others, especially where damage did not appear to be a necessary ingredient of
the tort, "unless those rights were recognized by the law and fell within some
accepted head of tort." Id. Inasmuch as Stuart-Smith had already found
particular damage and commission of the traditional tort of nuisance, he
concluded that it was unnecessary to pronounce definitively on the question of
harassment. Id.
439. News Group Newspapers [1986] I.R.L.R. at 351. He defined "picketing"
as "men acting in a body or singly who are stationed by a trade union or the like
to watch men going to work during a strike or at a non-union workshop and to
endeavour to dissuade or deter them." Id.
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peacefully marching or processing."4 ' The right to march or
demonstrate, therefore, did not formally extend to union
picketers. Although the 1980s saw increasing judicial
rhetoric about the need to balance rights to demonstrate
against the right of passage, even judges who adopted this
stance did not consider picketing in a trade dispute to be a
cognizable public "right." The ostensibly more generous
attitude in this decade toward stationary assemblies still
excluded 441labor picketing as a reasonable use of the

highway.

A stunning change had thus taken place over the course
of the preceding eighty years. Strikers had originally
enjoyed a preferred position as compared with nonindustrial picketers based on a specific legislative immunity

that authorized at least limited obstruction of the highway.
Further, at least some judges viewed the legislative
440. Id. at 357. The court in BritishAirports Auth. v. Ashton [19831 I.R.L.R.
326 (Q.B.), also decided that industrial picketing did not constitute a
"demonstration." It held that the strikers did not violate a bylaw prohibiting
"any public assembly, demonstration or procession likely to obstruct or interfere
with the proper use of the aerodrome." Id. at 328.
441. Industrial picketing was also particularly targeted by the Public Order
Act of 1986, ch. 24, which imposed statutory restrictions on outdoor
demonstrations for the first time since 1936. As a TUC delegate and member of
SOGAT observed in 1985, the fact that the government's proposal for a new Act
appeared in May, immediately after the miners' strike, demonstrated that "the
prime target is the trade union Movement." TRADES UNION CONGRESS, ONE
HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 611 (1985); see Hazel Carty, The
Public OrderAct 1986: Police Powers and the Picket Line, 1987 INDUS. L.J. 46,
46; Wallington, Some Implicationsfor the Policing of IndustrialDisputes, 1987
CRIM. L. REV. 180, 180. The government expressly presented mass picketing as
an example of behavior that the Act sought to regulate. See REVIEW OF PUBLIC
ORDER LAW, Cmnd. 9510,
5.10 (1985); Lewis, supra note 135, at 218. As
enacted, section 14 permitted restrictions on stationary street activity relating
to size, number or duration where the purpose was "intimidation" or where
there was "serious disruption to the life of the community." Public Order Act
1986, ch. 24, §§ 12, 14. Some observers noted that moving a picket line even a
short distance or ending it before a work force was due to arrive or leave could
totally defeat its purpose. See, e.g., TRADES UNION CONGRESS, supra, at 610 ("As
we all know, a picket line which is held away from the workplace entrance
which lasts for half-an-hour and which only has two or three people on it is
worthless."); East et al., supra note 258, at 315 (noting that imposing conditions
can undermine a picket as effectively as a ban); Wallington, supra note 39, at
190. The Public Order Act also made CPPA section 7 offenses arrestable and
increased the penalties.from three months' imprisonment or a fine of £100 to six
months' imprisonment or a fine of £2000. It did not resolve the problem of the
appropriate interpretation of the "independent illegality" requirement. See
Carty, supranote 441, at 47.
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immunity as informing the common law interpretation of

reasonable use. By the 1980s, however, three developments
had collectively reversed the respective positions of union

and non-union picketers: the legislative constriction of the
immunity; an increasingly narrow view of permissible
common law picketing, especially the resurrection of Lyons
and the creation of a special cause of action for
strikebreakers in Thomas; and a more tolerant approach to
stationary picketing that excluded the activities of union
members. The evolution of nuisance thus ensured that the
legal status of most union picketers, far from being
privileged, was even more precarious than that of ordinary
citizens.
CONCLUSION

The intersection of nuisance law and picketing over the
past century suggests several conclusions about the history
of industrial relations in England. First, despite the
supposedly "abstentionist" nature of the labor law regime
after 1875 and the existence of a special legislative picketing immunity, judge-made nuisance law continued to play a
significant role in determining the fate of union picketing.
Rather than acquiescing in the scheme of collective laissezfaire, courts utilized nuisance at critical junctures to
circumvent the abstentionist labor statutes. As the Article
demonstrates, labor law cannot be viewed as an isolated
field governed by specialized labor doctrines such as the
CPPA and the economic torts."42 To the contrary, developments in the area of picketing were significantly
determined by the general law of nuisance.
Second, this Article establishes that particular
characteristics of nuisance law made it an effective tool to
regulate labor picketing. It was easily adaptable to judicial
purposes; it imposed on plaintiffs and prosecutors minimal
evidentiary requirements; it ostensibly applied to all persons impartially; and it operated independently of legislative judgments in the area of labor relations.
The elasticity of the doctrine was especially significant.
It allowed the courts to shape its two dominant forms-a
private civil doctrine to protect enjoyment of property and a
criminal doctrine to safeguard public passage-to ac442. See supranote 5.

700

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

commodate changing social and economic circumstances.
Private nuisance first appeared in the labor context in
response to the new unionism of the 1890s, when Lyons
ruled that the infliction of economic pressure was
actionable by employers. Ostensibly interred by Parliament,
the Lyons concept of labor nuisance was resuscitated many
decades later in Hubbard in the context of a consumer
boycott and eventually in Verrinder in connection with an
industrial strike. A similarly innovative process occurred in
public nuisance. When industrial picketing grew in
sophistication and militancy after the mid-1960s, adopting
such confrontational forms as mass picketing and blocking
vehicles, the courts shaped nuisance law precisely to reach
these new provocative types of conduct. Developments in
the two categories complemented each other nicely. Though
picketing was generally a criminal nuisance that the police
enforced at their discretion, in divisive periods such as the
1890s and 1980s private civil suits by employers played an
important supplementary role in regulating picket lines.
Indeed, during the miners' strike the two types of nuisance
coalesced, when the High Court created a new action for
nonstriking workers by synthesizing concepts of private
economic harm and public interference with passage.
The other major advantage of nuisance was its ease of
proof, making it exceptionally reliable as an instrument of
enforcement. Although nuisance was by nature a factsensitive doctrine, in the labor context judges enunciated
per se rules that obviated the need for them to consider
particular facts and often allowed plaintiffs to prevail
without offering any evidence as all. As a matter of private
law, courts following Lyons treated peaceful picketing as a
nuisance per se. Similarly, as a matter of public law, the
judiciary considered stationary picketing to be per se an
unreasonable street obstruction. In addition, Piddington,
Kavanagh and Moss empowered the police to restrain
pickets preventively on the mere basis of an "apprehension"
of potential nuisance. By ensuring that nuisance was
always available as an instrument to control picketing,
these judicial rules maximized the discretionary powers of
the policy in situations of industrial conflict.
In addition to exploring the manner in which the courts
stretched the limits of nuisance law, this Article has also
traced the circuitous but effective process by which they
simultaneously narrowed the protective immunity. A third
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principal conclusion is that the erosion of picketing rights
after 1875 was based on a dual process that involved
shrinking the statutory immunity as well as reinterpreting
nuisance law. Although Parliament in 1906 eschewed a test
of lawful picketing based on the reasonableness of picketers'
methods, courts skillfully reintroduced this rejected approach as part of an analysis of picketers' "purpose." Judges
inferred that "excessive" tactics such as circling, mass
picketing and stopping vehicles belied the claimed lawful
purposes, and they also ratified the police practice of
defining "reasonable" picketing in highly restrictive quantitative terms. The result was to undercut severely labor's
achievement in persuading Parliament to support a
"purpose" standard in the Trades Disputes Act. Further,
the courts drained the statutory "right of attendance" of any
practical significance by construing it to confer only a bare
right to be physically present as opposed to conveying any
meaningful right to influence and persuade. So defined and
limited, the picketing immunity covered few pickets and
sanctioned few actions.
As this Article has demonstrated, the combination of a
widening nuisance law and a contracting legislative
immunity significantly eroded the union "privilege" to
picket in the course of the twentieth century. By the 1980s
most union picketers stood outside the immunity's scope,
yet at common law were unable to benefit from either a'
claim of passage or the more relaxed nuisance rules that
governed stationary picketing in non-industrial settings.
Labor picketers-the formal beneficiaries of a special
scheme of statutory protection-thus came in fact to
possess a legal status inferior to that of ordinary citizens.
These developments, however, were not attributable to
the actions of the judiciary alone. A fourth central argument of the Article is that the legislature, supposedly the
unions' protector against judicial incursions, was complicitous in exposing picketers to the vagaries of nuisance
law. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 and subsequent
legislation failed to clarify the relationship between the
picketing immunity and nuisance, leaving the matter
wholly to judicial elaboration. The Court of Appeal doubtless contributed to the uncertainty by refusing in Ward to
define the scope of nuisance or later to resolve the conflict
between Ward and Lyons, thereby allowing inferior courts
considerable freedom in applying nuisance rules to curb
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picketing. The legislature itself, however, bore significant
responsibility for the erosion of the protection that it purported to mandate.
Finally, as part of a broader inquiry into the political
power of nuisance law in modern English history,4 3 this
Article establishes that nuisance doctrine determined the
boundaries of permissible labor picketing as thoroughly as
it dictated the contours of the more general right to public
assembly. In the labor as well as the more directly political
context, the special features of nuisance law-its elasticity,
reliability and seeming neutrality-permitted subtle but
highly effective interferences with organized popular
movements. Moreover, in both spheres the police enjoyed
extensive independence to enforce nuisance rules, a
discretion that they exercised lightly in harmonious times
but employed rigorously and systematically in contentious
periods.
As a political instrument, nuisance also provided a
pivotal mechanism for allowing authorities to treat groups
disparately, sanctioning the actions of certain movements
while stifling the operations of others. The author has argued elsewhere' that in the 1880s the courts achieved a
doctrinal resolution that recognized processions as lawful
exercises of the "right to passage" while invalidating
stationary assemblies as impermissible obstructions of the
highway. This framework legitimized moving demonstrations by relatively respectable organizations such as the
Salvation Army while justifying the suppression of radical
meetings of socialists, communists and the unemployed.
The labor picketing cases illustrate how the judges imposed
special limits on their own doctrinal formulation. In
addressing the practices of organized labor, they shaded
their own distinction by excluding circling picketers from
the category of "movement," despite the fact that parading
by labor picketers was no less related to "legitimate" travel
than the lawful political processions of other organized
groups. The ultimate logic of nuisance law was not an
abstract "legal" logic but a purposeful social logic.
The disfavored position of unions by the 1980s was both
ironic and disturbing. Parliament had, after all, carved out
for labor picketing a special sphere of protection, yet the
443. See Vorspan, supranote 41.
444. See id. at 976-82.
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judiciary's use of nuisance law had virtually extinguished
this mandated area of insulated conduct. Moreover, unionists were more vulnerable to nuisance than protesters in
general for an additional reason. Not just the state but also
the picketers' direct adversaries-employers and strikebreakers-were able to wield the power of the doctrine. In
circumstances of popular political protest, nuisance ostensibly protected "public" rights; in the labor context, it openly
served, narrow private interests as well. Indeed, the
judiciary created new civil nuisances based on "economic
pressure" and "harassment" specifically to advance private
anti-union economic objectives. By the 1980s the combined
force of judicial efforts to protect interests antagonistic to
labor-the employer's right to conduct business, the
nonstriking employee's right to work and the public's right
to passage-had wholly overpowered the legislative immunity. The history of labor picketing thus suggests that
nuisance was more powerful in restraining labor activity,
and less justified in doing so, than it was in curtailing other
popular movements. One solution to this progressive weakening of the ability to picket might be enactment of a
scheme of positive trade union rights,44 paralleling a movement in the general political context to secure for all
subjects a positive "right to demonstrate."46 However, a
more effective approach-and one more promising in light
of the return of the Labour Party to power-might be to
clarify through elaborate and fully articulated legislation
the proper role of nuisance law in industrial relations.

445. See supra note 333. Discussion of the virtues of a scheme of positive
rights accelerated in the 1980s. See, e.g., DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 4, at
369; TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 5, IT 339-82; Patrick Elias & Keith
Ewing, Economic Torts and Labour Law: Old Principlesand New Liabilities,41
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 356-58 (1982); Ewing, Immunities, supra note 5, at 26-31;
Lee & Whittaker, supra note 422, at 37-38; Simpson, supra note 5, at 192;
Wedderburn, supra note 169, at 515-16. Indeed, some trade unionists
themselves became converted to the idea. As a TUC delegate proclaimed in
1985: "What we need is a positive statutory right to demonstrate and to picket."

TRADES UNION

CONGRESS, ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 610

(1985). However, it was not only the left that supported such proposals, and the
problem remained how to cabin judicial interpretation of such rights. See
DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 4, at 369; Wedderburn, supra note 12, at 515
(noting that discussion could be meaningful "only if the proponents make clear
what kind of right, what kind of strikes, what extent of legality, they have in

mind").
446. Vorspan, supranote 41, at 1014 n.376.

